



MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

BY

Nathaniel Peffer



HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS

NEW YORK AND LONDON

1935



80440277



MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?



MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

*Copyright, 1935, by Harper & Brothers
Printed in the United States of America*

All rights in this book are reserved.

*No part of the text may be reproduced in any
manner whatsoever without written permis-
sion. For information address
Harper & Brothers.*

FIRST EDITION

B-K

Contents

<i>Chapter I. The Issue in the Far East</i>	I
II. Japan's Rise to Eminence	11
III. China, Stake for the Machine Age	25
IV. World War in the Far East	47
V. Japan Strikes	73
VI. Japan Shows Its Hand	87
VII. Samurai in a Factory World	104
VIII. The Japanese Trade Offensive	122
IX. Russia vs. Japan	136
X. United States vs. Japan	154
XI. China—A Battleground	183
XII. Case Study in War	209
XIII. Can We Prevent a Far Eastern War?	223



MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?



Chapter I

THE ISSUE IN THE FAR EAST

THIS is not a book about the Far East. It is a book about war in the Far East, war involving both East and West. There was a time when a book about the Far East could concern itself with Far Eastern countries and Far Eastern affairs. That time is past. Now no book about the Far East which deals only with the Far East can tell the whole truth about the Far East. In the long run and for historical purposes it may still be more important to consider such questions as whether the nations of the East can find their way into the modern world; whether they can adapt their governments, laws, economic systems, education and customs to a machine civilization; most of all, whether China, the most populous race of mankind, can have a regeneration after three thousand years or more of one existence and become again a great country and a vital culture. For the student of history and observer of the human drama these may even be more interesting questions. But for the present they are overshadowed. They must be subordinated to a more pressing question. Will there be war in the Far East? It may already, indeed, be more accurate to ask: when will the war come, and which nations will be engaged at the beginning—Russia and Japan or the United States and Japan?

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

The question is not fanciful or far-fetched, as recurrent international crises of the last few years attest. It is not even new. It is of organic growth with the development of modern civilization and has been forming for years. By the events of the recent past it has been obtruded into the consciousness of the world, and now it can no longer be ignored or evaded. All that has happened since September 18, 1931, when Japanese troops occupied Mukden, in South Manchuria, and began the conquest of an area of some 400,000 square miles, has been notification to the world that the climax in the Far East approaches. Step by step Japan has advanced since then to the goal it has set for itself. What this is can no longer be misunderstood. Japan aims to make itself master, by direct possession or effective hegemony, of all of Eastern Asia. More particularly, it aims to reduce China to vassalage, and it has already gone farther in that direction than is commonly realized in the West. That it will not desist unless restrained is now manifest. That it cannot be restrained except by force is equally manifest. Either half a continent must fall to Japan, with all the consequences that entails for the rest of the world, or there must be war. From these alternatives there is now no escape. They state a harsh choice, for the consequences include the loss by the Western Powers of vested interests established in the course of a century and, still more, of all their prospects of material benefit from the economic development of the Far East, prospects that the evolution of their economic systems has made a condition of existence. On the

THE ISSUE IN THE FAR EAST

profits derived from the exploitation of Asia and other undeveloped continents our economic order was in large part built; without their continuance its maintenance is at the least unlikely.

Under the circumstances the nations of the West are not disposed to let these prospects go by default. Whether they can or not, having regard to the present economic situation, need not be argued at this point. The fact is that they are not willing to do so, as all contemporary evidence witnesses. Russian and Japanese armed forces face each other on the borders of Manchuria and Siberia. Great Britain and Japan are engaged in undeclared economic hostilities over Eastern markets. The United States and Japan confront each other in direct opposition on issues which cannot be resolved by compromise. The United States has never conceded the legality of the severance of Manchuria from China, while Japan has pledged its military might to the maintenance of the pseudo-sovereign state of Manchukuo. Japan has declared its right to exercise a veto on the acts of other Powers in relation to China; the United States has explicitly refused to concede such a right. On the Pacific a naval race is setting in, with Great Britain, the United States and Japan engaged.

More indicative than specific disputes is the general tendency. The drift to conflict is marked and unmistakable, its momentum accelerating year by year. What were once minor questions on the periphery of professional diplomacy are now central motive forces, their influence directly affecting ostensibly unrelated questions such as

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

European disarmament, the balance of power in Eastern Europe, the future of the League of Nations, tariffs and international trade agreements. As Europe was in the years between 1900 and 1914, so now is Asia. Even in retrospect it is impossible now to single out one event or one dispute in those years and say, this is what caused the war, here was the central conflict: if the controversy over Morocco had been settled or Austria-Hungary had not taken Bosnia and Herzegovina, there would have been no war. The World War was the product of a complex of forces all moving in the same direction. So it is in Asia now. Japan's seizure of Manchuria may not be enough to cause a war, nor its claim to an inflated Monroe Doctrine for the Far East, nor its invasion of the English textile market in India. But each of these is itself an effect as well as a cause in a continuing sequence. As in Europe before 1914, a cumulative effect is gathering, already grown to dangerous proportions, as is evidenced by the successive tensions over the Far East in the last few years, always recurring at shorter intervals and each more acute than the one preceding. A shot at Serajevo ignited Europe. No greater a spark may do the same for Asia, with as little warning.

An historical process is in motion in the East. Rather, one may say that one of the tidal movements in history is in process. It is one which is not unpreventable in natural law but which is unavoidable in the circumstances in which the nineteenth century developed. Without taking these circumstances into consideration it is impossible to under-

THE ISSUE IN THE FAR EAST

stand the Far East. It is a fallacy to think of the Far East as something apart and self-contained, as hanging in suspense in time and disconnected from the world. Its affairs and the present crisis are meaningless unless seen in the larger setting. There is nothing episodic or accidental in what has happened in the last few years. There is nothing bizarre in the sudden emergence of interest in a remote quarter of another hemisphere. The Far Eastern problem—and the danger of war in the Far East now—is of the stuff that made nineteenth-century progress, Western expansion and conquest over all the earth, the World War, the unhealthy flush of the post-war years and the paralysis of the years after 1929. There has been an almost direct line of progression from the early nineteenth century to Japan's seizure of Manchuria in defiance of Europe and the United States, to Japan's semi-official claim to a protectorate over China, to Japan's invasion of the English textile market in India and Japan's insistence on naval equality and the formal end to the slender hope of disarmament, if any such hope was left. There is a unity in the history of the last hundred years, and these events are part of that unity.

The governing principle of unity is, of course, the dynamic power derived by the West from power-machine industrialism. The expansive drive which this power made not only possible, through more effective weapons of aggression, but necessary, in order to realize the potentialities of the machine, carried the West in waves of conquest over the earth, first of all in the East. As soon

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

as the industrial revolution had come through its first phase, the higher productive capacity of the machine put a premium on export trade. Led by England, industrially the most advanced and therefore having the most compelling motive for expansion, the Western nations reached out for foreign markets. In order to ensure exclusive exploitation of markets there was an incentive to take colonies. The race for colonies began, accelerating through the last half of the nineteenth century. Before it had concluded, virtually all of Asia, as well as Africa for that matter, had been divided up among a few great empires. From China in particular, since that was the most valuable prize of the East, large slices of territory had been cut away and what remained had the status of a disputed dependency. In this stage, however, the motive for conquest was primarily commercial. European and American factories were turning out ever more manufactured goods and a profitable outlet had to be found for them.

The first stage, that of trade imperialism, merged into a second, which may be called a profit-taking imperialism. In this stage the primary motive was financial. Now imperialism entered a subtler phase. Its object was not to take territory but, by loans, concessions, the establishment of banks, building of railways and "supervision" over the customs and other sources of revenue, to acquire as complete a control over a country as if it were a colony. Hegemony was economic, not political. It did not have to be political. The pressure now was not so much for market for surplus products as outlet for surplus capital,

THE ISSUE IN THE FAR EAST

the unprecedented accumulations of wealth yielded by industrial progress. Investments in undeveloped areas brought heavy returns: terms could be fixed by lenders; the first profits from exploiting virgin resources are always high; developing backward regions by railways, waterways, and the extraction of raw materials enlarges the markets for manufactured goods. It was in this period that China became a diplomatic and financial dueling ground, with diplomacy as the weapon of finance. The Powers were contending not for cities and ports but for the right to build railways, open mines, establish semi-official banks and control public services. When rivalry became dangerously sharp they divided the country into spheres of influence, each Power having monopolistic rights of exploitation in its sphere. This period continued until the outbreak of the World War, itself a product in great part of those rivalries. Germany was threatening Great Britain's economic dominance in the East, as Japan is now.

The war brought a pause. The energies of the aggressive nations were absorbed in a death struggle. After the war they were absorbed in recuperation. There was an interlude in the movement of expansion. The East was given a breathing-space. The recuperation was deceptive, however. The world-wide economic depression came, and with it another change in the motivation of conquest and the working of imperialism. There was a reversion to the earlier stage, when the pressure was for outlet for manufactured goods. In that stage we are now. We are again,

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

as in the middle of the nineteenth century, engaged in international competition for markets, in an international rivalry for control of weak countries as purchasers of our surplus products. There is this difference, however, that whereas in the nineteenth century foreign trade was for extra profit above the normal profit of enterprise, now it is for the purpose of meeting costs. The industrialized nations must have foreign trade in order to maintain solvency for their economic structures and employment for their populations. It is no longer a luxury but a necessity—a condition of survival of the existing economic order. Since the Far East is the largest remaining unexploited market—in China alone is a population of 400,000,000—it is the arena of international contention, the great stake of empire. Hence the struggle to maintain a foothold in the Far East, a struggle for survival.

Into this historical process there has been injected one factor which has not only complicated it but given it its present intensification. This is the emergence of Japan as a world Power. The simple relation of numerous rival Western aggressors and a supine, helpless East as the spoils of successful aggression has been disturbed by the fact that Japan, while remaining geographically Eastern, has become Western in economic motivation, political action and, most of all, military strength. Itself subjected at first to Western domination, it slipped out through the too loose net which the West in its overconfidence had thrown over the Far East and rescued itself. Alone among the Eastern peoples it read the secret of Western superior-

THE ISSUE IN THE FAR EAST

ity. Consciously and deliberately it broke with its heritage of culture and adopted industrialism as the key to power. Having acquired the new instruments of power, it proceeded to use them, not only as a means to wealth and strength but as a measure of defense. It turned to aggression on its own hemisphere because aggression was profitable, materially and psychologically, and also because if it did not do so the Western empires would lodge themselves. Once established in China, they would be in a position to swallow up Japan.

Japan resolved to forestall the West by doing itself that which the Western nations were striving to do, and doing it first. In other words, Japan marked out China for its own possession and use. Inexorably it has moved to attain that end in recent years, its efforts speeded up by the strategic consideration that now the West is at its weakest. The Western nations have not recovered, psychologically, morally or economically, from the World War; they are engaged in a resumption of the conflict which the war failed to settle; they are caught in the coils of the depression. If ever Japan is to realize the destiny its ruling classes have conceived for it, it must do so now. Therefore its casting off of all pretenses in the last few years and its open bid for dominance of China and mastery of Eastern Asia. This is why the Far East has suddenly galvanized the attention of the world. The century-old struggle for empire in the Far East has now become a struggle between the Western nations and Japan over the body of China. It is now drawing to its crisis.

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

Japan will absorb China or it will be stopped by war. If it successfully absorbs China—and inevitably later Northeastern Asia and Southeastern Asia as well—it will wield power second to no other nation on earth, power to which all other nations will have to yield respect, if not more. That it will be permitted to absorb China unresisted is therefore hardly likely. War, then, with whom? The question lies at the focal point of international relations in this generation, subordinate not even to the last stages of the European blood-feud.

Chapter II

JAPAN'S RISE TO EMINENCE

TO ANYONE with an eye for historical trends it must be patent that something has happened in the Far East these last few years that has changed the focus of world affairs. Obviously, this is the emergence to power of Japan. In the long view no event in these turbulent times is of greater significance. Indeed, Japan's rise to power is one of the startling phenomena of our times. It is also characteristic of our times that we should find the phenomenon startling. Thereby is revealed one of the basic fallacies in our thinking.

Japan's rise is no doubt without parallel in history. Eighty years ago it consisted of a small group of islands at the door of a great continent, locked up from the world by a self-imposed seclusion, both ingress and egress being forbidden. Thus it had lived for two hundred and fifty years, in a shadowy æstheticism strangely combined with an exaltation of the warrior spirit which had in itself something æsthetic. It was not so much a nation as a loose connection of feudal principalities with intense local clan patriotism. The way of life of the people was that of the Middle Ages. Forgetting the world, it was by the world ignored until forced open in 1853 as an incident in the sweep of the Occident over the East, but, interestingly, it was opened up by the United States, then a minor figure

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

in world affairs, and not by one of the major participants in the struggle for power. Japan was then too unimportant to count in the moves of the larger imperial strategy. And after it was opened up it was subjected to humiliations and to restrictions on its sovereignty by the great Powers.

Now, eighty years later, Japan exercises a decisive influence in the world. It is one of the great empires, one of the principal factors in the international equation, one which has to be reckoned with in all the calculations of world politics. It can and does ignore both the wishes and the commands of the other nations and itself makes demands which have to be respected. Economically it is so dangerous a competitor as to arouse the fears of the richest and most efficient countries. It has industrial cities which rival Manchester and Chicago, banking systems, trusts, railways, public utilities, the whole apparatus of modern civilization, not the least important part being a potent army and navy. In eighty years from the Middle Ages to the super-power of the twentieth century!

The transformation is prodigious no doubt, but that it is so generally assumed in the West to be miraculous reflects the thought of the West rather than the accomplishment of Japan. There was no logical reason not to have expected Japan to do as it has done, which is to say as England, Germany and the United States have done. There is no reason now not to expect any other Eastern people to do likewise. If there is ground for surprise it is only that Japan has succeeded so soon.

JAPAN'S RISE TO EMINENCE

For generations we of the white race have been under the spell of a myth which has almost religious compulsions. It is that we have been tipped by divine fire and endowed with the secret of omnipotence. And because we have actually succeeded in establishing our supremacy over all the earth there has been bred a conviction of racial superiority which almost has the fixity of hypnosis, the conviction that is the premise of most of our social thinking and the ground of all of our collective action. In truth, however, there is nothing supernatural or of divine ordination in the means by which we have come to power. The discoveries of science and their application to production in the form of machinery—our technology, in other words—are all that have made us great. By our technology we have been enabled to exploit natural resources and convert them into finished products in a quantity which has given us our fabulous wealth and therefore our opulent cities, our magnificent physical structure, our magical means of communication, our comforts and luxuries, even our control of disease. By our technology also we have been enabled to forge weapons before which other peoples were helpless—our fast ships, heavy artillery and, latterly, airplanes, submarines and poison gases. Thus may be explained our partial conquest over nature and complete conquest over the world. Science and its application are mainly what differentiate us from the rest of the human race and all that differentiate us from ourselves five hundred years ago, when by comparison with the East we were a backward people. What

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

is assumed to be an eternal dispensation, part of the natural order of the universe, has a simple and material explanation. It is not divine and it may be only transitory.

The discoveries of science were not secret. They were not held as craft mysteries. And there is nothing mystical or magical in the operation of machinery, nothing which cannot be mastered by any people which has passed the primitive stage. No peculiar racial traits are requisite. The assumption that the benefits of the advance of science could remain forever a racial monopoly not only was groundless in reason but has been proved fallacious by the event. The most conspicuous refutation is Japan. The Japanese have acquired technology and all that flows from it. They, too, have diminished the area in which nature was beyond man's control. They have amassed great wealth. They have forged the weapons which make them invincible against those not similarly equipped—the Formosans, the Koreans and, most notably, the Chinese. Here in fundamentals lies the explanation of what has been happening in the Far East. Here may be found the force which gives direction to all contemporary international relations and which, further, may be undermining the economic system of the West.

Consider all that is revealed by one fact. British trade supremacy is being successfully challenged by Japan throughout the East as well as in British imperial possessions elsewhere. In particular the Japanese are taking away the textile trade, which has been traditionally England's and on which England's economic position has been

JAPAN'S RISE TO EMINENCE

based. And practically all Japan's cotton mill machinery is of British manufacture, sold to Japan by British manufacturers. That fact states in miniature the political, social and economic evolution of the last hundred years to the point reflected in the Far East by Japan's seizure of Manchuria and overlordship in North China, in the East generally by Japan's successful commercial offensive and in our own countries by economic stagnation.

It was not altogether out of shortsightedness or innocence that the British equipped the Japanese mills with their own machinery. In part, to be sure, it was the expression of the delusion of superiority, the complacent assumption that we never should have anything to fear from the rivalry of the lesser breed, in the Kipling phrase which like so many Kipling phrases is so expressive of the spirit of the time. Parenthetically, the social history of the end of the nineteenth century might be written around the fact that Kipling was its voice. But the delusion of superiority was not the only reason. Necessity was another, a still weightier one.

In principle the paradox of plenty had manifested itself before 1929. It is new only in that it makes itself felt more forcefully and that it is more generally recognized. From the point of view of enterprise for profit surplus production has been a threat to economic equilibrium or a goad to economic aggression since the middle of the nineteenth century: surplus, that is, as measured not by need but by income available for absorption of the product. The threat was easy to evade in the earlier stages

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

because there were always areas open to aggression, first near at hand and then at a distance. When, for example, the productivity of the English textile mills became too great for the English public to absorb, for lack of widespread income, the English textile manufacturers sent their exports into Germany, underselling the more costly handicraft product. When Germany and the rest of Western and Central Europe defended itself first by tariffs and then by industrializing, the English reached out to other continents. And when all Western Europe had come to the same industrial stage it followed England in seeking outlet on the other continents. Thus Europe and later America always managed to push off the threat which surplus presented.

The backward regions of the earth, in other words those which had not yet industrialized and lacked the technical knowledge and proficiency to do so, served as a safety valve for the European economic system. It was a role that they could not fill permanently even if they had remained willing. To illustrate there may be taken a favorite platitude of after-dinner oratory in the Far East twenty years ago. If only, it used to be said, the 400,000,000 Chinese would lengthen their cotton gowns by one inch and buy one garment a year: 400,000,000 Chinese, 400,000,000 gowns, 400,000,000 more inches of cotton goods bought—boundless prosperity for Lancashire and New England! It was an alluring picture but it contained some serious flaws. How could the Chinese pay for the extra cotton goods? With what could they

JAPAN'S RISE TO EMINENCE

pay? No country organized on a decentralized handicraft economy has a large supply of liquid capital or mobile credit. China could not pay with gold or silver; it did not have enough of either. It could not pay by exchanging its own manufactured products because, being unindustrialized, it had no surplus to export. It could pay only with raw materials or by borrowing from the countries from which it bought.

To both these courses there is a limit. As to the first, no country which is undeveloped can export raw materials in large quantity. Being undeveloped, it has not the technical skill required to extract them and, moreover, lacks the means of transportation for bringing them economically to ports of embarkation. As to the second, obviously there can be no profit in selling goods to a country and lending it the money with which to pay, except as a temporary expedient. In short, until a country's capacity to pay is increased, its potentiality as a market cannot be raised. This is a truism—a truism which has been a motive force in international economic relations for almost a century and which is now at the heart of our economic difficulties.

As a matter of fact we did take measures to increase the capacity of China to pay, as well as other countries like China. We did so by developing their resources. We had to do so in order to market our products and we could. For machine production had yielded not only a surplus of goods but a surplus of capital. Surplus capital sought profitable outlet no less than surplus goods, and

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

the exportation of capital helped the exportation of goods. Investing money in backward countries to build railways, open coal and iron mines, construct harbors and set up factories was profitable in itself, and indirectly it increased the profits of the same classes in the lending countries, since it opened up a wider area for penetration by trade. It created wealth in the borrowing country; it gave employment; it established new and more active commercial centers in which new habits were formed by the native people and demands for new commodities stimulated. To start a textile mill in Japan or China or India provided a more economical means of supplying the native demand, since transportation costs were saved, local raw materials could be used and, most of all, native labor was cheap and unprotected by the kind of social legislation which could be used and, most of all, native labor was cheap. Also it provided an export market for machinery of all kinds, a need which became more pressing after industrialism became more highly evolved. Districts with textile factories soon wanted other factories for the milling of flour, the making of cement, canning of foods, electric light, telephones, good roads, modern houses. And we did start such factories, and they had the desired results. We did increase the capacity of the backward countries to pay for our goods, and thus we increased our exports and our prosperity.

There was another result, however. The picture of the Chinese and the extra 400,000,000 inches had one more flaw, a fatal one. Even assuming that the Chinese could

JAPAN'S RISE TO EMINENCE

have paid for the additional material, what reason was there to expect that they would not learn to make it for themselves? The operation of a power loom can be learned by anyone of moderate skill; again, there is no secret formula. To the contrary, we did our best to transmit the skill—because we had to. We started factories among them; we trained operatives and foremen among them; we used all the pressure of salesmanship to induce them to buy spindles and looms. By the wealth we flaunted, whether as nations or as individuals residing among them on a standard of living which seemed to them as the way of the demigods, we offered temptation. Why should not they, too, enjoy fabulous wealth and ease and power, and incidentally substitute the pressing of a lever for backbreaking labor? Why should not they themselves industrialize?

They did, or are doing so—India, China, Japan and other Eastern countries, but more particularly and most effectively Japan. When Commodore Perry of the United States Navy sat behind his guns and ceremoniously but firmly persuaded the Japanese to sign a treaty opening their ports to foreign trade, the calm of the little islands was forever shattered. The Japanese were first stunned and then outraged, but after fifteen years of violent protest they made their peace with their fate. As they recognized the inevitable when Perry's cannon pointed at the harbor of Yedo (the modern Tokyo) and gave him what he demanded, so they recognized the inevitable after bombardments, indemnities and demands for apologies

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

by the various Western Powers demonstrated the futility of resistance without the means. They drew the correct inference: the Western Barbarians were irresistible except on their own terms. They also, as has been said, were unique in the East in that they drew correctly the deeper inference: the invincibility of the West was not one of weapons alone. It derived from a form of civilization and social organization. To build or buy fast ships and guns was not enough. It was necessary also to acquire the knowledge, the instrumentalities, the system of production, the way of life of which the weapons were a product and a part. They proceeded to do so.

In 1867 the dual government of Shogun and Emperor was abolished and power restored to the Emperor. Under the impetus and leadership of a group of extraordinary men there was taken a succession of decisions and measures to execute them which constituted a social revolution. Feudalism was abolished. Missions were sent to Europe and the United States to observe, to compare and to select. Young men were sent everywhere in the West for technical training. Experts were engaged from various countries to plan, organize and set up medical schools, banks, factories, engineering works, telegraph systems, railways. Within a few years there were a modern school system, modern banks, railways, universities, hospitals, a legal code, a constitution, compulsory military service and the beginnings of a navy. Trade was stimulated. Machinery was imported. A merchant marine was started which, like many similar enterprises, was given

JAPAN'S RISE TO EMINENCE

the benefit of government subsidies. Corporations were organized on the Western model, with the advantages of large capital, and strategically situated cities became the nuclei of great industrial centers.

By the last decade of the century the foundations were securely laid for a modern state and an economic order based on industrialism. They were, it is true, overlaid on the old order as a kind of superstructure without any attempt to join or fit or mold the new into the old. There were in consequence creaks and strains which have not been eased to this day. Japan's growth may have been phenomenal, but it may also have been socially unhealthy. The lack of inner balance reveals itself today in the inequitable distribution of burdens, especially in the plight of the lower middle class and the peasantry. For all larger purposes, however, Japan had become a part of the Western social system. Its industrial apparatus may have been a superstructure, but from this came the country's only dynamic force. From then on it was to set the course the country would take, internally as well as externally. Culturally Japan could thenceforth be classified as Western. It felt the same pressures as any Western country. Its springs of action came from the same source. And it was to occupy the same role in world affairs.

At first the Western Powers were little affected, or, if at all, then not adversely. Japan was wholly absorbed in its own reconstruction and development. Its industrial capacity was taxed by its own needs. Appetites were being whetted for Western goods beyond its own capacity to

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

satisfy them—for Western clothes, hats, shoes, furniture, stoves, soaps, locomotives, steel, machinery to equip factories and capital goods generally. Thus the market in Japan for imports from Europe was appreciably enlarged. In general it may be said that a country which is beginning to industrialize, so far from offering competition to countries already developed, works instead to their advantage. Only when its own development is well advanced does it threaten their economic security. An analogy may be drawn between Japan's relation to the whole West and America's relation to Europe. Europe waxed on the development of the American continent. It exported capital for investment in the United States and sold machinery and finished products in exchange for food and copper and other raw materials. Not until after the turn of the twentieth century did it have to become aware of the United States as a prospective competitor. America was still fully engaged in providing its own needs. Not until after the World War had Europe anything to fear. Japan in 1900 was as the United States fifty years earlier. The West did not have to be economically aware of Japan except as a market and source of profit.

Time passed in the East, too, however. Once the foundations for industrialization are securely laid, advancement goes by geometric progression. Japanese bankers were learning finance. The technicians were becoming expert. Workmen were acquiring skill. The ability to organize on a large scale, the touchstone of success in modern enterprise, was maturing with practice. A genera-

JAPAN'S RISE TO EMINENCE

tion was growing up which had been educated in modern schools. Japan was making rapid material progress. Even so, in the normal course a much longer time would have been required for fruition, had it not been for the advent of the World War, which foreshortened economic evolution in Japan as elsewhere in the world. Europe's withdrawal as a producer not only threw Japan on its own productive resources but left open to Japan the Eastern market previously pre-empted by Europe. Furthermore, the war demands made the belligerent Powers search the whole world for sources of supply. Instead of supplying Japan's demands Europe demanded Japanese products. Japan boomed. There were all the excesses of boom periods and much of the growth of the war years was rootless and soon withered. But much remained that had had time to take root, and it was later to flourish. Again, the analogy with the United States holds. The end of the war found Japan a full-fledged industrial country and economically a world power.

The inseparable accompaniments of that culmination were to make themselves felt both within Japan and without. It was no longer to be said that the West was little affected. For Japan had then all the needs, incentives and drives of an industrial country. More than any other country it needed raw materials, in which it is seriously deficient. It needed markets. Its great banks, trusts and trading houses were accumulating excess capital which sought the highest returns, and, as everywhere else, sought foreign outlet when internal development had passed a cer-

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

tain point and the law of diminishing returns was setting in. In other words, Japan had the same motives for expansion as any of the European Powers two generations earlier. How much was need and how much the appeal of the opportunity for quick profits is as difficult to apportion for Japan as for Germany, England and later the United States. The motive was no less compelling, whatever its constituent elements might be. Finally, Japan had by now the means to act on its motives. It had equipped and trained an effective army and navy. As Europe reached out to the undeveloped continents after the first potentialities of industrialism had been realized at home, so did Japan. There was this difference: Japan was at the door of one of the undeveloped continents. It is an island group lying off the coast of Asia. Hence these last few years and the situation that is now called the crisis in the Far East. Japan has reached out.

There is nothing adventitious in this crisis. Japan has come to power and a position of challenge. There is nothing miraculous in Japan's attainment of that position. Japan has acquired the instrumentalities of power as power is determined in the twentieth century. That which has happened in the Far East to shift the focus of world affairs is that which happened earlier in the West: the discoveries of science, the invention of machinery to make use of them, machine industrialism and the economic, political and social consequences. In essence what really has happened in the East to bring us to the point of wars is that the twentieth century has succeeded the nineteenth.

Chapter III

CHINA, STAKE FOR THE MACHINE AGE

JAPAN, like the other industrialized countries, reached out to the undeveloped continents, with the advantage that it was just off the coast of one of them. Something more was involved, however, than a matter of commercial advantage. This alone would have produced international complications. What intensified the complications was that the Western countries had already established themselves on that continent. All the great Powers had already entrenched themselves in Eastern Asia. They had won favored positions geographically, politically and economically. To England, forcing its way into India and China, Asia was still a free field for exploitation. To Japan it was already ear-marked territory. In fact, it had been disputed ground long before Japan entered the arena. The entrance of Japan only added one more contestant who by advantage of situation was to bring decision nearer.

It is futile to attempt to understand the origin, motivation and significance of Japan's incursion into Manchuria and Mòngolia since 1931 without taking into account the background of the preceding ninety years. The League of Nations attempted to do so in its effort to settle the conflict that arose in 1931 and for that reason it failed. It proceeded on the assumption that the conflict was an

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

incident, whereas in truth it was only one event in a sequence of related events by which it was determined. The defense offered by Japan at Geneva was unconvincing not only because it was intrinsically weak but because the ground on which it bases its real defense was never touched. The background of the offense with which Japan was charged was left entirely out of the proceedings, for which reason the proceedings were artificial and the result was negative. A verdict was found against Japan, and it was ignored. Japan acted as if there were no League of Nations.

The Far East was disputed territory long before Japan became an active participant. This is the governing fact in the Far East. Nothing that concerns the Far East itself or the acts of other nations in the Far East can be understood except in relation to that fact. What Japan has just done, what it aims to do, is one point in a continuity. The setting of the dispute is China, and the goal has been possession or domination of China. The issues in the Pacific are mixed, but all take their key from the question of the ultimate disposition of China. The Philippines, British Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, even Siberia, are pendant to the fate of China. With the mastery of China goes the mastery of all Eastern Asia—if, that is, China is to be mastered at all.

On the mastery of China, then, all international politics in the Far East has turned since there has been international politics in the Far East. And the end has come nearer to attainment than political aims usually come. If

CHINA, STAKE FOR THE MACHINE AGE

China has escaped subjugation long before now, it has not been for lack of the attempt or the desire or because of China's ability to resist but rather because of the indecisive rivalry of those who aspired to conquest. No one of the Powers was able to eliminate the others. None of them was able to levy a preponderance of strength in the Far East. Japan comes nearer to doing so now than any other Power which has had ambitions for conquest in China. This is why the menace to China is greater now than it ever has been and why therefore the anxiety of the other Powers has been sufficiently stirred to produce again the kind of tension that existed in the Far East about 1900 or until Russia was eliminated by the Russo-Japanese war.

It is not necessary to dwell at length on the foreign aggressions against China. The story is now well known and is contained in all the standard texts. The details are of less importance than the cumulative result—the laying of the background for the present. From 1800 onward China has been under continual pressure from one Power after another, sometimes from a combination of Powers or two rival combinations of Powers. Always it has had to yield. At first the West pressed merely for the right to trade. Whether from arrogance, insularity or a sound instinct that the West had better be kept at a distance, China refused. Undoubtedly all three entered, all with some justification. Arrogance was not unreasonable, since China in the eighteenth century under the Emperors K'ang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung was as magnificent an empire as existed

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

at the time and at least as highly civilized. Insularity was not unnatural, since China occupied the larger part of a continent, shut off by ocean, mountain range and desert, a world unto itself. Fear was not misplaced, since the account which the white travellers had given of themselves in the East since 1500 was noxious. The predacity of the European voyagers, adventurers and traders on the Asiatic coast has been surpassed only in Central and South America. Their conduct had served as forewarning. In any case China refused to permit foreign trade or admit foreign residents or even accept foreign diplomatic representatives. Usually it also stated its refusal insultingly.

From the latter part of the eighteenth century through the early part of the nineteenth century the controversy grew, aggravated by the opium question. For the stuff of foreign trade in China was mainly opium. Although the importation of opium had been prohibited by the Chinese government, since the destruction wrought on the race by the drug habit was evident, the Europeans, especially the English, were driving a flourishing business in it. The English were growing opium in India and, since it was a government monopoly, were paying at least part of the cost of ruling India out of the profits on the sale of opium; and China had already proved itself to be the most profitable market for opium. Supplies were brought into the isolated trading post at Canton which China had allowed as a concession and from there smuggled into the country or passed through the connivance of corrupt Chinese officials. The quantity of opium coming into the country in-

CHINA, STAKE FOR THE MACHINE AGE

creased steadily; the opium habit became widespread in China; the Chinese government protested; and simultaneously the foreigners became more urgent in their insistence on unrestricted commerce, the more so as the demand for opium grew and therefore the potentiality of profits. The foreigners stated their case in terms of principle: the inherent right of free intercourse between nations. The Chinese based their position on the application of the principle, which was a traffic in drugs. The merits of the controversy have been mooted for a hundred years; it is a dead issue now and can be passed over. Both sides were right and wrong. In principle China was wrong. But the technical justice of the foreigner's case was smirched by the dirty nature of the business that was at stake.

A combination of factors brought the issue to a head. The decisive one was that the West was already on the upsurge and would brook no suppression. China remained adamant, overconfident, in its ignorance of what was happening in the West, of its ability to deal with the white barbarians. The crisis was precipitated when a Chinese official at Canton confiscated a large quantity of opium and destroyed it. England went to war.

China's complacency was short-lived. The forts of Canton crumbled before the English guns and in 1842 China was compelled to sign a treaty whereby Hongkong was ceded to England, five Chinese ports were opened to foreign trade and an indemnity was paid for the confiscated opium. In supplementary treaties with England and other

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

Powers, the United States among them, China was forced to make concessions which later were expanded to include the right of the foreign Powers to fix China's tariff and of foreigners to live in China under extra-territoriality, that is, exempt from Chinese legal jurisdiction. There was included also the most-favored-nation privilege, whereby every right granted to one Power was automatically granted to every other Power. It was under these latter provisions that the Powers subsequently managed to fasten the equivalent of an international control on China.

China submitted but rebelled against fulfillment of its obligations, conceiving them as not binding since exacted under duress. It put various obstacles in the way of foreign trade, obstructed the movements of foreign residents and by every possible device sought to negate the privileges it had granted. The Chinese in the ports opened to foreigners, especially those at Canton, showed their resentment and there were numerous personal clashes. In short, the controversy had been further rankled rather than appeased and a minor incident led to another war in 1856, this time France joining England. The result was again a foregone conclusion but before China could be forced to accede to the demands of the allied Powers their troops had to land in the northern port of Tientsin and march overland to Peking, where incidentally they were guilty of considerable vandalism. In 1860 China finally ratified a peace treaty which opened more ports to foreign trade, ceded more territory to England and accorded to foreign governments the right to establish legations in

CHINA, STAKE FOR THE MACHINE AGE

Peking. It was this treaty also that legalized both opium and Christian missionaries, the irony being unconscious. Thenceforth both had free entry into all parts of China, by virtue of the same treaty.

The spoliation of China then began. Appetites had been whetted. For one thing, China was obviously easy prey in spite of its size. Moreover, the West was feeling its power and the need to use it. Railways and steamships had accelerated the momentum of the progress of industrialism. Machinery had become more generally used, more ingenious and more productive. Europe and America were themselves undergoing transformation, less sudden and less dramatic than Japan's but none the less complete. They needed wider range and China was demonstrably open and defenseless. Within the next thirty years Russia had obtained concession of sovereignty over Eastern Siberia north of the Amur River, France seized piece by piece what is now French Indo-China and Great Britain detached Burma. There was small pretense of justification, not even search for provocation. They could take, and they did.

By the last decade of the century the tide of Western imperialism was in full flood. Africa was being cut to pieces. The Near East was staked out or maneuvered over. Every island in any ocean with a trace of natural wealth was seized by force or chicane. And just then China's disastrous defeat by Japan demonstrated that it was ripe for the plucking. Then began what was known as the Battle of the Concessions in China. Germany took

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

one strip of territory. To counter-balance that Russia took another. To counter-balance that in turn England had to be given one, and then France. Sometimes the convenient murder of a missionary or foreign traveller provided a pretext, sometimes the formality of pretexts was dispensed with. But alienation of territory was thereafter to play a smaller part. There were more effective forms of aggression that were less inconvenient, entailed a smaller expenditure of effort, troops and money and had the additional advantage of not requiring pretexts before and explanations after.

By now the technique of financial penetration was evolved. There was no need to incur the trouble and expense of garrisoning and administering an area if a firm grasp could be fixed on the arteries of its economic life. Therefore it was enough to have a mortgage on the government's revenues, to own or control its railways, harbors and communications facilities and to direct its banks. As has been said, this was the period of finance imperialism, which was not only more successful than territorial imperialism but had the advantage that it offered a field for the profitable employment of the surplus wealth that had accumulated in the industrially developed countries. The spearhead of financial penetration was the loan. Money could be lent to extricate an impoverished country from its chronic difficulties. The temptation was appealing to the borrowing country or at least to its officials. Thus they could be relieved of their more onerous responsibilities and, besides, in countries in which the formalities of par-

CHINA, STAKE FOR THE MACHINE AGE

liaments and budgetary explanations were lacking, a proportion of every loan could be diverted to the personal enrichment of the officials who negotiated with the foreign lenders. Otherwise money could be lent for the building of a railway or the exploitation of mines, a mortgage being taken on the railway or mine by way of security and the profits of the enterprise going to the lenders.

In China, as in Egypt, Turkey and elsewhere, the rich and strong countries of the West came proffering loans. If there was reluctance to accept, the loans were pressed, sometimes with moral suasion and sometimes with threats of gunboats. Russia and France obtained the grant of a loan to enable China to pay off an indemnity for a lost war. Thereupon England and Germany claimed the right to make a loan and succeeded. When Russia won the concession of the right to build the Chinese Eastern Railway across North Manchuria—the line over which Japan and Soviet Russia have been at deadlock since 1933, although eventual possession by Japan is inevitable—the French and Belgians demanded the right to build one in Central China. When China had to yield, England demanded, with the forcefulness of an ultimatum, concessions for railway construction in various parts of the country. When China yielded to that, Germany asserted itself. It, too, had to be satisfied with concessions. When England insisted upon and won China's consent to English supervision over the Chinese customs, France demanded and obtained supervision over the Chinese Post Office. Spheres of influence were staked out by England, Ger-

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

many, France and Russia, each binding itself not to entrench on the sphere of any other. Thus the balance of power was maintained, a diplomatic euphemism for temporary stalemate: no one country dared to defy all the others and all of them were not yet ready for decision by war. Thus also Chinese sovereignty was being whittled away and China was becoming a subject nation, with the added disadvantage of having several quarreling masters to serve.

China was losing its sovereignty not only as an abstract political concept. The country was made to feel its servitude concretely and materially. The government was cowed, its officials supinely doing the bidding of foreign military and diplomatic representatives in fear of incurring their wrath and inviting punitive measures. Its economic life-blood was canalized to flow to centers from which the foreigners drew enrichment. Its people had to step out of the foreigner's way, literally and figuratively. In every large port was a foreign concession or settlement administered by foreign officials as a foreign colony. The most valuable sites were pre-empted for foreign business; all conveniences, community facilities, public services and general arrangements were determined and conducted for the foreigners' benefit. To these ports was drained the wealth of the country. The Chinese tariff was fixed by the foreign Powers, fixed on one exclusive principle—the advantages of foreign trade. The Customs revenue was collected by foreigners and deposited in foreign banks. Foreigners paid no taxes, although their income was de-

CHINA, STAKE FOR THE MACHINE AGE

rived from China, and were indifferent to Chinese law. In effect, the life of China was organized primarily in the interests of foreigners.

Goaded by a sense of injustice and humiliation, China made a despairing effort to save itself. In 1900 the Boxer Rebellion broke out, springing from a complexity of causes but finally diverting itself to revenge on the foreigner. Many foreign residents were killed, most of them innocent; foreign property was looted and the legations at Peking were besieged. Expeditions were sent from Europe and the United States. They easily dispersed the Boxer rabble, put the government to flight and dealt out punishment with early Asiatic ferocity. Boxers and innocent peasants were slaughtered alike, palaces and shopkeepers' homes plundered and destroyed without regard to the guilt or innocence of their inhabitants. And as if that had not more than settled the account an indemnity of \$330,000,000 was levied on China and an international garrison permanently stationed in the capital. Incidentally, that brought the foreign debt of China to nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars, a sum which in effect bankrupted the country. But China was at length terrorized into submission. It was left to await its fate without hope of escape, a condition which was not lifted until the World War.

It is a malodorous story, a story of bullying, greed and rapacity. Judged by any code of ethics or the commonly accepted standards of conduct, it is revolting. But it is not unique in its time. It was duplicated in the Middle East,

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

Near East, Africa and everywhere else in the world where the combination of the existence of raw materials, a potential market and military weakness invited first to open depredations and then to veneered chicaneries. The entire career of Western Europe and, more recently, of the United States in the distant parts is best forgotten. In one sense it can be forgotten, for it may be done; and ethical judgments of the past are always vain. The time was malodorous too. The West was on the make, with all the qualities appropriate to that state, including bounderism. The West had broken with the culture formulated in the Renaissance, although the break is only now being recognized. As a culture it was still in the raw; and the psychology of the parvenu holds no less for races and cultures than for families and individuals. The motives derived from the new social order were imperative. The psychology of the time arose from the same sources as the motives, and in that psychology restraints were unlikely, if not impossible. It was a chapter in history, a hideous one. Perhaps it was also inevitable. In any case moral judgments on the irrevocable serve no purpose.

In another sense, however, the story unfortunately cannot be forgotten. It has not been forgotten in the Far East or at best lies at one level below consciousness. It has formed the mentality of the Far Eastern peoples wherever their affairs touch us—that is, in all their relations with the West. Intellectually they may be able to tell themselves that the dead past had better bury its dead and that to understand all is to forgive all; at any rate that it is

CHINA, STAKE FOR THE MACHINE AGE

wiser to deal with the present as they are confronted by it. Instinctively they cannot free themselves from the resentment, suspicion and distrust bred by a hundred years of victimization. These constitute the experience in which a racial memory has been formed. The passionate flare of Chinese nationalism a few years ago, seemingly so disproportionate to the immediate concrete grievances, was the release of feelings long pent. There was nothing unreasonable in the fact that it was not so much Chinese nationalism as Chinese anti-foreignism. However incomplete may have been the success of Chinese nationalism, it has had consequences now felt throughout the world, for it gave Japan the provocation which precipitated the present crisis.

More important, Japan's mentality, too, has been formed out of memory. Japan suffered less at the hands of the West than China, but enough to have rankled. Thus may be explained much of its hyper-sensitiveness toward the West, its too conscious pride, its awareness of prestige and its obduracy. Out of resentment, suspicion and distrust it has taken the premises of all its international conduct. Its acts are based on the assumption that the West is still the marauder in the Far East and that it must forestall the West. Unless, therefore, it conquers China itself, the Western Powers will do so. Whether openly expressed or not, in this lies Japan's motivation and its sense of the justice of its acts. That is why Japan's avowed defense of its acts, when put in legalistic form and constrained within the cast of logic, seems hollow. In

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

law and logic Japan's defense is indeed hollow, but not in the realities of experience which have conditioned Japan's thoughts and feelings and therefore also its motives, both rational and instinctive. The role of the West as marauder in the Far East may be done. It may even have been renounced. But its effects run on. They cannot be cancelled so quickly.

Nothing has been said so far about Japan's part in the subjugation of China, not because it had no part but because the process was already in motion before Japan entered, in fact while Japan was still a victim of a similar process. Culturally Japan had been a satellite of China since the sixth century, its written language, philosophy, moral code, education and many of its institutions being derived from China, directly or by way of Korea. Otherwise there had been only sporadic contacts between them, travellers going back and forth and an occasional embassy being exchanged. They touched each other only after the West had thrown a bridge between them.

For the first few decades after Japan had had its door forced open by the United States, it was occupied almost wholly with its own reconstruction. If it thought of external matters at all, then only of the desire to emancipate itself from the restrictions on its independence imposed by the foreign Powers, including extra-territoriality and foreign control of its tariff. With telegraphs, newspapers and diplomatic representatives stationed abroad, Japan was now abreast of world currents and what it saw taking place in China bade it hasten. It had no time or energy

CHINA, STAKE FOR THE MACHINE AGE

for external adventures, as well as no need yet; and excepting one or two incidents in Korea and Formosa there was little between Japan and China. An active military tradition stemming from the code of the samurai, the elite warrior class, became clamant soon after the institution of the new regime. There was a vocal group which wanted a chance to test its spurs on the continent. For one thing, the abolition of feudalism had left it unemployed. But the cooler heads directing the reconstruction counselled patience and, since they included the most influential and vigorous men in the empire, had their way.

Not until 1880 was there sign of any desire to become involved in the affairs of the continent. Then Japan and China came into direct contact in Korea. Japan had periodically sent expeditions to Korea through the centuries and at the end of the sixteenth century had succeeded in overrunning the peninsula but later had to withdraw. Like China and Japan itself, Korea too was beset by the Western Powers and its affairs were moiled with too much meddling. An incident led to the dispatch of troops by Japan in 1882, whereupon China did likewise. Korea had had the indeterminate juridical status common in the East of being independent and yet sending tribute to the Emperor of China. China therefore claimed the rights of a protectorate over Korea. From that time there was growing friction between Japan and China in Korea. Japan tried to assert its ascendancy in the best Western manner and China sought to obstruct. At length they clashed in 1894 and war broke out. To the world's great surprise

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

China was speedily and humiliatingly crushed. The surprise is now difficult to understand, for Japan had assiduously devoted itself to building up a modern military machine along with its reconstruction, while China remained contemptuous of modernity even if fearful of the West's modern guns. Already the world was underestimating Japan; it could not see beyond the disparity in size between Japan and China.

With the victory over China Japan was launched on its new international career. It could not have done otherwise even if it had so willed, for the victory had international repercussions. The peace treaty imposed on China by Japan also was in the best Western manner. It forced China to pay a huge indemnity, to acknowledge the independence of Korea and to cede Formosa and the Liaotung Peninsula, the southern tip of Manchuria. Japan had already learned much from the West. To prove its right to a status of equality it was demonstrating that it, too, could despoil the weak. It was soon to be disillusioned. The great Powers had advanced too far to permit an Oriental interloper to close off the paths they had explored for their own use. Russia intervened, with the support of France and Germany, and they jointly "advised" Japan not to insist on the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula. By way of giving point to the advice Russia began to move troops. For Russia was already headed eastward and had noted Manchuria for itself, since Manchuria had a warm-water port. It had German and French support for reasons having to do with European continental politics rather

CHINA, STAKE FOR THE MACHINE AGE

than Asiatic considerations. From the beginning the Far East had been a football of European politics. Japan bowed to the inevitable and waived its claim to the Liaotung Peninsula. But from that point its international career took a definite direction, the one in which it has advanced furthest in the last few years.

The motives of Russia's intervention were soon disclosed. In 1896 it induced China to sign a treaty giving it the right to build the Chinese Eastern Railway across North Manchuria as a short-cut for the Trans-Siberia Railway from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok. In addition it obtained the right to exploit mines on both sides of the railway and by its own later construction of the treaty assumed the right to "police" the railway. In effect, Manchuria fell under Russia's sway, a condition which became definitive two years later when Russia, in retaliation for Germany's compelling China to give it a lease on Tsingtao, wrested from China a lease on the Liaotung Peninsula—the same territory it had intervened to save for China from Japan. When Russia secured from China the right to extend the Chinese Eastern Railway across South Manchuria to the coast, the pincers on Manchuria were closed.

Russia now moved to consummate its destiny. The Boxer Rebellion in 1900 gave it the opportunity. Along with the other Powers it sent an expedition, but unlike the others it did not withdraw. Furthermore, it began to close pincers on Korea, where Japan had been active since the war with China. In fact, in 1902 Russia was in the same position in the Far East as Japan is now: it was at the last

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

stage before the reduction of China to a protectorate. Not only China's fate was in the balance, but Japan's. Had Russia succeeded in making colonies of Manchuria and Korea, it would have had to take only one more stride to do the same with Japan. From Fusan in Korea to the coast of Japan is a few hours' voyage for a fast cruiser. Japan had no choice if it was not to resign itself to extinction as an independent state, and for that it had already made too much progress in the ways of the modern world. It struck, and the Russo-Japanese war was on.

Once more to the whole world's amazement, it decisively defeated Russia. The world had under-estimated Japan and over-estimated Russia. While Russia was handicapped by distance and poor communications, its real handicaps were inefficiency and corruption. Russia was as much defeated by itself as defeated by Japan. The result was to make Japan a great Power in the East nonetheless. For by the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905 Russia recognized Japan's paramountcy in Korea and surrendered to Japan its leasehold on the Liaotung Peninsula, including the ports of Dalny (now Dairen) and Port Arthur, and the railway across Manchuria from Changchun to Port Arthur, together with all the rights which had been granted by China. In other words, Japan had not only freed itself from a menace to its national existence but had also succeeded to Russia's position in Manchuria. It also succeeded to Russia's ambitions. So far as China was concerned, one sword had been changed for another, but a sword was still suspended over it.

CHINA, STAKE FOR THE MACHINE AGE

In the first place, Japan soon made short work of Korea. Despite numerous formal pledges to respect Korea's independence and integrity it contrived, with an unscrupulousness worthy of the most predacious Western empire, to produce pretexts and provocations for annexing Korea outright in 1910. At the same time it began to close its grip on South Manchuria. There is no need to recount the exchanges of notes, the mutual assurances, pledges and treaties obliging all parties to respect international equality of opportunity in Manchuria. Within three years of taking over Russian rights in Manchuria Japan showed clearly that while juridically South Manchuria might remain Chinese territory, in effect it was Japanese. Nominally the territory was open to all nations for purposes of trade. In actuality such hindrances were put in the way of other nations that for all practical purposes only Japanese could trade—except in such commodities as the Japanese could not produce. There were numerous protests, officially polite and privately bitter; but they were futile. Efforts were made, especially by the United States, of which more will be told later, to bring about a settlement on a basis of international equity. They were vetoed. As part of the war's aftermath Japan and Russia had struck a bargain: a free hand for Japan in South Manchuria, a free hand for Russia in North Manchuria, and mutual support to prevent interference in either area by third parties. Already the tendencies were set which now make Manchuria the Balkans of the East. From the Treaty of Portsmouth to Japan's seizure of

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

Manchuria and Jehol and the subsequent rumblings on the Russo-Japanese border in Manchuria and Siberia is a direct progression.

Before Japan had succeeded in absorbing its new possessions the World War came. The war presented to it an opportunity which the war's aftermath has only reduced and not nullified and which it is still capitalizing. By the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth Japan only succeeded to Russian rights in South Manchuria, and those rights, according to the original treaty between Russia and China were soon to expire. The leasehold on the Liaotung Peninsula was to run out in 1923, after which the administration of the peninsula would presumably revert to China. Japan acted to remove the embarrassment with which it would be confronted in a few years. In 1915 it secretly served on the Chinese government the famous Twenty-one Demands. These were in five groups, of which three were of momentous importance. By the first China was to agree to leave the disposition of German rights in Shantung Province to settlement between Japan and the Allies. Japan had already, as an ally of England, evicted Germany from its leasehold over Tsingtao and the surrounding area and, incidentally, had in a few months encroached far beyond the rights held by Germany. By the second China was to extend the leasehold on the Liaotung Peninsula to 1997 and the right to operate the South Manchuria Railway even longer; also Japanese subjects were to have the right to reside and trade anywhere in South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. By the fifth group China was

CHINA, STAKE FOR THE MACHINE AGE

to agree to engage Japanese subjects as financial, political and military advisers and to put the police force in Chinese cities under "joint Japanese and Chinese supervision." In other words, China was to become a Japanese protectorate. Despite Japanese efforts to keep the Twenty-one Demands secret, they transpired in the natural course. They produced a shock in every important capital, but Europe was engaged in a death struggle and America had to keep its attention free to protect its rights as a neutral. This was a condition on which Japan had counted, of course. China resisted, and a wave of bitterness swept over the Chinese people. In deference to the resentment in China and the suspicion in Europe and the United States Japan finally waived the fifth group, which included control of the Chinese police, but delivered an ultimatum on the four other groups. China had no alternative. It accepted. Chinese hostility to Japan and the periodic anti-Japanese boycotts date from the Twenty-one Demands. So do the legal rights which the Japanese government said it was guarding from Chinese infringement when it appropriated all of Manchuria in 1931.

The fifth group was waived, but not the intention it revealed. Japan merely gave that a subtler guise. Unable to establish directly what was tantamount to a protectorate, it sought to do so indirectly. Unable to bend the Chinese government to its will, it decided to put in a government of its own creation. This it proceeded to do. By open bribery and by loans nominally for the development of resources but actually for the purchase of Chinese offi-

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

cials and their maintenance in strategic positions it helped elevate to power in Peking a political clique completely subservient to orders from Tokyo. With that clique as an instrument it proceeded to achieve its purpose. An orgy of loans followed, public and secret, whereby a mortgage was being placed on Chinese resources—the Nishihara loans, as they are called. The amount of these loans has been variously estimated; it may be put at between \$200,000,000 and \$250,000,000. More important, however, was the infiltration of Japanese authority throughout the political structure of China through men who were Japanese puppets. Japan was in a fair way, then, to hegemony over China when the World War ended.

The end of the war left the West free to turn its attention to what was going forward in the Far East. Also it released new forces in the Far East itself. These were to give a new turn to developments in the Far East and a pause to Japanese aggrandizement. One phase of Japanese conquest had closed. But in the fourteen years between the Russo-Japanese war and the end of the World War Japan had made itself the decisive element in the Far Eastern situation. Now the fate of China and of the Far East was no longer a matter for bilateral determination as between the West and China. Now there were three distinct sides: China, the West and Japan.

Chapter IV

WORLD WAR IN THE FAR EAST

IN THE Far East as elsewhere the principal effect of the World War was to telescope all political and social evolution. Nearly everything that has happened since the World War would have happened in any event; it has only happened sooner by reason of the World War. The free hand which the preoccupation of the great Powers gave Japan it would have obtained in the natural course, but in the natural course much later. All its centrifugal forces, taking their drive from its economic growth, had already projected it outward. The war only lessened the resistance to them and gave them added momentum. The war accelerated developments; it did not create them.

Nevertheless both China and the West were thereafter to be on the defensive. An attempt was made at the Washington Conference to restore the balance but it served only as an expedient for delay. The Far Eastern problem was precipitated immediately after the Armistice by the question of how to dispose of the German territorial holdings in Shantung Province, the city of Tsingtao and hinterland. Japan had taken them in 1914 and instituted a regime which clearly indicated its intention to remain permanently. By the Twenty-one Demands it had forced China to accede to whatever settlement was reached with the Allies. In secret treaties it had forced the Allies to

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

agree to its retention of Tsingtao. The Allies were faithful to their bargain at the peace conference and Tsingtao was awarded to Japan. The transaction was too flagrant, however, even by the standards of that conference, and it provoked a violent protest. The Shantung settlement became a symbol and more than anything else was used to turn American opinion against the treaty. In China it produced a volcanic reaction. A frenzy of patriotic indignation swept over the nation. General strikes were called, a boycott against Japanese goods declared, and finally revenge was taken on the pro-Japanese clique then at the head of the government. Mobs of students stormed the houses of cabinet ministers in Peking, drove them into hiding and finally forced them to resign and take flight. The government that succeeded refused to sign the peace treaty. But Tsingtao remained under the Japanese flag.

The inter-Allied expedition to Siberia also had to be liquidated. In 1918 after the Bolshevik regime had made peace with Germany the Allies determined to land troops in Siberia. Nominally the expedition was for the double purpose of preventing war supplies from falling into the hands of German and Austrian war prisoners in Siberia and evacuating Czech soldiers who had taken refuge in Russia and wanted to make their way to France. Actually its aim, as later revealed, was to force Russia back into the war and, when that was found impossible, to make a rear attack on the Bolshevik regime. America was induced to join the expedition, but in doing so it pledged itself not to violate Russian sovereignty or interfere in

WORLD WAR IN THE FAR EAST

Russian internal affairs. Japan made a similar pledge. Further, Japan and the United States agreed to send only 7,500 troops. Within a short period, however, Japan had sent almost ten times that number. As in Shantung it soon gave every indication of planning to remain permanently. It built barracks and supply depots, set up puppets as local officials and incidentally subsidized a brutal terrorism. In 1920 the other Allied troops began to leave. Japan showed not the slightest intention of so doing. Meanwhile the Siberians had formed what was called the Far Eastern Republic and with the hatred which the Japanese invasion had fomented minor clashes occurred periodically and a major clash was only a matter of time. If it came Japan would have a pretext for establishing a permanent occupation. Meanwhile, also, the American government was demanding with increasing firmness that Japan abide by its pledge and withdraw. The atmosphere in the Far East became ominous.

It was in these circumstances that the Washington Conference was convened in 1921. When first broached, its object was to secure an agreement for the limitation of naval armament, since in the international unrest of the post-war years a naval race was threatening on both the Atlantic and the Pacific. Later its object was enlarged to include Far Eastern political issues. For whether there was to be a naval race depended to a great extent on whether the Anglo-Japanese alliance was to be renewed on its expiration the following year. Japan sought to evade and came reluctantly, unable to refuse without exposing

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

itself to the danger of isolation and the loss of British support by default. An agreement materially reducing the navies of the five great Powers—Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy and Japan—was reached without great difficulty, but the political results were slight in proportion.

Japan was called to account from the beginning. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was formally declared dissolved, mainly as a result of pressure from the British Dominions and the United States. As a result of pressure from the United States alone, Japan was forced to agree to the retrocession to China of Tsingtao and environs and the evacuation of Siberia. Also a treaty was signed by the nine Powers having interests in the Far East in which they pledged themselves not to infringe on Chinese sovereignty or violate its territorial integrity, a pledge they had already taken on innumerable occasions before, with results as we have seen. The subject of the gains from past infringements was treated with dignified silence. Reference to the status before 1914 was plainly deemed to be in bad form. China indiscreetly asked for a general retrocession of its lost territory and the restoration of its sovereign rights. In reply it was given assurances of the most cordial good wishes for its welfare. All was left as it was before, except that Japan was made to disgorge the gains from the advantage it had taken of Europe's compulsory abstention. All that had gone to make the conflict in the Far East was left untouched. In consequence events in the Far East were allowed to march to where they now

WORLD WAR IN THE FAR EAST

are—at the verge of war. For that may have been the last chance to prevent what now seems foredoomed.

The bland refusal to consider China's plea did not prevent the Washington Conference from closing with decorum and the assurances of every nation's esteem for every other nation, thus constituting a success in diplomacy. But there were immediate consequences in the Far East. The Chinese went home disgruntled. Twice in two years China had asked for some redress, at Paris in 1919 and at Washington in 1921. Twice it had been put off with a smooth air of patronage. Now it was to cast off the role of supplicant. The ferment which had been working under the surface during the World War and come to the surface after the war now began to seethe. Before China had been respectful. Now it became insistent. It could be. The East that once could be cowed by threats of punishment and an occasional bombardment by way of discipline was no more. Too much had happened. For all of Asia this held true, but more particularly for China and India, the oldest and most distinctive cultural groups on the continent.

The beginning of change may be dated from the Russo-Japanese war. That was one of the decisive wars in history, not because it resulted in the supplanting of Russia by Japan as the dominant aggressor in the Far East but because it fired a new spirit in the East and raised a challenge to the ascendancy of the West which has still to be met. For the first time a white nation had been defeated by a non-white. For the first time a great Power had been

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

not only repelled but humbled by one of the lesser breed. It did not matter that Russia was a poor exemplar of Occidental might, a magnificent exterior internally rotten. Russia was white, a great Power and one of the conquerors before whom all the East had had to bend; and it had fallen. Plainly there was no divine dispensation. The white race was not invincible because white. Nothing was fore-ordained. What Japan could do others might do too. The East had an end to strive for. Most of all, it had hope. And that was the beginning of the end of the myth of white superiority, that which had been as a fixed law of the universe, an axiom in all the relations of the East and West, as fatalistically accepted by the East as it was complacently by the West. The myth was not quite exposed but certainly perforated.

With the World War it became transparent. The spectacle was as revolting to the whole non-white world before 1918 as it was to ourselves after 1918. These were not the doings of the elect; to the contrary, they were barbarous. A civilization in which they were possible was no higher than those it called backward and claimed the right to put under tutelage. Moreover, we revealed too much about each other. Our propaganda was too successful. If the candor of each side was incomplete, the candor of each was supplemented by that of the other. Taken together, as they were by the distant and dispassionate witnesses of the East, what the Allies and the Germans said of each other presented a rounded and completed truth. The superiority of the white race could not remain inviolate when one part

WORLD WAR IN THE FAR EAST

of the race blackguarded the other so convincingly. As war tactics the propaganda of the years between 1914 and 1918 had its uses, but as permanent strategy it was fatal. It was suicidal in proportion as it was successful.

What was most instrumental in bringing about a change in the attitude of the East was the working of time. The West had found a market in the East for more than its manufactured products. It had also exported ideas. In retrospect it seems fantastic to have believed that we could send to the East our machine-made textiles, telephones, locomotives, books, teachers and missionaries and put an embargo on our ideas, even if we had wanted to do so. We did not want to, as a matter of fact. Our cult of superiority—superiority in civilization as well as in technical resource—gave us not only a sense of security but a consciousness of mission, a mission to civilize others, which meant to make them like ourselves. There was a moral obligation to fulfill and it was also profitable, since transmitting our civilization also transmitted a demand for our goods. When our habits and our standard of living—the white world's latter-day definition of civilization—were taken over by a people, they called for our commodities and our things of use. Thus our moral duty coincided with our interest, as happily they generally did in the nineteenth century, especially in our dealings with other races. So we established schools and colleges and churches in China, as well as in India, Turkey, Hawaii, Egypt and wherever else there were materially backward races, natural resources and a population to buy our exports. We

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

taught the inhabitants about the Magna Carta and the Declaration of Independence, the French Revolution and Cromwell and Washington and Lincoln. And our missionaries spread the gospel of the common fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. Liberty, equality, fraternity, justice, all the abstract nouns that we orated grandly and construed freely in political and social practice, were injected into the intellectual vocabulary of the backward peoples we held in subjection while preaching equality. Unfortunately they did not learn to give the nouns a loose construction; they took them literally. Furthermore, magniloquently as we stated our ideals, the institution most distinctively characteristic of our civilization in the nineteenth century, next only to machine production, was nationalism. While democracy was honored only in the breach, nationalism had both reality and vitality. We were democratic only in name but nationalistic in fact. Our literature and our education were an indoctrination of nationalism, and when we took both to the East we took also nationalism. Democracy we have not succeeded in transplanting in the East, probably because it has never taken root in our own soil. Nationalism we did transplant, and it has taken root. Inevitably so: not only because we sang its glory and beauty but because our treatment of subject peoples was such as to instill a sense of national identity and a desire for national equality. The more we browbeat, the more burning became the passion for national liberty and independence.

Nationalism had taken root, and the World War irri-

WORLD WAR IN THE FAR EAST

gated it and gave it fresh lusty shoots. From the point of view of ruling races the Fourteen Points and the Wilsonian doctrine in general were fatal. It is interesting to observe that the only nations that took the Fourteen Points seriously were not those in the West to which they were addressed but those lesser and dependent nationalities to which they could not be applied without serious embarrassment. The unresponsiveness of the major Allies to the Fourteen Points was not out of any lack of idealism, as Americans have liked to believe—we who had little if anything at stake. It arose rather out of a sense of reality and self-interest. Self-determination and the rights of weak nations—where did they leave England and France in India and China and Africa and the Near East? By the common definition of the words they meant the end of empires. Therefore they never were taken seriously by the Allies—or by America so far as the Philippines and Cuba were concerned—and could not be taken seriously. They were enunciated because it would have been injudicious to offend President Wilson and because their moral effect on the public opinion of the Allied peoples was salutary. The war thereby seemed to be given some purpose worth the sacrifice it cost. But precisely because of their literal meaning the words of the Fourteen Points were taken seriously by the dependencies of the empires, and they were taken to mean the end of empires and the emancipation of the dependencies. And when the Allies disembarrassed themselves of the implications of war-time rhetoric at the peace conference, the appetites whetted throughout the East

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

went unappeased, the hopes that had been raised were dashed, disillusionment set in, and then bitterness. The aspirations that had been aroused were unfulfilled, but they did not die thereby. They were instead energized with a new vitality. Uprisings in India, Egypt, Turkey, Syria, Korea and China within a few years of the peace conference so testified.

The latent nationalism in China was fired by the rebuff at the Washington Conference. The resentment at decades of oppression, corroborated by all that the Allies had said of their war aims and then mocked by the peace settlement and again at Washington, now flared. And it was given body and force by the re-entry of Russia into the Far Eastern scene, though in a new role. The Russians correctly diagnosed the weak point of the Western system as the disaffected nationalities. At this point they could most effectively direct an attack on the Western system and at the same time broaden the base for world revolution. The frustrated nationalism of the dependent peoples, combined with the poverty inseparable from a non-mechanized economy and often with native misrule, made them fertile soil for the seeds of revolutionary propaganda. The Russians were ready to discard the illusory hopes of imminent revolution in Europe and America and saw their only hope in Asia. The brightest hope was in China.

With considerable acumen Russia came offering gratuitously what the rest of the Occident had refused on request. It declared its willingness to renounce a considerable part of the rights and privileges which the Tsarist

WORLD WAR IN THE FAR EAST

government had wrested from China and henceforth to treat with China as sovereign and equal. Russia kept, to be sure, the most valuable part, namely the Chinese Eastern Railway in North Manchuria. This was the first time, however, that any great Power had voluntarily relinquished anything to China and a deep impression was made on Chinese opinion. The Russians, whether Tsarist or communist, have always known better than other Occidentals how to deal with the East, and they followed their first move with skillful diplomatic approaches. They tendered assistance in exemplification of revolutionary Russia's sympathy for the downtrodden and in token of the new relation of friendship established between Russia and China.

It was a propitious time for such tenders. Just then another attempt was being made in China to regenerate the Kuomintang, the party responsible for the overthrow of the monarchy in 1911 and the establishment of the republic. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, founder of the party and organizer of the movement that dethroned the monarchy, had come forward again to lead the country out of the wilderness. The Chinese people were drifting into a psychology of despair. The republic, which had carried so much of their hope for a national rebirth, had patently failed and the condition of the mass of the people was worse than under the monarchy. The country was still beset by alien enemies within its gates who had broken their promises and refused to do simple justice. China was in a mood to snatch at deliverance. Sun Yat-sen had a

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

number of confidential meetings with the representative of the Soviet Russian government in the Far East at which offers of help were renewed. In brief, there was concluded what was tantamount to an alliance between Soviet Russia and the Kuomintang, which thenceforth became the vehicle of nationalism, with which was mingled a mongrelloid radicalism. It was not an alliance in the conventional sense of formal diplomatic and political relationship. But the basis was laid for recognition of the Soviet government—Russia was still an outcaste among the nations—and for Russian help to China. The latter materialized before the end of 1923, when Russian political and military advisers arrived in Canton, the stronghold of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his Kuomintang.

Chinese nationalism took an immediate impetus. In historical perspective Russia's influence should not be exaggerated. Like the World War, it did not create; it forestallened. The time produced nationalism. In India, Syria and Egypt there was no communist influence, yet in all three nationalism has been rife. What the Russians did was to teach the Chinese the manipulation of mass psychology and the arts of propaganda, to give them a scheme of organization for the Kuomintang and a respect for efficiency in organization, and to train a corps of army officers in the practice of modern military strategy. Beyond all, it instilled a feeling of hope in the Chinese people, a feeling they had all but lost. The future seemed to hold promise again and the negativism of the race was for a time shaken off. The propaganda disseminated under

WORLD WAR IN THE FAR EAST

the instruction of the Russians was not aimed primarily to make converts to communism. It dwelt on a note much more appealing to the Chinese people—independence, emancipation from the foreign yoke, liberation from the oppression of foreign imperialism, China for the Chinese. It was a note to which the Chinese were sensitively attuned just then and they responded with revivalistic fervor.

The atmosphere became electric. The cry, "Down with Imperialism," echoed all over the land, sometimes coming from the mouths of many who did not know the meaning of the word imperialism. The army organized by the Kuomintang drove northward from Canton and carried all before it, acclaimed by the people and assisted by them. Its progress was not so much an offensive as a mass rising. There were general strikes, demonstrations, attacks on foreigners. Nationalism became not only clamorous but intransigent. China no longer humbly petitioned. It demanded. It demanded the return of the leaseholds, concessions and settlements in foreign possession and the abrogation of the unequal treaties, as they were called—those providing for extra-territoriality, foreign control of the tariff, etc.

The foreign governments and foreign residents in China, unaware that the times had changed and complacently assuming that the Chinese would forever be supine, not only were unsympathetic but showed their antagonism. They were contemptuous as well, which only goaded the Chinese to further demonstration that they

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

were in a different temper. Then the foreigners resorted to prohibitions and commands, as in the good old days, and now both were ignored. There was a succession of incidents, some of which developed into serious clashes between foreigners and Chinese in the foreign controlled areas. In the years gone by such incidents would have invoked dire punishment, but now no punishment could be meted, for the Western Powers were still exhausted from the effects of the war. They could scarcely call on their people for adventures across the world. Their people were weary with adventures nearer home. A few cruisers and gunboats were sent and some troops landed, but not enough to restrain the Chinese. They could no longer be terrified with symbols. Threats alone no longer availed. And plainly the force that once lay behind the threats, or that the Chinese could be made to believe lay behind them, now was wanting. When the Chinese discovered that they could act with impunity, they acted with greater boldness. Since there was no intention to discuss abrogation or revision of the treaties, they dealt with them by openly violating them. The years between 1924 and 1928 were a period of nullification of the rights which the foreigners had won by the aggressions of preceding decades.

Mobs swept over the British Concession in Hankow and the British were forced to evacuate. The accomplished fact, blasphemous as it was according to all the traditions—the white man's prestige, keeping the native in his place, taking a strong hand to him when obstreperous and all that—was then ratified by Great Britain's formal relinquishment

WORLD WAR IN THE FAR EAST

of the Concession in Hankow and of concessions in other ports. The privilege of extra-territoriality was not officially abrogated. It was just openly violated. The foreigners were simply subjected to Chinese orders, treaty or no treaty. The prescribed limitations on the tariff were ignored and the Chinese made their own schedule and began to enforce it. Again confronted by the accomplished fact, the Powers made a virtue of necessity and agreed to grant tariff autonomy—not as a concession now but as a surrender under duress. In fact, the Chinese were now insisting upon securing far more than they would have accepted with gratitude a few years earlier. In four years the structure of foreign privilege which the West had reared in China was undermined and in large part torn down.

Throughout these years the main target of Chinese agitation was Great Britain. In the first place, the British Empire was the head and front of the imperialistic system. In the second place, it had been the earliest and the most successful aggressor in the Far East; despite the rise of Russia and Japan it still had the most valuable prizes. In the third place, the British had made subjection most galling to the Chinese. More than all other Occidentals, they had put the brand of racial inferiority on the Chinese, had erected a social pale around them, excluding them from clubs and hotels and public parks, imposing a form of Jim Crow law on them in their own country. It was this offense to dignity and self-respect that had embittered the Chinese more than economic and political exploitation, even if that was more injurious in logical and ma-

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

terial calculation. Rationally the Chinese might make no distinction between the British and the French or other Occidentals. Psychologically and emotionally their resentment was most easily touched off against the British. Finally, Great Britain was singled out as the target of Chinese nationalism because that suited Russian international strategy. Great Britain was still the first Power, and until it became more tractable the barriers of Europe would not be lowered to Soviet Russia. It would be more likely to become tractable if it were frightened by attack on the extended lines of the empire.

Japan's role in these years was passive. While it formally joined in the international efforts to curb the extreme Chinese demonstrations, it stayed in the background. It was quite content to let others bear the brunt of resistance and incur the consequent Chinese ill-will, since that would improve its own position in China commercially and politically. In the second place, since the Washington Conference Japan's Far Eastern policy had undergone a phase of moderation. The isolation in which Japan had found itself at Washington alarmed influential classes among the Japanese. Even the military caste had come to realize that a too impetuous defiance of the world might bring reprisals: the West no longer had its hands tied. More important in the eyes of the General Staff, the end of the war had left the United States incomparably stronger than it ever had been before and none too retiring in disposition. The financial and commercial classes which had attained power and a new dignity in the pros-

WORLD WAR IN THE FAR EAST

perous war years were more interested in economic potentialities than in imperial destiny or martial glory. They recognized that Japan's economic future lay on the continent and that China's good will would be an asset in the competition for trade. They also were disposed to demur at the burden of paying for the armament which such adventures as the Siberian occupation required.

To a lesser extent the impact of the ideas released by the war also was being felt in Japan. Democracy had become a popular word in Japan, too, even if it was only a word. And at the same time the social effects of industrialization were beginning to manifest themselves. The war-time boom had all the accompaniments of booms everywhere—inflation, a new-rich class, rising prices, depreciation in real wages for factory workers and exploitation of the laboring class. There developed at the same time, as a result, a movement for organized labor and an agitation for universal suffrage. The latter had the sympathy of the middle classes as well, since their lot had not been too favorable in the inflationary years and they had been tainted by what the military and bureaucratic classes still call dangerous thoughts: they had had opportunities for education in middle schools and universities and the literature of the West had been opened to them, including the literature of social protest. The feudalism which had been overthrown in name only at the beginning of the restoration now for the first time was being questioned in reality, although it was still secure. And both the middle classes and the disgruntled working class were

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

inclined to opposition to the militaristic policy, which inevitably was associated with reaction generally.

As a result the balance of political power was held for a time by a group which counselled and practised moderation in external affairs. It sponsored a policy of conciliation toward China or at least of restraint, thus at once disarming Western suspicion and cultivating Japan's best customer. This group was in control just in those years in which Chinese nationalism was most vociferous and most successful. And in those years the feeling between Japan and China was better than, or at least not so bad as, at any time in the last generation. In fact, by contrast with the West Japan shone in a friendly light. Whereas anti-Japanese propaganda had overshadowed all other political sentiments from 1915 to 1922, now propaganda had shifted to a general anti-foreignism, with emphasis on hostility to the white nations. Japan's restraint in China at the beginning of the nationalistic uprising followed from Japanese internal conditions in part, but it also was Japan's self-interest.

Japan could not long remain aloof or neutral, however. It was too intimately involved. China's national aspirations, if carried to their conclusion, imperilled Japan's vested interests. While Japan was the last to make inroads on China's sovereignty, it had made the deepest. If China was to recover its lost territory, it had to recover Manchuria. And in the mood engendered by its first successes it meant to do so. Unfortunately for its own immediate future it drew fallacious deductions from these successes.

WORLD WAR IN THE FAR EAST

So long as the offensive was directed at the Western Powers it was on fairly safe ground. England, France, Italy and the United States were far away. They were not in a position at that time to defend their interests. But two of the great Powers were within striking distance—Japan and Russia. Russia still had the Chinese Eastern Railway in North Manchuria, while Japan had the South Manchuria Railway, the cities of Dairen and Port Arthur and their environs and an overlordship in South Manchuria. Legally the South Manchurian provinces were under Chinese suzerainty except along the railway and in the Japanese leased zone, but in reality Japan had effective control. Whoever might be the governor or regional dictator, he remained in power on Japanese sufferance and so long as he did nothing that incurred Japanese displeasure. His decision ran in those affairs that did not concern Japan, and in the nature of things they were minor affairs.

As China voiced its ambitions more uncompromisingly and showed, as in Hankow, that it would resort to direct action if necessary, the Japanese military party became alarmed. It also saw an opportunity to reassert itself at home and regain the ascendancy over the civil and parliamentary bureaucracy, which had been growing in power. Manchuria was a good rallying-cry with which to appeal to the masses. Blood and treasure had been spilled to gain it within the memory of living Japanese, and only by doing so had Japan saved itself from subjugation by Russia. By taking Manchuria Russia had been kept at bay; by retaining it Russia could still be kept at bay, the more

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

necessary now that Russia was Red. Manchuria was the symbol of Japan's imperial grandeur and the mark which measured its status as a world Power. It could be represented as what Japanese spokesmen like to call Japan's "life-line," a designation not altogether accurate but having the ring of conviction. Also the Manchurian issue was a good one on which to regain the support of the commercial and financial classes, for the loss of Manchuria would strike a blow at Japanese business, a danger which made them reconsider their support of the moderate policy. Japan's investment in Manchuria was already estimated at between three-quarters of a billion and a billion dollars, and to Manchuria Japanese business looked for future opportunities. There Japan looked for a market for its expanding industry and for a field for its investments. Manchuria was undeveloped and under-populated but fast filling up with Chinese immigrants who would eventually buy Japanese goods. Manchuria could grow grain and already grew more than three million tons of soya bean a year, a crop valuable for its food content and by-products. Manchuria also had considerable deposits of iron and coal, both indispensable to Japan's large-scale industry, as well as large supplies of other minerals and metals and timber. Moderation entailed material risk.

In 1928, after breaking with the Russians, the Chinese Nationalists resumed their northward drive and succeeded in capturing Peking, then the capital. Thus they gained the right to proclaim themselves the lawful government of China, and thus also they brought nationalism within

WORLD WAR IN THE FAR EAST

the shadow of the Great Wall and to the borders of Manchuria. At the same time Chang Tso-lin, the Chinese dictator of Manchuria, was assassinated—the Japanese have never been cleared of suspicion—and his son succeeded him. Chang Hsueh-liang, the younger, and a group of young men who surrounded him were openly pro-Nationalist and indicated their intention of openly adhering to the Nationalist regime. Thereupon they were officially “advised” by Japanese representatives not to do so, but they answered bluntly that they would, and they did. Thus they reinforced the arguments of the military party in Japan which had been urging the necessity of a “positive policy” in China. That term was never strictly defined but in essence it meant taking a firm hand to China and making it understand that it could talk about nationalism, it could drive the British and other white men out of port concessions, it could even have its way about tariffs and extra-territoriality; but Manchuria was forbidden ground and the subject of Manchuria was forever closed. And the best way to make China understand this was to end all diplomatic pretense and legalistic fiction about sovereignty and take over Manchuria in fact as well as name.

The adherence of the Chinese officials of Manchuria to the Nationalist government in Nanking did not result in a frontal attack for the recovery of Manchuria. Even in their emotional glow the Chinese knew they were not quite prepared for that. Instead they made use of the weapons which had been used so successfully against themselves—the weapons of economic penetration. For a num-

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

ber of years there had been a mass migration from the poverty-stricken northern Chinese provinces into Manchuria until out of an estimated population of 30,000,000 more than 28,000,000 were Chinese. Nearly all of them were peasants driven from their own soil by famine, flood, bandits, misrule or over-crowding, but their presence drew merchants and artisans to serve them, then banks, small mills and soon factories. The Chinese, too, had become aware of the economic potentialities of Manchuria. There was a considerable boom in the newly settled provinces, but the business was being done by the Chinese, and it appeared that the profits of Manchuria's settlement and development were to go to Chinese rather than Japanese. Thus another turn was being given to the paradox of imperialism: just as before it mattered little that China had sovereignty over Manchuria so long as Japan had control, so now it appeared that it would matter little that Japan had control so long as China derived all the economic advantages. Japan might rule politically but China economically, a division entirely in China's favor.

This raised certain concrete questions which could not be evaded. Mainly there was the question of railways. For years the politics of Manchuria has been railway politics. It was Russia's concession to build the Chinese Eastern Railway that injected Manchuria into international politics, and railways have determined the content and direction of its politics ever since. For as the lines of communication run, so will the economic gravitation follow. The main artery of communication in Manchuria had

WORLD WAR IN THE FAR EAST

been the Chinese Eastern Railway (Russian) in the north and the South Manchuria Railway (Japanese) in the south. Now China was entering the railway field on its own account. It was beginning to build railways in Manchuria itself and naturally these were so planned as to draw off Manchurian exports and imports south of the Great Wall into China proper rather than eastward to the Japanese-controlled port of Dairen. The Japanese intrigued, obstructed, protested and threatened, but China went forward with its plans. Japan raised the contention that China had bound itself by a secret treaty not to construct any railway lines paralleling the South Manchuria Railway; China denied that such a treaty ever had been signed. At Geneva in 1932 Japan made much of China's violation of treaty obligations. This was the violation it had in mind. This was the one that had really given it concern. The concern had become acute when the Chinese began to construct a modern port at Hulutao on its own coast north of Dairen. Into this port the projected system of railways was to feed. If, then, the railways and the port were constructed and Manchuria was populated by Chinese and its business done by Chinese, the wealth of Manchuria would be drained off to China, not Japan. Then both the South Manchuria Railway and Dairen would be subordinated to a secondary position and Japan would see the prize of Manchuria snatched from its grasp. This there was little likelihood that Japan would permit without a struggle. As soon after revealed, they did not. And it is

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

significant that one of their first steps after occupying Manchuria was to order a cessation of work at Hulutao.

The first test in Manchuria came, not between Japan and China but between Soviet Russia and China. As already has been said, the Chinese Nationalists broke with Russia in 1927 for a number of reasons, variously interpreted and ever since hotly disputed. By some it is said that the conclusive reason was the relapse of the Nationalist leaders into bourgeois reaction—their re-assertion of class loyalties. There is at least as much ground for saying that the motive was fear of Russian dominance. That the Russians were rapidly acquiring the power of decision in the Nationalist government in 1926 and 1927 through the Chinese Communist party is beyond dispute. In the original agreement between Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Joffe, the Russian representative, it was formally set down that communism was not suited to China. Nevertheless every effort was made to organize Chinese communists and to insert them into the Nationalist party as a compact nucleus. The nucleus grew and, being subject to organized discipline, exerted increasing influence. It was a minority but a minority with a definite program, skillful leadership and means for attaining its ends. By the middle of 1927 it was making an open bid for exclusive authority. It cannot be doubted that the affairs of China would have been determined in Moscow thereafter if the Chinese had not broken with the Russians. The Nationalist revolution would then have had the result of substituting one alien master, though communist, for many imperialist masters.

WORLD WAR IN THE FAR EAST

China would still have remained independent in name only. And while there were numerous Chinese who sincerely believed in communism and some who even understood its tenets, the overwhelming majority had responded only to the appeal of national independence. At any rate China did break with Russia. Diplomatic relations were severed. The Russian advisers were driven out of the country, and incidentally a white terror was let loose, far more savage than anything the communists had done.

Soviet Russia accepted its repulse and the humiliation without retaliation, a fact which led the Chinese to assume too much. Under the circumstances there were both ill-feeling and friction in North Manchuria and in 1929 the Chinese suddenly swooped down on the Chinese Eastern Railway, imprisoned or arrested the Russian officials and took possession of the railway. This time, to China's surprise and chagrin, Russia did retaliate. It retaliated swiftly and orthodoxly. It sent a military force, gave the Chinese a sound thrashing, drove them out and took back the railway. Incongruously the first serious defense of imperialistic gains in China was made, not by one of the imperialist countries but by a communist country and, moreover, by the one which had taught the Chinese how to indoctrinate and organize the people for resistance against imperialism. Soviet Russia, headquarters of the Communist International, had acted in the best nineteenth-century British Tory manner. With that episode the climax of Chinese nationalism passed. By that episode, also, an example was set for Japan. It pointed the way if rights were to be pre-

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

served. It showed, furthermore, how quickly Chinese intransigence would subside if vigorously challenged. It briefed the Japanese militarists' case before their own public opinion.

The application of the "positive policy" was then only a matter of time. The Japanese stiffened, but China did not recede. China proceeded with its own economic enterprise in Manchuria, and it became clear to the Japanese that the course of events already set would end in the loss of Manchuria unless Japan acted. Japan did act, with the consequences as we know them, including the threat of one or more wars involving both hemispheres.

The immediate precipitating agent of the crisis in the Far East was Chinese nationalism. And Chinese nationalism was a product of the times, as was Japan's rise. Given the times, both were inevitable.

Chapter V

JAPAN STRIKES

IN 1932, after Japan and China had been engaged for months in an undeclared war and Japan had already invaded and occupied an area larger than France, the League of Nations sent an international commission to Manchuria to investigate the circumstances of the conflict and make recommendations for a settlement. It was a useless enterprise. There was no point in investigating the circumstances, for they were irrelevant; and no settlement would be accepted by the Japanese that did not grant what they had already taken. Once Japan had become convinced that Chinese nationalism threatened its position in South Manchuria, the action it took in 1931 was a foregone conclusion. Never since the Japanese had come into possession of South Manchuria in 1905 had there been a time when they would not have fought to the last extremity to retain possession. Never since then had there been any possibility of dislodging them except with an army stronger than theirs; and there is no other possibility now. With or without justification this has been an axiom of Far Eastern politics for a generation. The immediate causes of the conflict of 1931 were therefore of no importance. If there had not been one pretext there would have been another. If necessary, the Japanese would have created one. It is not certain that they did not.

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

Occasions offered themselves in the natural course. They were inevitable in a situation so confused and so highly charged. There was a fight between Chinese and Korean peasants in Manchuria and the Japanese supported the Koreans. As a sequel a hundred Chinese were killed in Seoul, the Korean capital, heavily policed as that city is by the Japanese. Then a Japanese officer was killed on Chinese soil and the Japanese charged that he had been murdered. Feeling was high in both countries and the Japanese military party had grist to its mill. It could cite evidence in support of its advocacy of a "positive policy." An intensive propaganda was started for military measures against China. The population was being prepared.

On the evening of September 18, 1931, a few feet of track on the South Manchuria Railway near Mukden were destroyed—perhaps by the Chinese, perhaps by the Japanese themselves. All the subsequent investigations and inquiries, including the one by the League of Nations commission, have not succeeded in determining which it was. The balance of the evidence inclines against the Japanese, especially when the past is thrown into the scale, for they have been adept in the manufacture of provocation. But which it was is no longer pertinent. The results stand. The Japanese formed their own judgment and executed it. Within three hours their troops were in motion, before morning the city of Mukden had been taken, and the rest is recent history. The conquest of Manchuria had begun.

Japan moved with rapidity and resoluteness, giving

JAPAN STRIKES

every evidence that it was acting with calculation rather than on impulse. Within twenty-four hours the army had been brought from its headquarters in Dairen and had struck along the whole length of the South Manchuria Railway. Every important city in the railway zone was in Japanese hands. The Japanese government was giving official assurances to the rest of the world that the army was only taking precautions to safeguard the railway against further attack, but the army was following its own counsels. Wherever it set foot it prepared to stay. Chinese administration was forcibly dispersed and a Japanese administration set up in its stead, directly or through puppets. Discrepancies between the promises of the Japanese civil government and the acts of the Japanese army have become familiar in recent years. They are the rule rather than the exception. Frequently there has been reason to believe that the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs has been as much taken unaware by what the Japanese army has done as the army's victim. What often is thought to be bad faith on the part of the civil government is lack of information as well as lack of authority. It is not certain that the Japanese civil government in 1931 sanctioned more than a punitive expedition in Manchuria or was consulted on what followed. When it gave assurances to the League of Nations it may have been uttering a hope rather than declaring a policy.

The League of Nations had become involved almost immediately, having intervened on China's request. The League convened in special sessions, heard statements, de-

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

liberated and gave judgment. It gave many judgments. It ordered Japan, not once but repeatedly, to evacuate the territory it had occupied. Each order was followed by an extension of the occupation. Before the end of the year the Japanese had overrun all of South Manchuria. While Japan's diplomatic representatives were debating legal points in Manchuria its army was making negotiations superfluous. Chinese troops were driven out, Chinese officials imprisoned or removed, Chinese police disbanded or placed under Japanese supervision, arsenals, barracks, public services, banks and railways taken over—especially railways. Where necessary or expedient, Chinese were shot and a degree of terror reigned. "Banditry" was a convenient blanket excuse for doing away with those who would not submit.

Given the opportunity the Japanese had sought for years, they made the most of it. They did not confine themselves to South Manchuria. With the same excuse of putting down bandits, a term defined according to need, the army was sent into North Manchuria and then across the Chinese Eastern Railway and into the Russian sphere of influence. In North Manchuria they did as had been done in South Manchuria, and within a few months all that was left of Russian influence there was a nominal hold on the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Russians remained quiescent, but at that time began the tension which has not yet eased. For immediately thereafter the Russians began to send troops to the Far East and to build

JAPAN STRIKES

up their defenses on the border between Siberia and Manchuria.

The League of Nations meanwhile debated and periodically warned Japan. After prolonged deliberations it resolved to send the Lytton Commission to the Far East to report to the Council on "any circumstances which, affecting international relations, threaten to disturb peace between China and Japan." The instructions were not intended to be ironical. By the time the Commission started for the Far East Japan was taking possession of the whole of Manchuria. It had already set up a provisional government with a few hand-picked Chinese surrounded by Japanese advisers who drafted orders for them to sign.

Early in 1932 came the six weeks' war at Shanghai, still curiously not called a war. It was brought on by Japan's resentment at the losses inflicted by the Chinese boycott, the only weapon left to China. Japan presented an ultimatum to the Chinese municipal authorities at Shanghai. The Chinese agreed to the terms laid down. Japan attacked nevertheless, confident that the Chinese would flee at the first shot as they had in Manchuria. But years of nationalistic agitation and the higher level of education of the Shanghai population had wrought a different spirit there. To the shock of the Japanese, the Chinese resisted, at first with considerable success despite the armament of tanks, airplanes, armored cars and motorized artillery which the Japanese brought up against Chinese mortars, machine-guns and half-trained peasant soldiers. By sheer weight of metal and mechanical

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

superiority the Chinese were finally crushed, but only after part of Shanghai had been destroyed and thousands killed by air bombs falling on streets crowded with men, women and children fleeing for refuge. The victory, not a very glorious one at best, was not capitalized by the Japanese, who later withdrew their troops, though maintaining outposts in the Shanghai area. But the diversion drew attention from Manchuria, where the Japanese were securely consolidating themselves in such a way as to reduce subsequent transactions at Geneva to the status of a diplomatic pageant.

The Japanese took little pains to conceal their indifference to what the rest of the world thought, but they were not quite prepared for so outright an act of defiance as the open annexation of Manchuria. Instead there merged suddenly a desire for independence on the part of the population of Manchuria, a strange sentiment in light of the fact that nearly all the population was Chinese. The desire was quickly fulfilled. A "declaration of independence" was issued in February, 1932, followed in a few days by the proclamation of a new state called Manchukuo. And a few days later Henry Pu-Yi, the last Manchu emperor of China, deposed in 1911 at the age of five, was brought to Changchun, the newly designated capital, and enthroned as dictator pending final decision as to the form of government. He was enthroned, flanked by Japanese generals and officials, in a ceremony planned and carried out by the Japanese as an expression of the will of the Chinese people. In 1924 Pu-Yi had been driven out of

JAPAN STRIKES

Peking, where he had been permitted to reside under the Chinese republic, and had taken refuge in the Japanese Concession in Tientsin. A few days after Japan's entrance into Mukden Pu-Yi turned up in Dairen, the Japanese port on the South Manchurian coast, in a way never quite satisfactorily explained, since the Japanese have given only cloudy explanations. In the same way he was brought to Changchun (now christened Hsinking) in time for his "coronation." Never in history has a separatist movement been generated so spontaneously, matured so quickly and consummated so easily. But never in history has one had such powerful sponsorship.

On March 9 Pu-Yi was elevated to his throne and Manchuria became a full-fledged state, its link with China formally severed. Four days later the Lytton Commission arrived in Shanghai on the way to Manchuria to investigate the dispute which had led to the Japanese dispatch of troops to Mukden the previous September. It was not only an ironical coincidence. The two events were related. Japan had sound reason for haste. One way to convince the League of Nations that attempts to interfere were useless was to confront it with an accomplished fact. And when the Commission arrived in Manchuria nothing was left for it to do except carry out a piece of historical research. A new government was instituted, with an emperor sitting as dictator pro-tem., a privy council, a cabinet, a legislature and all the other paraphernalia of government; but beside every lever of the machinery of government sat a Japanese, sometimes as nominal adviser, sometimes as

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

substantive official, but in either case always directing the operation of the machine. Already decrees issued by the state were seen by the men whose signatures they bore only after they were promulgated. In fact, one of the first decrees of the new state was a declaration of policy admitting all Japanese claims in Manchuria, especially with reference to railways: the question of parallel lines to the South Manchuria Railway was permanently settled as the Japanese had sought for years.

The Commission's report was completed and signed in Peiping (as Peking is now called) on September 4 and was to be submitted to the League on October 1. One of the recommendations of the report was the withdrawal of Japanese troops into the Railway zone and the cancellation of the independence of Manchukuo. Instead Manchuria was to become an autonomous province under Chinese sovereignty. Debate on such post-mortem issues was forestalled by the Japanese. On September 16 the Japanese government formally recognized Manchukuo as an independent state. Recognition was accompanied by two salient measures. First, General Muto, the commander of the Japanese military forces in Manchuria and governor of the Japanese leased territory around Dairen, was also appointed Ambassador to Manchukuo, showing Japan's idea of the distinction between its colony on the Liaotung Peninsula and the independent state of Manchukuo. In effect, General Muto became Resident General of Manchukuo. Second, a Protocol was issued, signed by Japan and Manchukuo, in which both agreed to "co-

JAPAN STRIKES

operate in the maintenance of their national security," to which end Japan was to be permitted to maintain in Manchukuo "such Japanese forces as may be necessary for this purpose." In short, Manchuria became a Japanese protectorate.

Japan had not yet finished. Manchukuo had to be rounded out. And China, too, had to be made to accept the accomplished fact. At home the Chinese were defiantly asserting that they did not acknowledge the existence of Manchukuo and would never submit to the loss of Manchuria. At Geneva they were vigorously pressing the legal case for international intervention, an unanswerable case as based on the Kellogg Pact, the Nine-Power Treaty concluded at Washington, the Covenant and the findings of the League's own commission of inquiry. China had to be cowed and formally to acknowledge defeat. Manchuria had to become a closed issue.

While the League was holding full-dress debates on the Lytton Report and Japan was on trial at the bar of world opinion in Geneva, Japan was pursuing its course relentlessly and with almost contemptuous indifference in the Far East. Lying to the south and west of Manchukuo is the province of Jehol, also known as Eastern Inner Mongolia. It has an area of some 60,000 square miles and a population of four million, about nine-tenths of which is Chinese and the rest Mongolian. It also has large deposits of iron ore. And its boundaries run southward to the Great Wall of China and within a hundred miles of Peiping. All North China lies therefore at its feet. In

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

brief, Japan proceeded to take Jehol. Whether maliciously intended or not, it began its drive through the province with 25,000 men on the day after the Assembly of the League had adopted a report finding Japan guilty on the indictment as drawn by the Lytton Commission and thus voiding the existence of Manchukuo. Japan not only took Jehol but pressed on through the Great Wall into China proper. The offensive began late in February of 1933. By the middle of May the Japanese troops were at the gates of Peiping and only forty miles from the port of Tientsin. By that time the Chinese were terrified. There appeared to be every prospect that North China would go the way of Manchuria. Reliance on the League of Nations was vain. China agreed to negotiate directly, which was what the Japanese had sought since 1931. A truce was reached on terms which constituted complete surrender.

China agreed to the demilitarization of nearly all of North China between Peiping and the Great Wall. Its troops had to be withdrawn, leaving only a police force officered by men who in practice have had to be satisfactory to the Japanese. This meant leaving the whole area of some 5,000 square miles defenseless against a foray by Japan from Jehol whenever Japan so desired. This in turn meant that not only the neutralized zone but all of North China was thereafter to be at Japan's mercy. So in actuality it now is. As Manchuria has reached the status of Korea before annexation to Japan, so North China now has reached the status of Manchuria before 1931. It is under Chinese sovereignty subject to Japanese

JAPAN STRIKES

veto. The government is Chinese but it governs on Japanese sufferance. It is unrestricted so long as its acts are not inimical to Japan's interests. At best it can hope to control only such of its affairs as Japan does not consider vital to itself. Manchuria has become a Japanese protectorate and North China a Japanese sphere of influence. North China remains Chinese at Japan's pleasure, thus advancing Japan's march of conquest by one stage.

The next stage recommended itself by simple logic. China had been cowed. The West still had to accept the new status as inevitable and renounce any hope of interference. Japan withdrew from the League as a protest against its decision on the Lytton Report, but something more positive was needed. China's new status, Japan's new role and the neutrality imposed on the West thereby had to be made clear beyond future question, doubt or challenge. After a few months in which the world had time to assimilate what had happened the attempt at clarification was made. In April, 1934, a spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office made a public statement. It was an abrupt warning to all other Powers to keep hands off in China. China was Japan's preserve. In that statement can be read the interpretation of all that Japan had been doing since 1931 and a forecast of what it still hoped to do. The sensation produced by that statement in every world capital was warranted. Not even the establishment of Manchukuo was of greater importance for the future of the Far East.

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

After referring to Japan's special position and "her mission in East Asia," the statement declares: "Japan considers that to keep peace and order in the Far East she must act single-handed and on her own responsibility. Japan considers that no other country except China is in a position to share that responsibility." Therefore Japan would oppose any attempt by China to use the influence of any other country "to repel Japan." And therefore, also, "Japan expects foreign nations to give consideration to the special situation created by the Manchuria and Shanghai incidents and to realize that technical or financial assistance to China must attain political significance."

By way of concrete application of this generalization:

"Japan must therefore object to such undertakings in principle. Although she will not object to any foreign country negotiating individually with China regarding propositions of finance or trade so long as these propositions are beneficial to China and do not threaten the maintenance of order in East Asia, if such negotiations threaten to disturb the peace of East Asia, Japan will be compelled to oppose them.

"For example, supplying China with war planes, building airdromes and detail military instructors or advisers to China, or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses, would obviously tend to separate Japan and other countries from China, and ultimately would

JAPAN STRIKES

prove prejudicial to the peace of East Asia.
Japan will oppose such projects."

The inferences are plain. There is more here than an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine, as the declaration is popularly called. There is notification that all relations between China and the rest of the world must be carried on through the medium of Japan, or at least with Japanese consent. Japan must be left free to deal with China as it sees fit and China must be left to whatever fate the Japanese decree for it. China cannot buy armament from any country except Japan. Even technical assistance, such as, for example, the League of Nations has been giving in advising China how to organize a public health service, is forbidden. "Loans for political uses," an elastic term which can be stretched to include credits of all kinds, are forbidden. Ordinary European and American trade with China is not forbidden, it is true, but only "so long as these propositions are beneficial to China and do not threaten the maintenance of order in East Asia." But what trade threatens the maintenance of order in East Asia is clearly left to Japan to decide, since it is laid down that in the maintenance of peace and order in Eastern Asia Japan "must act single-handed and on her own responsibility." In other words, nothing but trade and only such trade as Japan permits. Most of all, China's foreign relations are subject to Japanese visé. The meaning is clearly Japanese hegemony. All China becomes a protectorate.

So swift and vigorous was the protest from the other

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

Powers, since this touched them more intimately than the future of Manchuria or the sanctity of the Kellogg Pact, that the Japanese Foreign Office felt compelled to soften the edges of the statement by generalized assurances that it would not violate the treaty rights of other Powers. But never was the statement repudiated or explicitly withdrawn. Nor was any explanation made of the fact that the statement, simultaneously with its public announcement, had been communicated to Japanese consular and diplomatic officers throughout the Far East, presumably as a declaration of policy if not as a body of instructions. In fact, it could not be withdrawn, since it stated the ambition of the Japanese Empire.

Chapter VI

JAPAN SHOWS ITS HAND

FOR the key to the meaning of events in the Far East it is better to look, not at Japan's invasion of Manchuria or withdrawal from the League of Nations but at the declaration of the Foreign Office Spokesman. The diplomatic incident created by its pronouncement was smoothed over by the orthodox diplomatic device of evasion: all sides agreed to look in another direction and say that they saw nothing. But that which lies behind the declaration and was brought into the open by it remains. What that signifies cannot be evaded: it is the heart of the conflict in the Far East.

The central fact of the Spokesman's statement is that it contained nothing new. It only put into words what Japan has stood for throughout the last twenty years and in one way or another has sought to achieve. It voiced the convictions and expectations of the Japanese government and ruling classes and of the Japanese people inasmuch as the Japanese people always support their government and ruling classes. Had any representative of the Japanese government been equally frank at any time in these twenty years he would have made the same statement.

All that was in the Unofficial Spokesman's statement, put bluntly and unequivocally, can be read in Japan's

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

acts since the beginning of the World War. The Twenty-one Demands in 1915 were the first clear affirmation: as has already been pointed out, Group V of those demands, which would have given Japan control of the Chinese police force and imposed Japanese military, financial and political advisers on the Chinese government, would have been tantamount to putting China under a Japanese protectorate. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement, whereby Japan asked—and under pressure of World War diplomacy got—the United States to subscribe to Japan's "special interests" in China was a more modest affirmation. The attempt to retain possession of Tsingtao and to overrun Siberia was in the same tenor. So was the subsidizing of a pro-Japanese cabinet in Peking in 1918 and 1919 by means of so-called loans. The policy of conciliation in the years following the Washington Conference was only an interlude. The abiding purpose asserted itself again in 1931 and has become more resolute since. Before 1931 Japan was not of a sufficiently commanding stature to take its stand uncompromisingly. Now it is or believes itself to be. It has itself been growing in power while the rest of the world has declined at least temporarily. The Spokesman's declaration means Japanese hegemony over Eastern Asia; and hegemony is what Japan has aimed at covertly for twenty years and openly asserts now.

Japan's attitude at Geneva therefore is understandable after the fact and should have been predictable before. Its refusal to concede the right of the League of Nations even to interfere in Manchuria was not out of any

JAPAN SHOWS ITS HAND

obduracy, pride or captiousness, but wholly consistent with the larger object it has set for itself. The insistence that a settlement be reached in direct negotiations between itself and China was not a tactical maneuver but an application of principle. To have permitted a third party, whether a single Power or a group of Powers, to interfere would have been to concede that Japan did not have a unique relation to China; and that would have been to renounce all hope of domination over China. To have conceded the right to interfere with the conquest of Manchuria would have been to negate the purpose for which Manchuria was being conquered.

The motivation of the taking of Manchuria and the refusal to recede is to be found in Japan's idea of destiny. And this derives not only from national megalomania, heady militarism, desire for self-aggrandizement or economic urgency, although all enter, especially the last; there is also a certain historical derivation. The basic premise of Japan's philosophy of action is that force is the sole determinant in the relation of nations, more particularly in the Far East. As an interpretation of the last hundred years the premise is unchallengeable, especially in the Far East. Japan can document it from its own experiences and from its observations of China, the Philippines, Java, Malaya and India. Japan re-entered the world at an abnormal time, a time of inordinate rapacity, though veneered with cant: prime ministers led congregations in prayer on Sunday, and on Monday sanctioned the rape of provinces and the plundering of helpless races.

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

Nowhere was the law of grab observed with more consecrated fidelity and complete success than in the Far East. In Africa the international looting was only more brazen. Primitive tribes could be massacred and their lands stolen without the elaborate and lofty apologetics deemed appropriate when the more highly developed peoples of Asia were the victims. It was easier to demonstrate that despoiling primitive tribes of their property and killing them if they protested was for their own advancement in civilization. From 1853 until before 1914 the Japanese watched the Powers vying with each other in the plundering of China. What they could not see in the Near East or Africa they could read about. The connection of ideas they made was unfortunate but logical. They deduced that no restraints were suffered by the strong in dealing with the weak. Those took who could. Applying the deduction, they have based their course in China on the assumption that China would be conquered in any case. It was only a question which nation would be the conqueror. It is understandable that they elected themselves. Indeed, it would not have been understandable had they elected otherwise, for then they would have violated every instinct of self-preservation. Obviously, the next step to conquest of China by any Power other than Japan would be the conquest of Japan by the same Power. For this conclusion the history of empire in the last century offers ample evidence.

The corollary suggests itself. If Japan is to realize its ambition it must do so in the next few years. The time

JAPAN SHOWS ITS HAND

will never be more favorable. Now China is at its weakest and is least able to resist. Now the West, too, is at its weakest and is least able to oppose. Both conditions are indispensable to Japan's success and they must be present at the same time. Their coincidence may never recur. In fact, it is against all probability unless the prophets of doom are vindicated and the world is facing a prolonged process of dissolution.

For one thing, if nationalism is destined to wax rather than wane among the subject nationalities which have been the sport of empire, as it must almost by a law of social gravitation, then China will press more vigorously for recovery of independence rather than less. And it is likely to do so more successfully with the passing of time. China, too, has begun to modernize; science is being applied both to production and armament. If it succeeds in carrying out its reconstruction, its nationalism will not be vocal and emotional only. It will be equipped with the means of regaining equality just as Japan was. And the population of China is approximately five times larger than Japan's, a fundamental factor which Japan cannot permit itself to forget.

Much more important, if it still holds true that there is international competition for control over China, then Japan's competitors are now at the greatest disadvantage. The West is still exhausted from the effects of the World War. Economically Europe is still prostrate, partly as a sequel of the war's ravages and partly by reason of economic evolution. Politically it is still engaged in the war.

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

Great Britain, Germany and France, the principal claimants to position in the Far East before the World War, are immobilized by European hostilities. Each must remain alert against the dangers on its own borders and cannot run the risk of diverting energy or attention to the more remote concerns of Asia. All must think at the moment of survival rather than imperial aggrandizement. But, also, all have vested interests in the Far East, territorial, political or economic, and all must look to the potentialities of the Far East to recoup themselves. The present phase may be a temporary one. When the hostilities are appeased or once fought out to settlement and attention is once more disengaged, Europe will look again to its vested interests in the Far East and to the potentialities which once drew it to that hemisphere and which will have the more attraction with the greater need. Soviet Russia has lost its imperial might and still must devote every resource to the erection of a modern economic structure and the founding of a new social order. But its progress is ominous from the point of view of those who have anything to fear from Russia's strength—fatal, as far as Japan's ambitions are concerned. Year by year, unless Soviet Russia has now unforeseeable reverses, it will be in a better position to obstruct Japan's advance, if not to thrust it back. As for the United States, it, too, is now immobilized, partly because the World War taught that it cannot be indifferent to Europe and partly because it is going through economic travail. But the United States also has made ominous strides toward world leadership

JAPAN SHOWS ITS HAND

since 1918. Furthermore, it has given unmistakable evidence of its interest in the Far East, an interest more than quixotic. If only for economic reasons it will be less detached in the future rather than more. To that its attempts to veto Japan's aspirations in the last few years bear witness.

When the Japanese General Staff looks at the world as it is and then calls on the government to support a program of systematic conquest in the Far East, its case is irrefutable. Given the premises—that the Far East will be conquered by some Power sufficiently strong and that it is desirable to the Japanese that Japan be that Power—no answer can be made to the conclusion that Japan must proceed now. For in all probability it must be now or never. All that can be said in rebuttal is that the whole case is anti-social and that the premises on which it is based are obsolete, because a new international spirit reigns and the old motives of the Powers in the Far East have been changed.

Of the first it may be said that it is true but has no bearing on reality. The law as expounded by the Japanese is the jungle law; by it nations must struggle for existence and peace must be described as an interval between wars, the normal state in the life of nations. That this is a horrible, even a suicidal, prospect for mankind may be so, but that has nothing to do with whether it is a fact. The question is only whether the Japanese analysis is true to the evidence drawn from contemporary international society.

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

On the evidence are the Japanese premises obsolete? Where? In Europe? In the Treaty of Versailles? In France's relations with the Little Entente? In Italy's maneuvers with Austria and Hungary? Or in the emanations from National Socialist Germany or the higher mathematics of parity in Anglo-American naval debates? There have been frequent and lofty enunciations of the new spirit in international relations but it is yet an unembodied spirit. The Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawed war, but every nation has clung tenaciously to weapons which have no use except in war. Conferences on disarmament have convened, referred to committee and adjourned, and everybody in the world except large numbers of starry-eyed Americans, liberal but infantilistically innocent, knows that there never has been the slightest intention to disarm. The Covenant of the League of Nations is indeed the charter of a new international society, but what signatory has paid it more than lip-service if strong enough to ignore it? What country has shown any willingness to submit its national actions, policies or interests to international review or to subordinate its sovereignty to any world organ? Even the United States in its hour of highest consecration exempted the Monroe Doctrine from the jurisdiction of the League. There have been periodic inaugurals of the new order in rhetoric, but no nation has allowed any considerations drawn from a new order to inhibit it from attaining any object that it wanted to attain and was strong enough to attain. The new order

JAPAN SHOWS ITS HAND

has been proclaimed, but the acts are the acts of the old order.

Least of all has there been any new dispensation in the Far East. It may be that the Western Powers have made no new inroads since the World War, but in the first place they have been in a state of convalescence and in the second place there have been the obstacles of Chinese nationalism and Japan's potential opposition. The latter has been implicit rather than declared, but it has been understood nonetheless. While the Western Powers have made no new inroads, also they have not given up any of the gains of past inroads. They declared a new morality as from date but remained the beneficiaries of the old immorality. It was a not wholly disadvantageous arrangement. By declaring the game off at a time when they were not in a position to play successfully they at once excluded new entrants who were in a favorable position and kept their own winnings.

The Western Powers have made certain concessions to China, but these have all been relatively unimportant. Such as they are, they were wrested from the Powers. Nothing has been voluntarily relinquished. Nothing would have been relinquished had not the Chinese revolted, as was amply proved at Paris in 1919 and Washington in 1921. The Western Powers yielded to Chinese nationalism because they had to, insofar as they yielded at all: except for one or two minor points they have kept their territorial outposts. Japan did not yield to Chinese nationalism in Manchuria because it did not have to.

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

There was also this difference, that what the West was asked to give up was trivial relative to its whole world position, whereas Japan was being asked to yield the base of its imperial position. The West has conceded nothing even on extra-territoriality, but it asked Japan to concede everything on Manchuria, which means incomparably more to Japan. The moral law was invoked only when it would have penalized Japan alone, and even then its application is restricted to the Far East.

The Western Powers have given no positive evidence of any change of heart or mind in the Far East, of any difference in their hopes or motives. They have made declarations of disinterestedness, but they were making the same declarations in the years when they were systematically despoiling China. From Japan's point of view, then, it may be that the Western Powers have refrained from further aggrandizement in the Far East because they have reformed or it may be only because they were temporarily exhausted. If the latter, then there is every reason to expect that when their vitality is restored and they have freedom of action once more they will resume at the point where they were compelled to desist in 1914. In that case not only will a golden opportunity have been lost to Japan, but Japan will have been guilty of a lack of rudimentary precaution—an offense never yet charged against the Japanese. Then Japan's hopes will have gone by default and, besides, it will have at its doors again the fortified outposts of strong and covetous empires. It will

JAPAN SHOWS ITS HAND

have frustrated its own ambitions and incurred insecurity instead.

There is no need to speculate. The facts are plain. Japan is on the march. It flouted the League and pointed the action by resigning. It is going its own way and the direction is marked by the Foreign Office Spokesman. Manchuria is Japan's and will remain so, failing internal breakdown or the application of external force. The fiction of an independent state with a dummy government will be maintained so long as maintaining it does not impede too seriously the designs of the Japanese army or the opportunities of Japanese financiers and industrialists. If it does, then Manchuria will be annexed outright as Korea was, the interval of these few years having served as emollient to European and American sensibilities. Europe and the United States may recognize Manchukuo or not; it does not matter. As for the Lytton Report, it is already a forgotten document.

The present form of government in Manchukuo or the form it may have in the future is of too little consequence to be worth describing. Whatever form it may have, it will be a mechanism for executing Japanese commands. Chinese and Manchus will be kept in office as window-dressing as long as they are compliant, but only so long. For all practical purposes the government is and will be Japanese. Politically Manchukuo is and will remain Japanese. So also is it Japanese economically. The important banks have been taken over and merged into a central bank, government controlled. Almost the first

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

act of what is called the government of Manchukuo was to make an agreement conferring on the South Manchuria Railway, which is controlled by the Japanese government, the right to administer and operate all the railways in Manchukuo. Since 1931 there has been feverish construction of new railways, all with an eye first to Japanese military strategy and second to the tapping of now undeveloped areas. These lines are all designed to draw the resources and trade of the country exclusively to Japan. For one thing, they will destroy the utility of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the connecting link between Soviet Russia and Manchuria, even if that road is not sold to Japan or Manchukuo as the result of negotiations begun in 1932. To finance the consolidation of old roads and the construction of the new the South Manchuria Railway Company has increased its capitalization by nearly \$200,000,000, almost double the original amount. Since this is a semi-official enterprise and all of its capital comes from Japan, the likelihood of Japan's withdrawing or cutting Manchukuo genuinely loose may be surmised. Government monopolies are being formed to develop and operate the natural resources and public utilities of the country—oil, coal, gold, electric power, forests, etc. As in Japan, the monopolies will be operated for the profit of small financial groups closely related by family and interest to men at the head of the Japanese government. They will be financed by these groups—Japanese groups, with perhaps a little participation by Chinese in Manchukuo who are subservient and by their investments inci-

JAPAN SHOWS ITS HAND

dentally give hostages for continued subservience. Therefrom also it may be gathered how much prospect there is for withdrawal. At some future date Japan will say that its ties to Manchukuo are too close to enable it to give Manchukuo full freedom without endangering its own stability.' These are the ties which it is diligently binding now. This is not a unique order of procedure, however. The first steps taken by any imperialistic Power in subduing a weaker country are those which will give it a logical defense for remaining there as a matter of self-preservation. For example, consider India.

Manchuria, then, remains Japanese. But there is a remorseless logic in imperialistic expansion. Each step forward compels another step forward. Japan will not stop with Manchuria. Probably it cannot. The "rounding out" of Manchukuo was not completed with the taking of Jehol. Directly west of Manchukuo lies Mongolia, with boundaries ill defined as everywhere in Northeastern Asia. The question of security arises. It always does, for each step in advance leaves the new acquisition exposed to the territory that lies just beyond. A European Power which took Long Island would have a precarious hold unless it also had possession of Manhattan Island. It could never be secure in possession of New York City so long as the American army was across the Hudson River on the Jersey shore. For strategic reasons it would have to take New Jersey. And so on. In this way every imperialistic aggression is a hostage to further aggression. This is the attrac-

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

tion of empire and its fatal weakness. Thus all empires stretch until at some point of strain they fall apart.

The Japanese General Staff can argue with considerable reason that the frontiers of Manchukuo are difficult to defend with the no man's land of Mongolia just beyond. The argument derives added cogency from the fact that Soviet Russia is strongly entrenched in Outer Mongolia, where there has been a soviet rule of sorts for some years. At any rate the vanguard of the Japanese advance is already moving into both Inner and Outer Mongolia. Military and commercial agents, usually the former in the guise of the latter, have been trickling in since shortly after the consolidation of Manchukuo. The former Mongolian territory already incorporated into Manchukuo contains a large number of Mongols, two million according to some estimates. How logical then to unite them all under one banner, led by their kinsman Pu-Yi, descendant of the Manchu conquerors. The sparsely settled region of Mongolia has been juridically under the suzerainty of the Chinese republic since the overthrow of the Manchus, but the relationship has been loose. The Mongol tribes have for some time been restive and a movement for autonomy has developed, partly spontaneous in origin and partly with foreign stimulus. Stimulation has never been so active as now. Politically the Mongolian deserts are muddied waters, and Japan is fishing with diligence and skill. It is not prophecy but a statement of the law of momentum to say that at least Inner Mongolia will follow in the path of Manchuria.

JAPAN SHOWS ITS HAND

The fate of Outer Mongolia will depend upon such reckoning as may come between Japan and Soviet Russia.

All that has been said of Mongolia is equally true of Siberia, except that the waters of Siberia are not muddied and no fishing is permitted. Siberia comes down over Manchukuo like a fur cap, the head covered down over the ears. A little to the side of one ear is Vladivostok bristling with Russian guns on land and from the air. So long as Soviet Russia extends across Asia to the Pacific there is a potential check to Japanese aggrandizement. But Siberia cannot be dealt with as Mongolia. There no technique of penetration or infiltration suffices. No intrigue to set one part against another will be effective. No fictions can be maintained. Nothing except direct frontal attack against the whole might of Soviet Russia can make the frontier of Manchukuo "secure" on the north and round out Japan's continental empire.

As has already been said, North China now occupies the status of Manchuria before 1931. But that is too indeterminate a status to be permanent. It did not last more than twenty-six years in Manchuria, and during half that time Japan was only a minor Power and had to be circumspect. It cannot last so long in North China, now when Japan believes itself to be able to flout the world. Too many forces for change are at work in China for any part of it to remain long in a twilight zone. There are too many factors of instability for so delicate a balance to be maintained. Nationalism is subdued, not crushed. It will rise again, the more embittered for the humiliating defeat

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

by Japan, and with all the desperation of irredentism everywhere it will move to recover what it has lost. The challenge it gave in Manchuria before 1931 will be repeated in North China, but with more force, since North China is closely settled and developed and was for centuries the seat of Chinese government. Japan will not wait for that to mature. It cannot without jeopardizing everything it has already achieved. It will have to make a closed issue of North China as it did of Manchuria. North China cannot remain half Chinese and half Japanese. To get the advantages of control Japan must have direct possession. Otherwise it cannot long exercise control. It must take North China or renounce North China. And Japan's mood is not one of renunciation now.

In 1933 Japan sent its army to the gates of Peiping and Tientsin to put the Chinese in their place. Sooner or later it will have to send the army into Peiping and Tientsin, and once there the army will remain. But it is neither logical nor practicable to make a separate zone of the region between Jehol and Peiping and Tientsin. There are no natural frontiers. There is no reason for Japan to stop at that point and it is not likely to want to. For geographical and economic reasons and even by Chinese tradition North China must be considered as a unit. Japan is more likely to extend its sway down to the Yellow River and perhaps even to the Yangtze, consolidating North China with Manchuria and reconstituting a so-called Manchu empire—an empire with all the rights and powers that Manchukuo has now. How this will come and

JAPAN SHOWS ITS HAND

when and by what precipitated there is no way of knowing; there may be drift for some time or the climax may arrive at once. There may be in North China the analogy to the blowing up of the South Manchuria Railway tracks in 1931. It could come about naturally in the explosive situation in North China or it might be contrived. Or there may be a slow evolution and Japan penetrate ever further with military, political and economic influence until consummation of possession is only a matter of formal declaration. Japan has gone too far to stop, and it cannot recede without accepting self-imposed defeat—at a time when none other is able or willing to impose defeat—the humbler role in the world which it has bent every effort to put behind. This is scarcely compatible with the psychology of the hot flush of success. By all the laws of probability North China will fall to Japan as Manchuria did, failing the interjection of some impediment from without.

Chapter VII

SAMURAI IN A FACTORY WORLD

IT MAY be said, then, that unless there is war in which Japan is defeated, an economic collapse within Japan, a world-wide economic collapse that carries Japan with it or a world revolution that changes the whole content of international relations, Japan will succeed in converting all Eastern Asia into a colonial possession and thus making itself one of the most powerful empires on earth, if not the most powerful. As a corollary it must be added that then the Western Powers will be evicted from Eastern Asia. Of these contingencies world-wide economic collapse and revolution are incalculable. Reservation must be made for them in any attempt to analyze the present, but not even the most tentative hypothesis can be based on them. They may come and they may not.

Internal economic collapse in Japan is only by degree less incalculable, although there is a tendency in much writing about the Far East to assume that because Japan is poor it cannot attempt to execute its grandiose designs without breaking under the strain. Japan is, indeed, poor, but no sweeping conclusions can be drawn from that fact. The World War proved that normal criteria of public finance and national wealth cannot be applied in time of war or in any abnormal national condition which calls for the complete dedication of a nation's being. It was demon-

SAMURAI IN A FACTORY WORLD

strated with mathematical certainty in 1914 that the war could not last more than two years because then the nations involved would be bankrupt; yet the war lasted four years. Most of the combatant nations may have been bankrupt in 1918, it is true, but they were able to go on fighting nevertheless. So, too, Japan may be able to carry forward its advance even if by the measure of accounting it is insolvent. The lot of the Japanese people may then be hard and their livelihood scanty, but that need not affect foreign policy. It seldom does. As a generalization it may be said that a nation is solvent for purposes of war or foreign aggression so long as the government has the support of the people, unless the nation is one which must import foodstuffs and depends on foreign sources for much of its military supplies. Japan does not fall in this classification. It is or can be self-sustaining in food and it can buy and store war material for a long struggle before its wealth and credit are exhausted.

Further, even if Japan's resources are too slender at present to support the conquest, pacification and administration of an empire, it does not follow that these resources will not increase. The contrary is more likely. Japan is still in the early stages of industrialization, but it is making rapid progress, as the success of its commercial invasion of Asia, Africa and Latin America indicates. Like England a hundred years ago, it has entered on the course of empire at the first rise of an ascending curve. There is a marked difference in that a hundred years ago the whole world was economically at the beginning of an

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

ascending curve, whereas it now has at the best levelled off. But unless Japan is drawn down by a world-wide economic crash—Japan is now closely enough bound with the world economic system so that is possible—its wealth will increase and thereby its ability to support external aggressions. The time element is all important: the relation between the speed with which Japan can consummate its plans and the momentum of the forces of disintegration, if there is to be disintegration; and the relation between the speed with which Japan can make its exploitation of Eastern Asia profitable and the rate of exhaustion of its resources in making the attempt. There are too many unknown quantities here for any equation, too many variables even for an intelligent guess.

The drain on Japan resulting from the projection of the advance in Manchuria should not be underestimated, however. The government's budget figures already are eloquent. In the fiscal year 1931-1932, the year before the occupation of Manchuria, government expenditures were fixed at Yen 1,476,000,000. (A yen at normal exchange is worth fifty cents in American money.) For 1932-1933, the year after the occupation began, they were Yen 1,950,000,000—an increase of half a billion yen or one-third. For 1933-1934 expenditures were budgeted at Yen 2,309,414,000, a further increase of 360,000,000 or fifteen per cent. The budget for 1934-1935 calls for Yen 2,111,000,000, a slight reduction if it can be held to estimates, which is hardly likely. At any event Japan's gov-

SAMURAI IN A FACTORY WORLD

ernment expenses have increased by fifty per cent since the beginning of the Manchurian affair.

The bearing of Manchuria on these figures may be seen from three significant facts. In 1931-1932 extraordinary expenditures were scheduled at Yen 365,000,000, in 1934 at Yen 944,000,000. Also, of the total budget for 1934-1935 nearly a billion yen or 45 per cent was for the army and navy and the expectation was that this sum would be exceeded. Finally, the amount of Japan's national debt in 1931-1932 was a little more than six billion yen, in 1934 it was almost nine billion yen. It had risen by Yen 800,000,000 the year after the Manchuria affair began. This is approximately the amount of Japan's deficit every year since then, which is to say that since it took Manchuria Japan has failed to meet its cost of government by one-third.

Manifestly such a condition cannot last. Either Japan must succeed in making Manchuria profitable or it must tap new sources of wealth at home. It cannot call on unlimited foreign credit and its people cannot continue to bear the additional taxation which a deficit so large lays on them. The time element will be decisive. The future of Japan is a race between success in colonial exploitation and internal impoverishment to the point of disruption. But there is at least a race, and the glib conclusions that Japan's imperial expansion will be checked by its present economic limitations are subject to serious question. No conclusions can be drawn at all, certainly none robust enough to support any assurance of peace in the Far East.

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

This much is certain, however. If Japan is to be checked by any internal force within a measurable period, that can only be the threat of imminent financial disaster. One contingency can be excluded, one on which there has been much loose talk in America. It is that the Japanese people will call their militarists to account and compel them to reverse themselves. This theory was freely aired in 1931 by those who advocated a firm attitude on the part of the League of Nations and the United States with regard to Manchuria in order to preserve the authority of the international peace machinery. It was said that the Japanese people would not support a militaristic policy, especially against the declared opposition of the Western Powers. The Japanese liberals and business men, it was said, would be encouraged by the vigorous expression of foreign public opinion to make a stand against their militarists. The event proved how little substance there was in this theory. The Japanese supported them with almost religious zeal. In fact, those few public men who were thought even likely to voice opposition were assassinated and the assassins were given light sentences. Japanese opinion raised no outcry against either the assassinations or the light sentences. The theory reflects the intellectual immaturity of American liberalism rather than the state of Japanese opinion. The time may come when social evolution in Japan will produce enough unrest and the burden of armament for foreign conquests bear so hard on the Japanese people that they will be goaded to protest and have the power to make it effective, but that time is far distant.

SAMURAI IN A FACTORY WORLD

Now they would be helpless if they did disapprove of the acts of their military rulers, and there is no evidence that they do disapprove. To the contrary, they appear enthusiastic. And it could not be otherwise in the light of their past. To anyone who knows the history and the psychology of the Japanese nothing else would be credible. So important a part does the national psychological element play in determining Japan's international conduct that it must be understood.

For one thing, Japan is now radiant with success. In the language of the East, it has acquired face. The ease with which it flouted the combined authority of Europe and the United States has scarcely made for a chastening of spirit. Appetite comes with eating, and the feast which the Japanese militarists have spread before themselves in fantasy for a generation has just begun in reality. The militarists have shed lustre on the nation and the people bask in its effulgence. The Japanese people are not the first to take vicarious enjoyment in national glory as compensation for higher taxes and less food. Britannia ruled the waves in the nineteenth century and the inhabitants of perhaps the worst slums in the world took comfort in the fact. The psychology of national prestige may be meretricious but it is a potent force in international politics nevertheless. Not now, when Japan has for the first time proved not only to its own satisfaction but by the confession of the white nations that it can ignore them with impunity, will the Japanese people repudiate those who made the demonstration.

While a great deal of nonsense has been aired about the

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

“proud” Japanese race—racial pride can be induced in any people by the right kind of public speeches, a heady newspaper press and properly edited school books—the Japanese are uniquely conscious of their national identity and sensitive to their position with relation to other races. In part this is a product of the refusal of the white world to concede equality. The treatment accorded to the Japanese in common with other Eastern races by the white nations in their hour of might left a rankling sore in the Japanese, as in all the Eastern races. The refusal of the Allies formally to proclaim equality for the yellow race at the Versailles Conference and, still more, the barriers raised against Japanese immigrants by the United States and the British Dominions have festered the sore. Naturally, the Japanese people will stand by the class which has healed the wound to their self-esteem by proving their equality. In larger part, however, Japan’s psychology is a product of its background of thought and tradition, enforced by a conscious program of education.

While the education of every country is an indoctrination of national egoism, nowhere else is it so deliberately designed to that end. The Japanese are taught almost literally that they are the elect of God, and the result is chauvinism to the degree of national megalomania. History as taught to Japanese children and believed by the great majority of adults is a compound of myth and superstition unparalleled anywhere else in the world and incredible in a people so highly civilized. They not only believe in their Emperor’s Divine right to rule; they hold

SAMURAI IN A FACTORY WORLD

him himself to be of Divine origin and themselves to partake of semi-Divinity as his subjects, thus being distinguished from other mortals, who are of a lower order. To this mythology, dressed out in a pseudo-metaphysical jargon, historians, social scientists and psychologists in university faculties must give at least lip-service. Overtly to question it means ostracism in normal times and the danger of assassination in abnormal times such as the present. And it is accepted as fact by a nation which travels by train, communicates by wireless, reads daily newspapers, votes for members of parliament, works at the most intricate machinery, is cured by the most delicate surgical operations and can boast of distinguished physicists, chemists and biologists. Patriotism in Japan is not a sentiment but a religion with the passion of Islam, a religion, also, inculcated, spread and sustained by the most skillful artifices of modern propaganda. For while many of its elements are old, they have been systematized only recently and since then deliberately instilled as a cult. This cult is the moral support of Japanese militarism and imperialism, and so deeply has it been implanted that the militaristic and imperialistic class is not only omnipotent but secure against popular challenge. For opposition is more than a political position; it is a form of impiety.

The social background of Japan made the task of propaganda not a very difficult one. Feudalism was abolished as an institution after the Restoration in 1868, but it survives in the thought and feeling of the people. For all the great banking groups, railway systems, national monopo-

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

lies and industrial combines in which urban life is organized, Japan is still feudal in spirit. Loyalty is the dominant motive and represents the highest value in the moral code. It has only been transferred from the clan to the larger group of the nation. There is a mildly restrictive constitution, which even so is honored only in the breach, and the ceremony of choosing parliamentary representatives by ballot is formally exercised. Nevertheless the class which ruled before 1868 still rules. It rules under a different name and in a different way. It has changed somewhat in membership and is slightly enlarged. Those of the feudal nobility who could not adapt themselves to new ways have passed. The majority have made their adaptation. If the feudal daimyo are not identical with the overlords of industry and finance, they are associated with them. Until a few years ago each of the great clans which ruled the country through the army, navy, Privy Council and ex-officio group known as the Elder Statesmen had its close link with one of the great trading and financial corporations. Now the relationship is less direct and definite, but it is still there. If there is any change it is in the direction of a deeper and wider permeation of the national social system. The feudal daimyo have exchanged the double-edged sword for the weapons of loans and contracts, their lands for banks and factories, but they still wield power. A small oligarchy still rules—if not absolutely and although with certain superficial and nominal checks, at least for all practical purposes. At any rate the idea of rulership is accepted by the people—challenged

SAMURAI IN A FACTORY WORLD

faintly if at all and then only by a negligible minority. Members of labor unions may go on strike, but they strike as subjects. Obedience to a small ruling class is not yet challenged as an idea by the overwhelming majority of Japanese. It is the normal condition of life and the heart of social relationships.

By the provisions of the constitution the army and navy are responsible to the Emperor alone and not to the cabinet and the diet. They are therefore practically autonomous and in effect are in a position to overturn the cabinet if the civilian officials should by chance become untractable. They would be in the same position without any constitutional provision. For with feudal loyalty there has survived the feudal exaltation of the martial spirit. To the Japanese people the ideal is still stated in terms of the soldier. The code of the samurai—the professional warrior class—is still the moral code of the Japanese. It may be thinly overlaid with scraps of Western ideas and a veneer of Western customs and be somewhat blurred in a world of office buildings, factories and industrial slums; but it still strikes a response in the instincts of the Japanese people. The disillusionment with the glories of war and the protest against the institution of war now common among Western peoples not only is not shared by the Japanese. It is incomprehensible to them. It is out of another world. *Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori* is to the Japanese not rhetoric or romantic idealism. It is sober fact, and they would die on the battlefield with Islamic fatalism and, more, with poetic ecstasy, certainly without questioning.

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

No coup was needed for the army and navy to acquire the complete control over the country which they have wielded since 1931. That was in the natural order. There is no Japanese analogy to Germany or Italy. No dictatorship had to be asserted. There is only the accentuation of tendencies native to the country and permanent. The military are masters because to them belongs mastery as of right by Japanese standards. And the fact is that the Japanese people will follow the call of their military leaders into any adventure, for any crusade of conquest, against one country or all countries, whether suicidal or not. There may be those among them who know that it is suicidal, as there are already some who fear the ultimate consequences of the leap over Eastern Asia, but they will not dare to express themselves publicly. It is even doubtful that they would want to. If by chance they should do so, they would be put out of the way summarily and without process of law. The assassinations in 1932 stand as examples. The Japanese military caste can have its own way so far as its own people are concerned for reasons to be found in the structure of Japanese civilization. Any consideration of the Far East must take this fact as its point of departure.

All talk of Japanese liberalism as a check on Japan's military aggression is therefore hollow. It has not even the merit of reality. It is a phantasm of well-meaning American tourists making hasty deductions from superficial travellers' observations or drinking in the amiable sentiments of banquet speeches. There is no liberalism in Japan in any connotation of the word understood in Europe and

SAMURAI IN A FACTORY WORLD

the United States. There is a considerable number of Japanese, including many of those best known in the United States, who air their liberalism for foreign consumption, but it is only phrase-deep and not always sincere. Whenever the Japanese military caste commit some act in violation of the principles they have publicly espoused, they not only are silent but take the role of apologists. When the incident is concluded to the satisfaction of the military caste they become liberals again. There are a few rare spirits who have genuinely adopted the philosophy of liberalism and are genuinely opposed to national conduct contrary to the precepts of a war-less international society. They are without influence, if not mute by compulsion. There is also a small number of disaffected or perhaps consciously radical industrial workers, with a still smaller number of disaffected peasants. But the convictions of most of them are not very sturdy and would be washed out by the first wave of mass emotion in any national crisis. As for the rest, they are too few to be considered and their influence is less than negligible. They will no doubt increase in number and influence, if only by the momentum of social evolution in any industrial society, but not in time to affect the working out of forces now under way in the Far East.

The fallacy lies in the attempt to understand Japan in terms of Western ideas and principles and in making analogies from Western social organization because the words descriptive of certain institutions are the same. The error consists in translating words rather than institutions. There

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

is for example a parliament in Japan, but its activities have no relation to parliamentarism as practised and understood in Great Britain and the United States. There is a constitution, but it does not have the same meaning in Japanese political practice and Japanese thinking that it has in Great Britain and the United States. These are institutions with certain social contexts in the West. They lack those contexts in Japan, and, without those contexts they do not have the same purport or effect. The same may be said for liberalism. It is a meaningless word applied to Japan. The very concept of responsible government barely exists and the idea of popular control over the ruling oligarchy is exotic. No parallels can be drawn or comparative judgments made. Historically Japan may be within the Western cultural system, since it is adopting the Western way of life. But the cultural lag is even greater there than in the West. Western forms are still an outer layer. They have not yet penetrated to the core of Japanese ways of feeling and thinking. The motives are the motives of a world of mass-production; the impulses are the impulses of a feudal order. It is this combination of national centralization with feudal loyalty, of skillful propaganda with superstition, of mysticism with technical efficiency, of mediaevalism with tanks and airplanes, that makes the Japanese so difficult of comprehension by the modern mind and so incalculable by modern criteria, as well as so dangerous in a world in which the nexus is made by intricate economic ties and which at least hopes to avoid war. They dwell in a no man's zone of time:

SAMURAI IN A FACTORY WORLD

their springs of action in the Middle Ages, their instruments of action out of the twentieth century.

The motives and the instruments of action are out of the twentieth century. That fact should not be forgotten. The national cult is more than romantic survival or cultural atavism. Mass support for the feudal nobility brought to date is not just to satisfy class egoism. And national aggrandizement is not just to gratify an exuberant chauvinism. It is prompted not only by the strategy of international politics. Japan's motives are out of the twentieth century because it has adopted the social and economic organization of the twentieth century. It has industrialized. Industrialism has vested it with power and laid on it also all the obligations and penalties. And unfortunately for itself and perhaps also for the rest of the world Japan is ill-equipped for industrialization. Of the three prime requisites for machine production—coal, oil and iron—it has only niggardly quantities. According to the best estimates, Japan's reserves of coal would be exhausted in forty years at the rate at which iron is used in a country such as Germany. The yield of oil in one year is less than that of the United States in a single day. Of iron there is not enough to last more than twenty years. In fact, Japan is destitute of nearly all the raw materials essential to factory production. Only in silk is it richly endowed, and fairly liberally in copper. Without stores of natural resources assured to its use Japan cannot complete its industrialization. But it must fully industrialize or it cannot survive. As has already been said, without the power de-

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

rising from command of the machine it could not have endured against the onslaught of the Western Powers, and in any event it has gone too far in industrialization to retreat or even to stand still. Unless it becomes a full-fledged industrial nation it cannot feed its population.

Something must be said at this point about the question of Japan's population. It is injected into every discussion of Japan's acts and policies and is the stock Japanese excuse for every act of national aggrandizement: Japan is overcrowded and must have room to spread. The fact is undeniable; the defense can be summarily dismissed. The population has doubled since modernization began and must indeed have room to spread. But Japan's imperialistic designs have had little relation to this need. Its efforts for territorial aggrandizement have not been in a direction which makes room for Japanese colonists. Japan has had Formosa since 1895 and the number of Japanese settled there is trifling. In the period between the winning of South Manchuria from Russia in 1905 and the formal occupation of all of Manchuria in 1931 only 200,000 Japanese had gone there to settle. The same is true of Korea. The same will be true ten years hence of all of Manchuria. Whatever other prospects possession of Manchuria may hold for Japan, outlet for surplus population is not included. It is doubtful whether Japanese peasants or small traders could do more than survive in the rigorous northern climate of that region or whether they could survive at all against the competition of Chinese peasant immigrants. The Chinese have been populating the region

SAMURAI IN A FACTORY WORLD

for years and they cannot be excluded, because unless it is populated it will have no economic advantages for Japan. Most of all, it is scarcely likely that the Japanese peasants will make the effort. They have never wanted to colonize undeveloped areas and they do not make successful settlers in such areas. And there has been very little expectation on the part of the Japanese military caste that they would try. That is not in its calculations. The pressure of population is an apology after the fact, not a reason for the fact. Insofar as Japan is not actuated by purely military ambitions and strategic considerations, its desire for control of the Far East arises from economic need.

This need is genuine. Japan cannot feed its increasing population without giving opportunity for employment in factories. Industrialization is the solution of Japan's population problem; it is the only solution. Japan must have, therefore, assurance of raw materials for the use of its factories and, still more, assurance of a market in which to dispose of the products of its factories. This is a condition of survival for Japan, and it can rightfully plead justification for any measures it takes to attain it. Hence the determination to secure possession or exclusive control of Eastern Asia, which is at once a storehouse of natural resources and the largest undeveloped market in the world. In pure reason Japan could have such assurance without possession or control and just by the operation of economic laws. Its proximity to the Asiatic continent gives it advantages over other industrial nations both as buyer and seller. It could win against the other industrial nations in

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

fair competition—provided the field were left open to all comers in fair competition. But history has taught the Japanese that this is a condition contrary to fact. The international politics of the Far East has consisted of the effort by successive nations to appropriate territory for themselves. The struggle for empire proved that the only guaranty of free economic access to a region was to control it, unless the region was in a country militarily strong enough to repel all aspirants to conquest. The Japanese, as has been said, do not believe that this struggle has been abandoned and there is no evidence in contemporary international relations on which to base such a belief.

Now, it may be questioned whether Japan will get the kind of assurance it must have by the kind of efforts it is making. The point may be raised that Eastern Asia does not contain a large enough supply of raw materials to sustain an industrial system on the scale of the German, English or American. There is considerable evidence to support this hypothesis. The point may be raised that the benefits Japan will obtain from dominance over Eastern Asia by force will be counter-balanced by the cost of imposing its rule. The point may also be raised that Japan cannot extract any benefit from Eastern Asia by holding it in subjection. It cannot sell the products of its factories to a materially undeveloped China, for then China will not have the means wherewith to buy. China can constitute a market sufficient to Japan's prosperity only when it is itself industrialized. And then it will not only be self-sustaining but perhaps also a competitor. Also, when it

SAMURAI IN A FACTORY WORLD

has reached that degree of technological competence, it will be able to fabricate the means of defending itself against Japan. This is the inner contradiction of economic imperialism which ultimately nullifies imperialism. These are points which must be examined later. Now it need only be said that they are irrelevant. For Japan believes that the course on which it has set will lead to the destination it desires and it will act on that belief, whether sound or not. And it will have the support of its people. They must give their support. They will do so not only out of feudal loyalty. Were they by some miracle to become immediately and completely disenchanted with romantic nationalism and martial glory, they would have no choice. For under present conditions to interpose a veto on their military rulers, if they could, would be to close their only avenue to livelihood.

The Japanese people cannot check their militarists. They do not want to. And they will not.

Chapter VIII

THE JAPANESE TRADE OFFENSIVE

JAPAN cannot be restrained, then, except from without and the only form of restraint that can be effective is force. In plain words, unless there is war Japan will rule all Eastern Asia. And if it does, the results to the West, to say nothing at this point of the Eastern peoples who will become subject nationalities, will be more serious than loss of prestige, more even than loss of settlements, leaseholds and other territorial outposts in the Far East. The loss will be more tangible and more injurious.

That which has made China a prize of conquest and the stake of empire for nearly a hundred years is the prospect of profit from its economic exploitation. That prospect will be lost to the West. When it is said that the Western Powers will be evicted from the Far East it is not meant that they will physically and forthwith be compelled to evacuate the territories in which they are now established—with the exception perhaps of Soviet Russia, which may be driven out of Eastern Siberia. Japan will not give the open challenge to the whole world at once, and it does not have to. There are other devices which will serve the same purpose. The Western Powers just will not be left any reason to remain. All the advantages there would be in remaining will inure to Japan.

Japan is bound by numerous treaties to respect the Open

THE JAPANESE TRADE OFFENSIVE

Door—that is, the guaranty of equality of opportunity for all nations trading in China. It has already formally pledged itself to respect the Open Door in Manchukuo, the pledge being made through the medium of the nominal officials of Manchukuo. But the Open Door has never had more than Pickwickian observance at best, especially where Japan is concerned. Indeed, it may be said that the door through which Japan enters is thenceforth closed to all other entrants. Yet technically Japan can always remain within the law. In international practice, as well as in domestic corporate practice, it is always feasible to nullify the intent of a law while scrupulously abiding by its letter. Just so Japan can preserve the legalities while making the Open Door a fiction in actual practice. There will of course be some foreign trade in Manchukuo and North China that is not Japanese, but it will be small in volume and negligible in proportion. There is no need to speculate on how this will come about. There is the factual record of what took place in South Manchuria after 1905. At no time would it have been easy, if at all possible, to win a civil suit against Japan on the grounds of violating international law and treaties, yet a few years after Japan was established in South Manchuria European and American trading houses had gone. Such trade as remained had to be conducted through Japanese intermediaries.

The procedure can be repeated in Manchukuo and North China. No British, German or American will be expelled and his enterprise closed. No Chinese, Manchu or Mongolian will be forbidden to trade with Europeans

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

or Americans. But . . . An English representative of a Liverpool firm sells a bill of goods to a Chinese merchant in Mukden. The goods are shipped in the customary routine. They arrive in Dairen. First there is an unaccountable delay in discharging them from the ship's hold. Then they are, for some reason never quite clear, delayed in passing through the Customs. Then the Customs finds the invoices in error and special hearings are necessary. Thus two or three weeks are lost, and extra charges have to be paid. Finally the shipment is passed through the Customs and is ready to be put on board a freight train for Mukden. Again for some unaccountable reason it fails to be loaded on the train, or, perhaps, is put into a car dropped off in yards on some branch line. More weeks are lost. Finally the shipment is brought to Mukden and delivered at its destination, and then it is found that by some accident part of it was seriously damaged in transit. A few evenings later the Chinese purchaser meets another merchant at a feast and recounts his troubles. The delay has lost him a considerable amount of business and cost him a large sum. And the same thing has been happening at regular intervals. His friend assures him that he for his part never has such troubles. He orders all his goods from an Osaka firm and there is never the slightest difficulty. So likewise does the first merchant after a few more experiences. Thus only can he escape annoyance and monetary loss. And after other Chinese merchants in Mukden have come to the same conclusion the English agent in Mukden will be getting too few orders to warrant his

THE JAPANESE TRADE OFFENSIVE

being kept there. The Liverpool firm will close its accounts in Manchuria. But there will not have been a single violation of any provision of any treaty. There will not have been anything which any court can find irregular, or anything which the British Consul can make the basis of a protest. Everything will have been legally correct, and the British manufacturer will be out.

The same effect probably could be produced without devious stratagems. The operation of economic law might be enough. There was a time when trade followed the flag. Today it follows finance. The buying and selling of goods across frontiers is no longer an independent transaction. It is linked up with antecedent transactions and conditional upon them, the principal one being the extension of credit. Credit in this sense does not mean postponement of payment for goods but the provision of working capital and the creation of purchasing power. That national group which has credit facilities in a foreign land will have the best opportunity to get its trade, especially if the foreign land be one which is not yet developed and therefore lacks free capital. It is in a position to make loans. It can organize corporations among wealthy natives which can in turn open up new channels of business. It can subscribe to part of the capital of new enterprises and guide them in their policies, especially in deciding where to buy their plant equipment and future stocks. If a new mill in Mukden gets a large credit from a Japanese bank there, it will of necessity buy almost all of its supplies from Japanese houses. It will have to if it expects the kind of accommo-

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

dation in the future that a debtor to a bank must sometimes have. More than this, those who own the credit facilities can initiate, encourage or sponsor enterprises which open up new areas and create trade by creating a demand for products. All this is to say that the selling of machinery, cotton piece-goods or toothbrushes in industrially new countries depends less upon persuasive salesmanship than upon able banking backed by ample resources. The banker is the industrial pioneer in modern times. In Manchukuo first and later in North China banking will be all or predominantly Japanese. In Manchukuo such enterprises as go to other banking groups for financial aid will be made to understand that they are on the Japanese blacklist. As for North China, the future may be envisaged from the warning to the Western Powers by the Spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office against making loans to China. Japan reserves to itself the right to finance China's development, and to it therefore will accrue the benefits from China's development. The strands of China's foreign commerce will be brought together in Japanese banking houses, and the banking houses will be the primary agents of Japanese manufacturers. Furthermore, trade runs along the arteries of communications. In Manchukuo these are already exclusively Japanese. They will become so in North China too.

Whether by devious stratagems or by the operation of economic law, the result of Japanese hegemony in Eastern Asia will be the exclusion of Europe and the United States from a market constituted of almost a quarter of

THE JAPANESE TRADE OFFENSIVE

the population of the earth, the only market furthermore which has possibilities of expansion on the scale of the nineteenth century. This is a loss which strikes Europe and the United States at the most vulnerable point and at a time when they are critically vulnerable. And this is what makes the Far East the world's storm center in the immediate future.

In absolute figures the Occident's vested interest in the Far East is not so large. The total foreign investment in China is estimated at less than four billion dollars, of which only a quarter of a billion is American. The figures on trade also do not bulk so large. Worth less than two billion dollars in 1931, the foreign trade with China does not itself play a major part in the world's economy. But two facts make it relatively of greater importance. First is the marked increase in recent years. In twenty years between 1911 and 1931 China's foreign trade had tripled—from \$600,000,000 to \$1,800,000,000. In the same years exports to China from all other countries increased from \$350,000,000 to more than a billion dollars. It is an increase that by every economic law must continue at an even higher rate, for China has barely entered on the first stage of industrialization and is determined to press forward as fast as possible. The projection of the increase is what gives the Chinese market an importance out of all proportion to its present intrinsic value.

The second fact is that at this time no great industrial nation can dispense with even the smallest amount of foreign trade. All of them are in the same position as

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

Japan, although for different reasons: Japan because it has not yet completed its industrialization and must have raw materials to establish more factories and an outlet for the products of the factories in order to make work for a growing population; the Western countries because they have carried their industrialization so far that productivity has outrun the capacity for absorption of the product, that is, as limited by the income and purchasing power of the majority of the population. As was said in the beginning, national expansion has reverted to an earlier and simpler phase, that of struggle for foreign markets. The international relations of today turn on competition for foreign markets. The evolution of the economic system under power-machine industrialism has reached a point where foreign trade is not a luxury but a necessity. It no longer represents an extra margin of profit but the means of keeping factory-wheels turning, workers employed and the population fed. And this condition is accentuated by the depression. Given the continuance of the same course of evolution, foreign trade is necessary as a matter of survival. The excess product must be sold abroad to preserve national solvency. Until a new point of economic equilibrium is reached, whether by a restoration of the conditions obtaining between 1922 and 1929—if that is possible—or by a fundamental social reconstruction, there must be an ever-sharpening competition for foreign markets.

We are already engaged in that competition. Steadily mounting tariffs are one sign. Embargoes, quota restric-

THE JAPANESE TRADE OFFENSIVE

tions, bounties, reciprocity in its contemporary connotation, the manipulations of currency called "managing"—these are other signs. It is better to say they are weapons in a trade war that is just beginning. Appeals for lowering of the barriers to international commerce may be moving when stated in generalities, and in generalities unanswerable; but in actuality and in the concrete the barriers are for many countries essential to solvency. They are not causes of economic constriction. They are effects. In one form or another they must be raised to unscalable heights unless the necessity for them is removed. World politics is less concerned today with prestige, irredentism, boundary adjustments, linguistic autonomy and the classical preoccupations of diplomacy than with the right to ship wheat and oil and copper and shirtings and the manner of payment for them.

Japan is now sedulously erecting barriers around the Far East and as diligently striving to scale the barriers raised against itself in other parts of the world. The latter must be emphasized. They are at once symptomatic of the times and related to the conflict in the Far East. While consolidating itself on a Far Eastern base Japan has been conducting a commercial offensive in a far-flung terrain. As part of its rise to world eminence is its emergence as full-fledged competitor to the great industrial Powers. Thus, in addition to struggling against the constriction of economic evolution and the paralysis of the depression, these Powers must meet the blows of a new and vigorous opponent. Much has been made in recent years of Japan's

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

inroads into the markets of all Asia, Malaya, Africa and Latin America, perhaps too much. These inroads have, indeed, had serious effects, but they do not presage any peaceful Yellow Peril. Their real meaning lies in what they signify: the end of Western monopoly of the advantages of technological progress.

The gains made by Japan are impressive, even if the alarm they raised is out of proportion. While the exports of all other countries since 1928 have shrunk by as much as two-thirds, Japan's have increased by twelve per cent, measured in volume. Even in money value they have practically come up to the 1928 level despite the disastrous fall in prices. It is pertinent that the most notable gains have been made since 1931. From 1931 to 1933, the years in which the exports of other countries were dwindling away, Japan's exports increased by thirty per cent in volume and more than sixty per cent in value. Unofficial figures showed the rate of increase to be maintained for the first half of 1934. But these were the years, also, which followed Japan's departure from the gold standard and consequent depreciation of the currency. And they were the years in which the whole world economy was so highly disorganized that adventitious and abnormal circumstances could easily enter, circumstances having no permanent significance. Japan's advance has been attributed to the two factors of depreciated currency and low costs of production—the low wages and long working hours surviving from old Oriental standards. Of these the first has probably played the larger part, since the econ-

THE JAPANESE TRADE OFFENSIVE

omies of cheap labor, especially labor which has not yet been brought to the Occidental standard of efficiency, have yet to be demonstrated to be an advantage in competition. Both factors may be called transitory. For obvious reasons Japan cannot permanently remain on a depreciated and fluctuating currency. If normality is ever restored to the world's economy a new parity for all currencies must be established. That is an indispensable condition to the restoration of normality. Also Japan cannot permanently keep its labor on a standard of low wages and long hours. As its industrial establishment is enlarged and the personal relation between employer and worker is lost in the mass, the working class will organize to improve its lot there as elsewhere. It has already begun to do so in spite of the feudal survival and the repressive measures taken by the industrialists' allies in the government. The results are predictable with the expectancy of an engineer's formula. The disparity between costs of production in the Occident and Japan will inevitably narrow. What is permanent, however, is Japan's advent into competition for the world's markets with the producing nations of Europe and America. It will continue to take its share of world trade and to contest for entrance into new trading areas. Its gains will not be at the feverish rate of the years since 1931, but they will be maintained and probably increased. But again, this proves only that the nineteenth century passed and the twentieth century succeeded.

The real import of Japan's trade invasion so-called is its geographical distribution. It has been carried out most

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

effectively in industrially new areas, in areas that have been controlled by European empires for their own economic advantage. Since Great Britain is the first empire, it has been the most conspicuous victim. And India has been the scene of its most notable reverses. The foundation stone of British commercial supremacy throughout the nineteenth century was the textile trade of Lancashire, particularly that with India. In 1928 Great Britain's share of the total world cotton cloth exports was fifty per cent, while Japan's was eighteen per cent. In 1933 Great Britain's share was thirty-eight per cent and Japan's thirty-nine per cent. In India alone Japan's exports increased by ninety per cent in two years, and in 1933 Japan actually passed Great Britain in the number of yards of cotton goods and rayon exported to India—a milestone in the world's economic history. Thus, Japan sold more textiles, Great Britain's traditional commercial field, to India, Great Britain's principal colony, than Great Britain did itself, despite mounting Indian tariffs aimed at Japan, despite the organized resistance of British manufacturers in England and in India. Elsewhere in British Asia the same was true. Japanese exports of cotton goods and rayon to the Straits Settlements were double Great Britain's, to Ceylon they were almost three times as large. Therefore the protracted and sharply contested diplomatic negotiations between Great Britain and Japan throughout 1933 and part of 1934, including the denunciation of the commercial treaties between the two. On Great Britain's part

THE JAPANESE TRADE OFFENSIVE

these represented an effort, vain on the whole, to stem the tide of Japan's economic progress.

Everywhere in the dependent countries it has been the same. Japan's trade with the Dutch East Indies exceeds that of the Netherlands itself, having increased by one and a half times between 1931 and 1934. Its exports of textiles to Kenya and Uganda were six times as large as Great Britain's. Its exports of all commodities to Egypt more than doubled between 1928 and 1933. They more than doubled to South Africa. They quadrupled to East Africa. The increase in Latin America was not in the same proportion but it was marked.

All this is to say that in those parts of the world on which we have counted to sustain our industrial structure when the pressure from within has become disruptive Japan has forced an entry to pre-empt the opportunities and the perquisites—just those parts where all our political power has been used for economic ends. Therefore the competitive raising of tariff walls, the diplomatic maneuverings, the political complications—all of them, whatever their immediate origin may be, whatever their visible content, all of them growing out of the constriction produced by economic evolution and the urgency of economic pressure. Therefore also the intensification of interest in the Far East and the critical significance of Japan's military aggressions there. The primary purpose of empire has been stripped of all extraneous accretions and is starkly visible. For all the great Western empires the primary purpose of empire is being negated. And the most valuable prize

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

of empire is about to be appropriated by one empire, and that a newcomer and one which is giving the challenge to supremacy.

If Japan consummates its political designs in the Far East there will be closed to Europe and the United States half of the only continent on which they can find escape from the pressure which already threatens to become unbearable. For if Japan can do what it has done in the last few years in territories over which it does not have political ascendancy—with all discount made for the exaggeration of abnormal and temporary phenomena—then the future may easily be forecast for the Far East, in which it does have political ascendancy. Economically the Far East will become a Japanese preserve, denied to Europe and America—denied to Europe and America when they cannot brook denial of outlet for external enterprise without risk of internal collapse. The acrimonious controversies over a few thousand tons of naval construction are a symbol and portent. For under nationalism navies are the instrument of the state in the discharge of its highest function, which is to further the interests of the national economy at all times and to protect it in crisis. More than strategic significance attaches therefore to the size of Japan's navy, and there is more than professional military egoism in the resolute opposition of the British and American navies to parity for Japan. For those are the two countries which must contend most vigorously for economic outposts and for markets—the one to protect a position it

THE JAPANESE TRADE OFFENSIVE

has consolidated in the past, the other to gain a position it must have in the future.

More is at stake in Japanese hegemony over the Far East than colonies, prestige and national honor. Unless the course of economic evolution is miraculously and providentially arrested, there is at stake in Japan's conquest the loss of opportunity for escape from the economic blind alley. The Western Powers cannot permit Japan to take possession of the Far East without accepting the risk of national insolvency. On all historical precedent it is hardly likely that they will.

Chapter IX

RUSSIA VS. JAPAN

ONLY war can stop Japan. War, then, with whom? Only three countries come into question: Great Britain, Soviet Russia, the United States.

Of these Great Britain can be excluded at this stage. It has too many hostages in the East. Its far-flung empire is its strength and also its weakness, for it is vulnerable in the East against any Eastern country with striking power. Hongkong, Singapore and the whole of British Malaya would fall at once with the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Japan. Even India would be gravely menaced, and British trade routes to the East would be precarious if not actually severed. Politically the question is artificial. There is an active party in England that favors coming to terms with Japan, that regrets, in fact, the dissolution of the alliance with Japan in deference to American pressure. While this party is definitely a minority, it is an influential minority. And while it would not be joined by a majority in supporting an alliance with Japan in the face of American hostility, a majority would agree with it in holding that as long as Great Britain has territorial possessions in the East it must either make terms with the strongest Power in the East or seek an ally to counter-balance that Power. On this principle the original alliance with Japan was contracted as a check against Rus-

RUSSIA VS. JAPAN

sia. But an alliance with Russia against Japan is not feasible so long as Russia is communist and anti-imperialist. As practical politics war between Great Britain and Japan can be excluded. It is too remote a possibility. Great Britain may oppose Japanese encroachment with every diplomatic and economic stratagem, but unless there is a complete reformulation of the international situation it will stop short of measures which threaten actual conflict.

As a matter of practical politics it can do so, for even if Japanese aggrandizement constitutes a menace to its national security, it can count on others to undertake the obligation of removing the menace. And this is probably the principle underlying the British philosophy of action in the Far East today, although unexpressed and perhaps subconscious. For Soviet Russia and the United States cannot be excluded as potential opponents of Japan. To the contrary, war between Japan and either of them must now be counted as a definite possibility, if not a probability. When one discusses war in the Far East one means war between Soviet Russia and Japan or war between the United States and Japan.

First with regard to Japan and Soviet Russia:

Here no theorizing is necessary. The physical fact is eloquent. Since 1932 the border that divides Siberia from Manchukuo and Korea has been an armed camp. On one side Russian troops, tanks, munitions and supplies are massed for a long campaign, and Vladivostok has been transformed into a fortress and air base with hundreds of planes ready to descend on Japan's industrial cities, key

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

points and lines of communication. On the other side is a Japanese army, with feverish construction of railways designed to enable the Japanese to paralyze communications between European Russia and Eastern Siberia and to pour troops into the region around Lake Baikal for an offensive which would cut off the Siberian maritime province. Each side watches the other with wary suspicion. Each accuses the other of violations and provocations. Periodically there have been reports of clashes, subsequently proved untrue, denied or smoothed over. All the border incidents inseparable from such a situation have occurred. It is a state of armed neutrality, not of peace, one which cannot be indefinitely prolonged without the occurrence of some incident which cannot be smoothed over and which will set a train of consequences that are beyond control. To avoid such an occurrence on the loosely defined boundaries of that region, with little government and less law, would be providential. More than desire for peace is required to ensure peace in a setting so explosive.

The greatest danger of war between Soviet Russia and Japan lies in the explosive setting—the danger that there will be an unintended collision which quickly draws in more men from both sides and then expands into formal hostilities that can no longer be stopped. Even if this be averted, there is the basic conflict of which the explosive setting is a result. This goes deeper than possession of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the line across North Manchuria, which has been the ostensible cause of the recriminations between the two Powers since 1932 and the subject

RUSSIA VS. JAPAN

of prolonged diplomatic huckstering. The railway is itself only a counter. If the disposition of the railway were all that lay between the two countries, it could have been settled as a matter of diplomatic routine. In the first place, its value to the Russians was lost when the Japanese took North Manchuria. Economically it would have little utility and strategically none. In the second place, the Russians are well aware that the Japanese could take it whenever they wished and its recovery would be practically impossible. If the Russians haggled for two years over a difference of a few million dollars in the selling price of the railway, that was because of what lay behind it. They were protecting a diplomatic position rather than the railway.

What induced the Russians to move an army and a military establishment across a continent, at the cost of retarding their industrial reconstruction to a degree scarcely realized outside Soviet Russia, was the sudden renewal of the old Russo-Japanese conflict in Eastern Asia, with the Japanese now as aggressors. In its earlier form before 1904 the conflict turned on possession of territory external to both parties. Now the soil of one was in danger. As has already been explained, the Japanese forgot in a few weeks in the Autumn of 1931 that they were only taking punitive measures for damage to the South Manchuria Railway. Before the end of the year they had crossed over into North Manchuria, which had been Russia's zone for a generation. They made themselves free on the Chinese Eastern Railway, of which Soviet Russia and China were

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

joint owners. They arrested and imprisoned Soviet Russian officials. They finally took North Manchuria altogether. It appeared for a time as if the boundary of Siberia would be ignored, too. Then began the movement of Russian troops into Siberia. It was a matter of simple precaution. Japan was on the rampage and there was no predicting when and where it would stop.

The consolidation of Manchukuo gave a new cast to all relations in Northeastern Asia and a critical turn to relations between Japan and Soviet Russia. So long as Manchuria was a semi-autonomous part of China it served as a buffer between Russia and Japan. With the buffer removed they meet each other on ill-defined boundaries in what can really be described as a no man's land. For both countries the question of security has been raised. While Japan is in an aggressive mood Russian tenure of Siberia is challenged. It can be assured only at the price of maintaining permanently a powerful military establishment in the East. On the other hand, with Soviet Russia in possession of Vladivostok across the narrow Japan Sea from Japan proper, there is at the least a potential check to Japanese aggrandizement. The massing of planes at Vladivostok was an object lesson to Japan. With Vladivostok fortified, garrisons along the Siberian border opposite Manchukuo, and Soviet Russia exercising an unofficial protectorate over Outer Mongolia, a halt can be called to Japanese progress in Eastern Asia. To the north and east Japan is stopped. It must confine itself to an advance in China, and the further it advances in China the longer the

RUSSIA VS. JAPAN

flank it exposes to the north. As General Staffs conceive security this is precarious.

Soviet Russia and Japan have flanks exposed to each other. Each is vulnerable and has cause to be uneasy whenever the other shows any desire to disturb the status quo. And both are Asiatic Powers with almost inescapable ambitions for ascendancy, the one for imperialistic reasons and the other because impelled by its philosophy of social revolution. In Japan there is a momentum carrying it eastward, in Russia a momentum carrying it westward. They must collide unless at least one of them can arrest the propulsion from within or they can come to some agreement dividing Northeastern Asia into spheres. So long as Japan is in its present temper and Soviet Russia is a communist state, an agreement is hardly practicable. At the best it would be temporary. Each party would distrust the good faith of the other, probably with reason. In the nature of things they are incompatible. Their respective objects are mutually repellent. Meanwhile they face each other, fully armed, tense and suspicious. It is a situation that cannot long endure.

If it does not, if, that is, there is an incident that ignites the explosion or the basic conflict comes to an issue because one side presses its ambition to a conclusion, there will be war. In the present phase this means either an incident or a decision by the Japanese General Staff to settle the matter once for all, now that it is in a better position to do so. If the issue is forced, it must be by Japan. This is not to say that Soviet Russia is actuated by any doctrinaire

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

pacifism. To the contrary, it has been on a war footing since 1919 to protect itself from external attack on account of its revolutionary policy, and it has manifested beyond doubt its willingness to go to war to preserve the revolutionary state. Soviet Russia will go to war, therefore, only if its territory is violated. Under those circumstances it will. There is no element of prophecy in saying that if the Japanese take as much as five square miles of Siberia Russian forces will resist. Russia will then have no choice, for if it can be demonstrated that an invader can act with impunity in the East, the act will communicate too pointed a suggestion in the West. And Soviet Russia's only guaranty of survival lies in the recognition by the nationalistic Powers that to interfere in Soviet Russia is perilous. Otherwise Soviet Russia is constrained by its inner necessities to a defensive policy. It must have time to carry out its industrialization and, still more, it must conserve its resources to that end. They have already been depleted by the diversion of men, money and materials required to throw up hasty defenses in the East.

By the same argument Japan must act soon if it is to act at all. In 1932 it could have taken Vladivostok with ease and occupied the region between the coast and Lake Baikal without resistance. Once established, it could have been evicted only by a war in which the burden of the offensive would have been on Soviet Russia, a burden Soviet Russia could not have borne at the time. By 1933 the opportunity had passed. The burden of the offensive had shifted to Japan. Time works against Japan. Every year it

RUSSIA VS. JAPAN

waits the task will be more difficult. With every year that passes Soviet Russia can be expected to become stronger economically and technologically and, therefore, stronger for military purposes. With more railroads across the continent, more industrial centers in Siberia and more factories capable of turning out munitions and supplies, Soviet Russia will be well-nigh impregnable against Japan, for the weight of larger population and greater natural wealth will then tell. It may be, indeed, that if the Japanese militarists are ever to realize their dream of enclosing the Japan Sea in Japanese territory and making a solid Japanese bloc on the Asiatic continent, they must do so now. It was the urgency of the time factor that made an influential element in the Japanese military party clamor for immediate action in 1934 and that led to the world-wide anticipation of a Russo-Japanese war in that year. And if Japan does elect to give the challenge in the next few years it will be in recognition of this urgency. It will then have decided to give priority to removing the potential check in the north before proceeding to extend the empire into China. In other words, it will have decided to eliminate Soviet Russia before giving the challenge to Europe and the United States. This is, as a matter of fact, the major decision of policy that Japan must make: whether to concentrate first on China, at the risk of allowing Soviet Russia to become so strong that it will be more difficult to deal with, or to concentrate first on getting Soviet Russia out of the Far East, thus freeing itself of a powerful

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

neighbor, erecting a wall against communism and also putting off the reckoning with the West.

Even if Japan should decide to force the issue with Soviet Russia first, that would not, however, exempt the Western Powers from immediate complications. In Asia it is almost as true now as in Europe that international conflicts cannot be localized or circumscribed. Even if actual physical collision could be confined to Asia, which is itself doubtful, the effects could not be so confined. The whole of the Far East would immediately go into a state of solution, and all the Western Powers have possessions, interests and hopes that would be imperilled. The repercussions would be as far-reaching as those of the World War. In result, even if not in extent of participation, it would be a world war.

For one thing, war would involve China directly or indirectly. It is almost impossible for any war to be fought in Eastern Asia without involving China, if only because the territory that must be fought over is inhabited largely by Chinese. It is doubtful whether the Chinese would make a serious effort to remain aloof. There would be fighting in parts of Manchuria. The Chinese irregulars and guerilla bands, which the Japanese describe as bandits, would make raids to embarrass the Japanese, blowing up railways, bridges and supply depots. Officially China would be neutral, at least at the beginning, and individual Chinese would even sell supplies to Japan. But in reality the Chinese would give such aid to Russia as they could. Large numbers would do so even against the

RUSSIA VS. JAPAN

orders of their government, whether the government was motivated by a desire to be officially correct or feared Japanese punishment or temporarily was controlled by men in sympathy with Japan. They would sabotage Japanese effort wherever possible and obstruct by the kind of passive measures they use so expertly. And Japan would first warn, then threaten and then take reprisals. Since Japan occupied Manchuria and, more particularly, since the attack on Shanghai and the killing of thousands of Chinese non-combatants by Japanese air-bombs, the Chinese of the articulate classes have been in a state of suppressed bitterness bordering on hysteria. The realization that they are helpless only drives the bitterness in deeper. It is no accident that the most unqualified predictions of imminent Russo-Japanese war emanate from China. The wish begets the belief. On such a war the Chinese now pin their hopes since the League, as they see it, failed them. The outbreak of war would release a wave of hope and of pro-Russian sentiment throughout the country.

Communism, or what may be loosely identified with communism, is already entrenched in a large part of China. Because of desperate conditions as the result of civil wars, official misrule, the excesses of condottieri and general social breakdown, it is spreading. It may conquer in any event, without external stimulation. But if Russia went to war in what propagandists would picture as the role of China's deliverer, the movement could hardly be stemmed. If Japan did take reprisals for Chinese help to Russia, China would be thrown into the arms of Soviet Russia.

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

In any case, if Russia won, nothing could keep China from going communistic. It might not be communist in reasoned conviction or ideological understanding. That is another matter and will be discussed later. But it would adopt the outward forms and the phrases, and at the least it would fall under Soviet Russia's sway to a much greater extent than in the period between 1924 and 1927. Then Soviet Russia was China's defender against the vague, generalized enemy of Western imperialism. Now it would be China's successful champion against a specific enemy, an enemy who had just made his hostility felt in such a way as to arouse a much more genuine emotional resentment. There would be Russian military and civil advisers who in effect would be co-rulers of the country. Since Soviet Russia has a clear line of action while China has been groping in confusion for a generation, without program or beliefs or principles, decisions on China's affairs would be formulated in Russia and ratified in China. China would be to all intents and purposes embraced within the Russian communist system.

The consequences are easy to imagine and hard to overestimate. A Russianized China would make the larger part of Asia communistic. Almost one-third of the human race would then be under the Red flag. The social revolution would be taken to the borders of India, down to French Indo-China and almost to the door of British Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippine Islands, where already there is nationalistic unrest and a desire for independence from the white nations. Most of

RUSSIA VS. JAPAN

all, it would raise the old Russian bogey for the British. It would renew, with more reality than of old, the Anglo-Russian rivalry for dominance in Asia as of the 1890's. Now there would be this difference, that Kipling's Bear That Walks Like a Man really would be at the Himalayas looking down into the plains of India. On the British Empire a huge shadow would fall, the more ominous for being cast by a Red mass.

Great Britain also would not remain aloof. One cannot conceive the British government passively watching the unfolding of such events. As the better part of British diplomacy always is forethought, one cannot conceive it waiting for the accomplished fact. It would not stand by and watch Japan being decisively defeated. In some way it would have to intervene to neutralize the victory or prevent the garnering of its fruits. How, in what way, whether alone or in concert with other Powers, and how far committing itself—these are the questions that a Russian victory would put to Great Britain for decision. It could not evade them. To let them go by default would be the first act in the surrender of the empire. Great Britain cannot permit a decisive Russian victory in the Far East if it would remain a Power with world eminence.

Nor could France remain a disinterested spectator while Soviet Russia was crushing Japan. It could not risk the loss of French Indo-China. Still less could it watch with equanimity the consolidation by Soviet Russia of a continent with which to confront a divided Europe. For France the ruling consideration would be the effect on

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

Europe, since all French foreign policy turns on relations in Europe. Here cognizance must be taken of a potential regrouping of Powers in both Asia and Europe which will link Far Eastern politics with the traditional European feud. On the one hand there is the possibility of an understanding, if not an alliance, between Japan and Germany. Their positions are superficially similar and could be made complementary to the advantage of both. Each is isolated; each has Soviet Russia to fear; each can use its strength in its own continent to immobilize the potential enemies of the other. On the other hand, France is already being driven by European strategical needs to come to an accord with Soviet Russia.

To France the situation would present a dilemma. If a German-Japanese alliance should materialize, it would have to give at least moral support to Russia in order to prevent an accession of power to Germany in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, a Russian victory which left both Germany and Japan broken would give Russia dominance in Asia and the balance of power in Europe as well, a result which would only postpone France's relegation to secondary political rank. A German-Japanese alliance may be only a fantasy of Japanese and German National Socialists playing statesmen. Except insofar as each could contribute something to the elimination of Soviet Russia as a political power and the spearhead of social revolution they have little in common.

That the Far East has been brought within the sphere of European politics and that power politics is no longer

RUSSIA VS. JAPAN

an affair of individual continents is clear. This is not new in principle, however. The Far East was a pawn in the game of world politics for a generation before 1914, with Europe as the player. Now it is no longer a pawn or even a major piece. Now it is a player in the game. Rather, both Europe and Asia are major pieces in the game. If, then, a German-Japanese alliance should become a reality, France's decision in the event of a Russo-Japanese war will be determined by the play of forces in European diplomacy. If it should not, France like Great Britain will seek to neutralize a Russian victory. It will have to. No Western Power which has built up an empire in the last hundred years can take a negative course without being prepared to surrender its empire.

A complete Japanese victory would be only a little less serious for the Occident. It can be taken for granted that such a victory would be followed by Japan's absorption of all of North China and the conversion of South China into a Japanese sphere of influence. The Chinese probably would have given ample provocation during the war by their violation of neutrality, and the Japanese would find one if they had not. There is little doubt that the Japanese would occupy or at least station garrisons at the principal Chinese ports before the war was long in progress. They would do so as a defensive measure, giving assurance that it was only for the duration of the war. The end of the war would find that they had entrenched themselves, and, if victorious, they would never withdraw. As has been said, the Japanese are not given to

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

restraint when flushed with success. And they learned after 1931 that *fait accompli* is a cogent argument. They would be established in the Chinese ports, and the burden would be on some Power to eject them. The Japanese would hold their hour to have struck. All the dreams, hopes, overblown ambitions and motives deriving from historical experience and genuine economic need would unite to form a resolve to make the most of opportunity. They would cast off all fictions, pretenses and the comparative modesty of the so-called Asiatic Monroe Doctrine for simple possession. When the shifting of events had settled, all of Eastern Asia from Kamchatka south to the Yangtze River and from the coast west to Lake Baikal and Tibet would be Japanese territory.

Such a prospect would be only a little less distasteful to the Occident than a Russian victory. To Europe it would be less dangerous only by degree: if less dangerous at all, then only by virtue of the fact that Japanese aggression would not be unified and galvanized by the idea of social revolution, the promise of deliverance to the oppressed, the nationally as well as socially oppressed. Japan must conquer with armament and it must keep its resentful alien subjects subdued by force. In fact, no nation has ever had so sure a faculty for incurring the hatred of its subject peoples. Russia has the additional weapon of an idea, a hope and an efficient system of propaganda. The hope has a peculiar appeal to the masses of Asia, who live in the primitive poverty and deprivation of a pre-indus-

RUSSIA VS. JAPAN

trial economy and who are oppressed by both their native rulers and their alien imperialist conquerors. At any rate Japan would be at the door of Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, Indo-China and Java. The process of penetration it has carried forward in Manchuria since 1906 it would begin in Indo-China, Malaya, Java, Sumatra and the Philippines. Then all the political and economic consequences of Japanese hegemony which have already been detailed would come into operation on a much larger scale.

One cannot conceive Great Britain and France facing this prospect passively either. Still less can one conceive the United States facing this prospect passively—but of that more later. For all the Western Powers the only assurance of escape from implication immediately or as a sequel would be a quick stalemate from exhaustion. Even an indecisive war ending by exhaustion would carry danger to the West if it were long drawn out, because before the end steps would be taken, perhaps by both sides and certainly by Japan, which would involve interests the Western Powers consider vital. The chance of a quick stalemate is slight. There would more likely be a decisive conclusion. If it were a quick victory, the war might pass off without external complications. The geographical and political dispositions might be consummated before other nations could have opportunity or pretext for intervention. In that case the ultimate settlement of the Far East would be postponed. Crisis would be averted

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

once again and left to another sequence of circumstances to invoke, probably before very long.

If the war should come, it is more likely that the only course left to the Western Powers would be to bring about a deadlock or, if that fails, to deprive the victor of his spoils. Every effort would be made by the neutrals to achieve their ends without taking sides, certainly without taking sides alone. Every effort would be made by each of them to put the onus and the risks of the initiative on some other neutral—on the United States, it may safely be assumed. Forced to the choice, Great Britain would prefer a Japanese victory as the lesser of two evils; so also would the other European Powers. Forced to the choice, the United States would prefer a Russian victory as the lesser of two evils, for that would at least postpone the foreclosure of its economic expectations from the Far East. Within that area of divergence would lie the diplomatic intrigue, bargaining and blackmail which would affect every major Power, singly and in shifting combinations. The outcome would be decided mainly by the sternness of America's resolution and its imperviousness to subtle suggestion and by the shifting of the internal European balance—that is, the relations between Germany and France, France and Italy, Italy and the Little Entente. For these would limit the extent to which each European Power was a free agent in the Far East and determine the constituent elements of whatever combinations were formed.

If war should come between Soviet Russia and Japan,

RUSSIA VS. JAPAN

whether by unavoidable incident or the calculated act of Japan, the probability is that the whole Far Eastern imbroglio will be precipitated, the climax of a hundred years of conflict be reached and the whole world be entangled in its settlement.

Chapter X

UNITED STATES VS. JAPAN

LESS than any other country, it has been said, will the United States passively accept the prospect of the Far East falling to Japan. And here we come to the crux of the international situation in the Far East. Deepest down the Far Eastern conflict is a Japanese-American conflict. In the immediate future there is greater danger of a Russo-Japanese war, precipitated by the unpremeditated incident. If that is averted, the drift of political and economic forces, the whole development of our times, is toward a war between Japan and the United States. And we have been moving in that direction at an accelerated pace in the last few years. Nowhere else is this so little comprehended as in the United States.

Here, too, the physical fact is eloquent, and if theorizing is necessary it is only because of the immaturity of American political thinking. The implications of recent events are clear enough. At the abortive naval negotiations in London in 1934 the issue was clearly drawn between Japan and the United States. It was the resolute refusal of the United States to concede parity to the Japanese navy that caused the rupture. The British worked for compromise; the Americans were unyielding. It is the United States that is held to blame by the Japanese for the failure to win naval equality, not Great

UNITED STATES VS. JAPAN

Britain. Indeed, the Japanese indicated that it was equality with the United States that they sought. They might have agreed to a higher ratio for Great Britain. Then as always they realized that the adversary was the United States. For the determination of the United States to keep the Japanese navy smaller than its own is not the captious mood of a moment. Now if there is not to be a Japanese-American naval race on the Anglo-German model of before 1914, with all the consequences such a race always carries, that will only be because desperate economic straits preclude it.

In the same way it was the United States that led the world in seeking to obstruct Japan's conquest of Manchuria after 1931. The League of Nations deliberated, but the United States took action. It was in the United States that opinion was most thoroughly aroused and in the official communications of the American government that there was the bluntest speaking. It was the American government that first clearly enunciated the doctrine of non-recognition of territorial changes brought about by means contrary to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, that is, by force. It was the United States that first explicitly declared that the separation of Manchuria from China was void in law. The League of Nations two months later only resolved that it was "incumbent" upon members of the League not to recognize any situation brought about by force. Only the United States stands committed. No other Power has committed itself further than by the signature of the resolution expressing the moral duty of

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

all nations not to acknowledge that Manchuria is no longer a part of China. There is a difference. Whatever the legal subtleties may be, the Japanese recognized the United States as the head and front of obstruction, and on the United States their resentment was visited. Japan withdrew from the League, but directed its emotional hostility to America. It was not without reason, for America as always had stood in its way. This also must be understood: saving only the declaration of war in 1917, never in modern times has the United States taken so strong a stand on any international question as it did on Japan's conquest of Manchuria—again, not out of any captiousness of the moment.

The complacency of American opinion in the fact of evidence such as this rests on two grounds. The first is that the mass of the American people are indifferent to the Far East and could not be stirred to war, no matter what the circumstances. This can be dismissed as not worth serious consideration. Except in certain classes on the Atlantic seaboard, nine out of ten Americans also were indifferent to Europe early in 1917, and before the end of the year they were hounding Bohemian bakers in the streets of Missouri towns, villifying professors who did not assert that all Germans were biologically degenerate and christening sauerkraut Liberty Cabbage. The mass of the American people, as of any other people, can be stirred to war whenever their government decides to go to war. They will remain indifferent to Japan until six weeks before the war. Then the blood-cry will ring as

UNITED STATES VS. JAPAN

always, no less terrible for being artificial in impulse. The war passion may be synthetic, but it delivers a people to the war machine nonetheless. No people can resist the compulsions of propaganda created and disseminated by a government or compact ruling group which knows what it wants and has command of the channels of opinion. The technique of mass production of emotion is as efficient as the technique of mass production of any other article of use. With respect to war public opinion does not matter. It can be manufactured whenever a government decides to go to war or drifts into war unaware until too late to withdraw. Raw materials are always to hand. Wars and international hostilities do not come by spontaneous combustion. There are mutual irritants in advance and a setting in which emotions are easily enkindled. There is needed only the incident—the assassination of an Austrian Archduke or a Jugo-Slav king or, say, the killing of twenty Americans in a Japanese attack on Peiping or Shanghai after the United States had protested against any further advance by Japanese troops. The American people will want war with Japan whenever it is deemed desirable that they want war.

The second ground for complacency is that American interests in the Far East are trifling in value. The fact is indisputable; the inference is illogical. Our financial investment in the Far East, it is true, is relatively slight—\$200,000,000, exclusive of missionary and educational enterprises, a little more than one per cent of our total foreign investment. Our trade with China and what was

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

Manchuria in normal years totals between \$250,000,000 and \$300,000,000—between three and four per cent of our total foreign trade. We have no territorial holdings on the Asiatic continent, and in the Far East altogether only the Philippine Islands. American residents in China and Manchuria number about seven thousand, less than the population of a suburb of New York City. Our tangible interests are indeed trivial. The very disparity between our tangible interests and the vigor with which our government acts in the Far East is evidence that we are involved, that something more is at stake than present interest. If any argument can be drawn from the relative unimportance of our material interests in the Far East, it is that there must be some force that draws the United States into entanglement in the Far East.

This is not a new force. It has been exercising its attraction for nearly a hundred years. Neither the Far East nor America's role in the Far East can be understood except in the perspective of time. Then it may be seen that in America, too, there is an idea of destiny, innate but until recently latent, because until recently America could afford the luxury of keeping manifest destinies fanciful and remote. In foreign relations as in all else the conditioning fact for America has been a huge, rich and virgin continent. America could enjoy the immunities of political introversion. Rather, there was no alternative if the continent was to be populated and made to yield its wealth. But there was always an inner awareness of a potential dynamic, the direction of which was toward the

UNITED STATES VS. JAPAN

Pacific. America was looking westward to the Pacific and further westward across the Pacific when the land between the Atlantic and Pacific was still wilderness. As the Japanese say when in rhetorical mood, America began looking to the Pacific and beyond when the first Americans landed on the Eastern American shore, and this contains more than rhetoric. There is substantial evidence too. The American government's agitation over Manchuria had a long cumulative precedent.

Before the end of the first half of the nineteenth century, when the period of European aggression in the Pacific was under way, the Hawaiian Islands became the object of the covetous glances of European nations, principally France. In 1849, when there were not half a dozen states west of the Mississippi, the United States took notice, although the Hawaiian Islands were two thousand miles distant from the American continent. In that year President Zachary Taylor in his message to Congress said, with reference to the Sandwich Islands, as Hawaii was then still called:

"We could in no event be indifferent to their passing under the dominion of any other Power."

A few months later Daniel Webster, then Secretary of State, said in an official dispatch dealing with the Hawaiian Islands:

"The United States can never consent to see these islands taken possession of by either of the great commercial Powers of Europe."

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

Observe: the great *commercial* Powers of Europe. There were no great commercial Powers of Asia then.

A few months later President Millard Fillmore gave concrete interpretation in his message to Congress. After pointing out that the United States was the first to recognize the independence of the Hawaiian Islands he went on:

"We were influenced in this measure . . . by the consideration that they [the Hawaiian Islands] lie in the course of the great trade which must at no distant day be carried on between the Western coast of North America and Eastern Asia. . . . I need not say that the importance of these considerations has been greatly influenced by the sudden and vast development which the interests of the United States have attained in California and Oregon, and the policy heretofore adopted in regard to those islands will be steadily pursued."

Observe: *the great trade* which must at no distant day be carried on between the Western coast of North America and Eastern Asia. Here in embryo is the policy of President Hoover and Secretary of State Stimson in 1932. The policy has indeed been steadily pursued. It is necessary only to read Manchuria for the Sandwich Islands and to substitute Japan for the great commercial Powers of Europe. Further, it must be remembered that the "development which the interests of the United States have attained in California and Oregon" have now reached fulfillment, wherefore our concern advanced from the

UNITED STATES VS. JAPAN

islands in the middle of the Pacific to the continent on the other shore of the Pacific.

Actually the United States was already playing a prominent role in the process by which China was being compelled to submit to the Western Powers. In the successive demands, negotiations and treaties by which a new status was being forced on China between 1842 and 1860 the United States took an active part. It did not join in any of the wars against China, nor did it take any territory. The appeal of territory to a country which still had half a continent uninhabited was slight. But the United States did insist on the benefits of the most-favored-nation treaties by which every privilege or right granted by China to any other Power automatically was extended to the United States. Thus, the American gunboats shelled no ports and landed no expeditions. But when the British or French did so and compelled the Chinese to open a port to trade—incurring Chinese ill-will—the United States claimed the right to trade at that port on equal terms with the British or French—without incurring Chinese ill-will. The United States never shared in the imperialistic grab in the Far East—except in the dubious circumstances of the “purchase” of the Philippines and the subsequent killing of Filipinos to make them submit to the deal—but it reserved all its rights toward a share of the benefits of imperialistic grabbing when desired.

Circumstances then supervened in the United States which restricted America's role in the Far East to that of little more than spectator. The first was the Civil War.

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

The second was the period of boom which carried from the Reconstruction to 1900, with intervals for the panics of 1873 and 1893. The great railway systems were being constructed, new reserves of natural resources were being discovered and worked, open land was being taken up and cultivated, inventions were bringing industrialization to maturity, and the great industrial combinations were being formed which now dominate the country's economic life. There was neither time nor attention for other continents. Nor was there incentive. There was profit enough for all at home. It was then that the dynasties of the dollar princes were being founded and fortunes being laid which made America the legendary land of millionaires in the eyes of all other nations. No argosies had to be sent out in search of El Dorado. It could be found at home. What need to think of the Far East? It could be pushed down to the layers of the subconscious—there, but not thought of or recognized.

This was only an interlude, however. The bonanza period ended. Opportunities were not exhausted, but earmarked. The continent had been carved out, and the profits of first exploitation were taken or canalized. Restless American energies had no patience for intensive development. We were habituated to quick results and big ones. Economic enterprise was still a gamble with nature for big stakes—win or lose at a fling. We were still able to feel assured that if we lost we could soon make up a stake for another fling. And we were not accustomed to losing, for nature had always been prodigal. But it no

UNITED STATES VS. JAPAN

longer could be prodigal. It had to be played against coolly and patiently and for small stakes, which did not comport well with American habit or experience.

The last frontier was taken up about 1890, it is commonly agreed. It is more than coincidence that within a few years the United States was reaching beyond its own shores for the first time. Within a few years it became apparent what President Taylor, President Fillmore and Daniel Webster had in mind in laying the injunction against French dominion over the Hawaiian Islands. By a combination of circumstances orthodox in imperialistic aggression the dominion denied to France was assumed by the United States *de facto* and then as an incident to the Spanish-American War was made substantive. Hawaii was annexed. Also as an incident to the Spanish-American War the Philippines were taken, partly by purchase and partly as the spoils of victory: thus a war begun for the liberation of Cuba, an island in the Caribbean, ended with the appropriation of a group of islands on the other side of the world. And in instructing his peace commissioners to insist on possession of the Philippines President McKinley referred to "the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship cannot be indifferent," thus faithfully echoing his Presidential predecessors of fifty years before. America had stepped across the Pacific.

Not by islands, however, is the magnetic pull of the Pacific exercised. It is the Asiatic coast that draws, and, on the Asiatic continent, China. To China America then directed its attention actively, vigorously and in the his-

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

toric tradition. In 1898 the partition of China among the great Powers seemed inevitable. Small pieces were being hacked off by way of preliminaries in the so-called Battle of the Concessions. The United States moved to reserve its rights as usual. As usual it did not ask for territory. It asked only free right of access for trade. It enunciated in 1899 what has since become known as the doctrine of the Open Door. It sought to exact a pledge from all the Powers that they would not discriminate against any other Power in the areas in which they claimed a special position. That is to say, even if a Power had possession of a Chinese port or a sphere of influence in certain provinces, it could not by tariffs, port duties, special levies or any other measures, interfere with free competition in that area. All the Powers gave the pledge with alacrity and without any intent to observe it if they could escape observation and violation was to their interest—as all the strong Powers have always been willing to give pledges of social conduct in the Far East or anywhere else for that matter, *e.g.*, the Kellogg Pact.

Their cynicism was not altogether immoral. What the United States asked of them was to renounce the advantages which were their motive in taking Chinese territory. America's virtuousness was no loss to America. On the contrary, it was to America's gain. America did not want possession of territory but opportunity to sell goods and make investments in a territory. It wanted all the advantages to be extracted from a territory without the onus of conquering its inhabitants and the cost of ad-

UNITED STATES VS. JAPAN

ministering it, to say nothing of the international risks involved in taking it against the desires of other Powers for the same territory. But those who took the burden and the cost and the risk wanted the compensating advantages for themselves. America's idealism was an inexpensive luxury, if it was idealism at all. In principle the Open Door is an insurance against recurring wars for dominion over weak areas, but the principle happens to work only to the benefit of countries which have a sufficiency of land and natural resources within their own frontiers. Also, America has not been so sensitive to the principle in foreign areas which it controls, as for example the Philippines and Porto Rico. There America has priority by means of tariff regulations and, in consequence, a virtual economic monopoly.

In the Open Door policy America was serving its own interest and acting with full consistency. Now, there may be ground for arguing that in its sudden intervention in Far Eastern international politics America was acting not on its own initiative but on British suggestion. There is considerable historical evidence that the Open Door policy was first conceived by the British in the Far East and skillfully implanted in the mind of John Hay when he was still Ambassador in London before becoming Secretary of State. Just at that time the Open Door worked to Great Britain's interest, too. Great Britain had no pressing need for additions to its empire in the East. To have attempted to acquire more territory would have necessitated incurring the enmity of Russia and Germany, which

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

were then coming into their fulness of national power. In fact, it could not have done so without throwing them into each other's arms and perhaps having to overcome them by force. Just because Russia and Germany were then reaching a position where they could challenge British imperial supremacy it was Great Britain's strategy to seek to preserve the status quo, to freeze the international status of the Far East. It already had financial leadership in the Far East and a political leadership in all the foreign-occupied areas in China which gave it commercial pre-eminence. All it needed was a continuance of that situation, so that it could continue to export as much to China as it was exporting and to get the larger share of whatever increase there would be. Equality of opportunity in trade on the lines laid down would be Great Britain's gain, too. Had Great Britain officially sponsored the Open Door, it would have met greater opposition. European jealousies would have generated suspicion of anything proposed by Great Britain, and Great Britain would have had to concede something in return. The United States was a neutral in the Far Eastern imperial struggle and was not taken seriously anyway. Therefore it was good tactics for the British to have American sponsorship for the Open Door. But it was also in line with the direction America was taking as bidden by its own needs.

The Open Door treaties were signed and equality of trading rights was guaranteed, at least in name. America became a Power which had to be consulted in the Far East for the first time. It was formally a Far Eastern

UNITED STATES VS. JAPAN

Power, and by so much its role in the world had changed. The Open Door became international law, with all the observance that is customarily accorded international law. In 1900 the Boxer Rebellion started and the Powers, America included, sent expeditions to China to rescue foreign residents. Again partition was threatened and again America used its influence to preserve China intact—again not at all to Great Britain's loss or displeasure. All the Powers subsequently withdrew their troops except Russia, which saw an opportunity to capitalize, as has been told. What Russia sought to achieve immediately after 1900 was almost an exact parallel to what Japan has been seeking to achieve since 1931, except that the international situation constrained Russia to greater subtlety and circumspection: the other European Powers were not immobilized by war-weariness and economic difficulties. Russia kept its troops in Manchuria, was stretching out to Korea and cast its shadow over North China. As a beginning it was pinching out all other foreigners doing business in Manchuria. The United States protested in the name of the Open Door, sharply and more than once, thus manifesting that it took seriously its sponsorship of the Open Door and meant to remain an active claimant in the Far East.

The issue was automatically closed by the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. So far as the United States is concerned, the most noteworthy fact in that war was its strong partisanship for Japan. Officially it was neutral, but the American people were pro-Japanese, sentimentally,

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

romantically pro-Japanese. President Theodore Roosevelt mediated, first to bring about an armistice and then at the Portsmouth peace conference to bring about a final settlement. Probably that intervention saved Japan, for it could hardly have gone on fighting much longer. Its resources were fast approaching exhaustion and a prolongation of the war probably would have resulted in a stalemate. Settlement at Portsmouth on what appeared to be a compromise actually was a substantial victory for Japan.

Japan took over Russia's rights in South Manchuria and Russia's ambitions as well. As a beginning it also proceeded to pinch out the other foreigners in Manchuria. Pro-Japanese only yesterday, America began protesting against Japan. It has never ceased. Within a few years first suspicion of Japan and then a definite anti-Japanese sentiment emerged. They have increased with every year. As Japan was coming steadily nearer to attaining success than Russia, so American protests to Japan became sharper than they had been to Russia. America not only protested; it sought to obstruct. In 1909 Secretary of State Knox tried to get the agreement of the Powers to the internationalization of the railways in Manchuria as a measure to preserve the Open Door. The attempt was a fiasco. That would have given reality to the Open Door, which was furthest from the desires of any Power. Even Great Britain then had commitments in Europe which precluded giving any offense to Russia or Japan: 1914 was already in sight. The result of America's venture into the realities of realpolitik was an alliance between Russia

UNITED STATES VS. JAPAN

and Japan guaranteeing each other's position in Manchuria, Russia in the north and Japan in the south. It was a No Trespass sign to ambitious interlopers.

Incidentally, this was not America's only venture into the serious business of Far Eastern politics. With the advent of the Taft administration was ushered in the period of dollar diplomacy. In order to get a share of the concession to build a new system of railways in Central China President Taft personally intervened with the Viceroy of China, this time successfully. Also America won the right to membership in the Six-Power Consortium, which was to have a virtual monopoly of the right to make loans to China. Dollar diplomacy was more than a personal vagary of President Taft, Secretary Knox and the New York financial groups who had their ears. It was a social symptom. The trustification era was over. It had netted huge profits. The great concentrations of wealth now characteristic of the country were being consummated. There was a surplus of capital, more than was needed for the internal development of the country, certainly more than could be employed on the scale of profit to which capital had been accustomed. The opportunities of the automobile and power era were not yet envisaged and the subtleties of the holding company, financial reorganization and bank-industry technique of manipulation had not yet been mastered. Capital sought outlet in the conventional channels—investment abroad in undeveloped countries. The traditional commercial interest in the Far East now had financial reinforcement.

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

The issue now was, not closed but suspended by the supervention of another war—the European war. The issue was also clarified. Hitherto there had been many strands to the Far Eastern tangle. No one of them could be followed. There were knots and sub-knots. Now most of the strands were eliminated. The European Powers were forced to withdraw as contestants for primacy in the Far East. Only Japan was left. For America the policy of opposition against the closing of equal opportunity meant obstruction to Japan. The issue became clear for the first time: Japan against America.

It has never again been obscured. Japan has pressed it and America has stood firmer in equal ratio. The first test came in 1915, when Japan attempted a grand coup with the Twenty-one Demands. It was frustrated partly by China's resistance, partly by European inquiries and partly by the scrutiny fixed on the proceedings by the United States. But even so much as was gained by Japan—a free hand in bargaining with the Allies for the German possessions in Shantung and extension of the leasehold in South Manchuria—was met at once by definite notice from the American government of the reservation of all its rights. Even before the negotiations between Japan and China were concluded Secretary of State Bryan formally declared that the United States would not recognize any treaty or arrangement which impaired the integrity of China, the Open Door or America's treaty rights in China. In 1917 the United States entered the World War and itself became immobilized in the Far East. Japan

UNITED STATES VS. JAPAN

had a free hand and made the most of it. Unfortunately for Japan's hopes the war came to an end too abruptly. At the peace conference it won legal sanction for its possession of the Kiaochao Peninsula in Shantung. But the time for reckoning had come, with America as inquisitor. From then to now the chronicle of international politics in the Far East has been one of Japanese advances and American obstruction.

Under the mass pressure of European diplomacy President Wilson agreed to the rendition of the Kiaochao Peninsula to Japan, but the United States did not. On that ground more than any other the American people were persuaded to repudiate the Versailles Treaty. It is both interesting and revealing that the American people could be stirred, not by the transfer of the Austrian Tyrol to Italy or Hungarian soil to Rumania—both of them worse violations of reason and elementary justice—but by the award to Japan of a few square miles with a name they could not pronounce and of which they had never before heard. The rejection of the Versailles Treaty was not the end. It was the American outcry that kept the world's attention fastened on Shantung and prevented the question from being closed as an accomplished fact. It was American insistence at the Washington Conference, which was itself convened on American initiative, that forced Japan to retrocede the Kiaochao Peninsula to China. It was America's insistence also that compelled Japan to evacuate Siberia, where Japanese and American troops had been at swords' points and on which there had been diplo-

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

matic interchanges of brutal frankness between the Japanese and American governments. In fact, between 1919 and 1921 the relations between Japan and the United States had been tense enough to be alarming. But America still had the military strength unexpended in the war and it could levy the support of the Allied Powers, partly because it held the world's purse strings and partly because all of them were still hoping for America's backing to preserve the post-Versailles status. Japan yielded, and in doing so it disgorged a large part of the gains it had made during the war. And it had been forced to disgorge by America. However unaware the American people remained of the implications, to the Japanese it became plain: America was the enemy, the obstacle to fulfillment.

For reasons which have been outlined Japan abated its expansionism after the Washington Conference. Significantly in that period relations between Japan and the United States improved except for the effect produced by legislation formally closing the United States to Japanese immigrants. Parenthetically it should be said that America's attitude on Japanese immigration, while tactless, needlessly offensive and no doubt morally indefensible, has been an irritant rather than a fundamental cause of strain. It has given Japanese militarists a rallying-cry with their own people, a stick with which to beat the American dog whenever it was desirable to win their support against America on questions having nothing to do with immigration. The Japanese ruling class is not con-

UNITED STATES VS. JAPAN

cerned about America's refusal to admit a few thousand Japanese immigrants. It is concerned about America's refusal to permit Japan to have its way in China. Except for the friction caused by the immigration legislation, however, there was an easing of strain between the two countries. And it was more than fortuitous that this coincided with the relaxation of Japanese pressure on China.

For reasons which also have been outlined the era of good feeling came to an end when Chinese nationalism put an inescapable choice to Japan. In September, 1931, Japan began the operations which ended in the absorption of all of Manchuria. It had scarcely begun when the United States intervened. Both the League of Nations and the United States intervened—the League with reluctance and the United States with alacrity. The League was compelled by the Covenant and by China's formal application to attempt to end the conflict developing between China and Japan. It complied with the formalities, though half-heartedly, the great States which have power of decision in the League being goaded by the minor States and by American opinion. Not being a member of the League, the United States did not share in the obligations. Its only legal warrant for taking cognizance was that it was one of the signatories of the Kellogg Pact. The League would have been willing to accept Japan's contemptuous indifference to its decisions and orders and to have been resigned to what was happening as *force majeure*. Not so the United States. The United States became ever more searching in its inquiries of the Japanese

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

government. It became ever more peremptory in its observations and the statement of its expectations. It made its opinion unmistakable in notes that were made public throughout the world that it expected Japan to get out. It even overcame the traditional American aversion from association with the League and sent a representative to sit with the League Council.

The American government, while sitting with the League, acted independently, however, and its action went far beyond the League's. In doing so it forced the League's pace. For while the League was still deliberating, in the face of Japan's extension of the occupation in defiance of League orders, the United States took a definite step. On January 7, 1932, Secretary of State Stimson officially notified China and Japan that it would not recognize the legality of *any situation*, treaty or agreement impairing the territorial integrity of China and the Open Door and brought about by means contrary to the Kellogg Pact. This was the famous Stimson Doctrine.

The words that should be marked are the three words: "of any situation." They are what distinguish the Stimson Doctrine from the note of Secretary Bryan in 1915. Then the American government merely insisted on the safeguarding of its treaty rights and the maintenance of the Open Door. The integrity of China was not affected, since no new territory was being taken away. Thus no direct issue was raised. There was a question subject to interpretation. Japan could always maintain that the Open Door was not being violated, and whether it was or not

UNITED STATES VS. JAPAN

was a matter of tenuous legal abstractions. The Stimson Doctrine is not subject to interpretation. It raises a stark issue of fact. It states much more than a refusal to recognize the new state of Manchukuo. Recognition in that sense is merely a juridical formality. At the most, it implies non-intercourse. America could refuse to recognize Soviet Russia without danger to either. It made no demands on Soviet Russia and exacted nothing which would have damaged Soviet Russia. It was merely stating a subjective attitude: it did not like communism.

When, however, the United States declared its refusal to recognize the legality of any situation brought about by force in Manchuria, it made an unequivocal commitment implying action. For the situation that has been brought about is the separation of Manchuria from China and its transformation into a pseudo-independent state called Manchukuo which is in reality a Japanese colony. It is this that America refuses to recognize, and this is not subject to exiguous interpretations or legal subtleties. It is an issue of fact. Is or is not Manchuria still a part of China? Manifestly it is not in actuality, but in the eyes of the American government it is. By the interpretation of international law which still stands on American records Japan's position in Manchuria is that of an invader. The United States says Manchuria *is* a part of China. Japan says it is not a part of China but Manchukuo. There is a conflict as to fact which cannot be permanently evaded. For by American interpretation every law affecting foreigners decreed by the existing regime in Man-

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

chukuo is invalid; every tax which is levied, every attempt to organize a state monopoly, such as the oil monopoly, which affects American interests, every regulation touching the affairs of foreigners, is illegal. Sooner or later the American government must accept the laws, the taxes, the monopolies and the regulations or it must take measures to win immunity from them for American interests and American citizens in what was once Manchuria. And the measures that would be effective are of one kind only: force. It is an issue that cannot be compromised. At the most, ultimate decision can only be postponed. Sooner or later America must yield, Japan must yield, or they must go to war. America accepts the fact that Manchuria has become Manchukuo, a Japanese colony; or Japan rescinds Manchukuo's independence and returns the territory to China—or America and Japan fight.

Thus America is irrevocably in the Far East. Swearing fealty to the ancestral injunction against foreign entanglement and therefore turning its back on Europe, it commits itself to a perilous position in the most turbulent quarter of the globe. With Europe, with which it has racial kinship, cultural affinity, common historical origins and evolution, and economic relations so close that a bank failure in Vienna closes factories in Missouri—with Europe it will not be what is called involved. But it leaps defiantly into the breach when three provinces in one Asiatic country are taken by another Asiatic country, three provinces in which its material interests are negligible and which nine out of ten Americans cannot find on a map.

UNITED STATES VS. JAPAN

Why? To preserve the sanctity of treaties outlawing war? True, America was a signatory of the Kellogg Pact; and true, Japan broke its bond. But if Italy had swallowed up Jugo-Slavia or vice-versa, would America have acted similarly? Would it have committed itself with equal finality? Would it have insisted that Italy withdraw and then given formal notice that it would never recognize the legality of Italy's status in Belgrade? The questions need not be asked. Had the government attempted to do so, there would have been a thundering outcry in the press, echoed by public opinion. The government would not have dared. Let Europe "stew in its own juice," would have been the judgment of America. There was no outcry on the Stimson Doctrine. To the contrary, it had the support of most articulate American opinion.

America is in the Far East irrevocably, but in this there is nothing new. It has only been forced to the surface, thrown into relief by Japan. That which the American government did in 1932 it had done in principle in 1915—or in 1851—and there was no Kellogg Pact then. It would have done as it did in 1932 if there never had been a Kellogg Pact. It has always acted in the same way with reference to the Far East. Sometimes the ground has been the integrity of China, sometimes the Open Door and sometimes the sanctity of the international peace machinery. The grounds have varied; the acts have not. The men in office may change; their attitude toward the Far East does not. No matter what party has been in power and what principles it has espoused, no matter who was

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

President and what his inclinations, antecedents and affiliations were, the same policy has been pursued in the Far East. President Wilson did as President McKinley, and President Hoover as President Wilson. There has been a consistency and a continuity to American policy in the Far East for at least a generation, and the policy of the last generation was foreshadowed almost a hundred years before.

America opposed Russia when Russia threatened to close off the Far East for its own use. It began to oppose Japan as soon as Japan offered the same threat. And its opposition has become more direct and vigorous and uncompromising as Japan has come nearer attaining its end. The issue now approaches crisis because to all appearances Japan is about to succeed. But if a second earthquake were to sink all of Japan to the bottom of the sea and Russia were to resume its former role in the Far East, America would oppose Russia with equal vigor—or England or France or Siam. For this is the heart of American policy: that no other Power shall be permitted to pre-empt for itself the opportunity of economic exploitation in the Far East, especially in China.

In this there is nothing mystic. It rests on a clear, definite, material principle. Isolation from Europe has been an easy luxury for America. It did not have to concern itself with Europe, because Europe holds nothing for it. Entanglement in the Far East is not accident or indiscretion or the obligation of idealism. The Far East does hold something for America. And if America is in-

UNITED STATES VS. JAPAN

flexible in its resistance to any effort to foreclose on the economic potentialities of the Far East, that is because it is thinking of its own economic expansion in the only part of the world still left open to expansion—a thought already adumbrated by President Fillmore. That thought has become increasingly exigent as the opportunity at home has drawn finer. It is most exigent now. Regardless of whether the present economic depression is episodic and cyclical and will pass, America has reached a point where it must have a larger field for economic activity. Given the continuance of the existing economic system, it must export. It can produce more than can be absorbed by domestic purchase. The surplus must be exported to ensure stability to the industrial and financial structure. The most promising field for export happens to be China. Hence America's interest in China, which has grown in proportion to its needs. The efforts for trade and the results have grown in equal proportion. Exports to China have increased six-fold from 1910 to 1930, a comparison which is not lost on the American government or American business. A projection of that increase is America's promise for the future, a promise it will not allow to be denied to itself—whether by Japan or Russia or any other country.

If America is exercised over the remote political concerns of the Far East, that is out of no possessive feeling for its custodianship of international peace instruments, since its regard for that custodianship is not so jealous in other parts of the world. Nor is it motivated by its

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

present material stake in the Far East. It is thinking of the future. Far back in its past it began thinking of the future there. And as the future has drawn closer to the past it has become more intently and intensively aware. Now the span between present and future has become oppressively short. It is no longer possible to think of the future in the Far East, certainly not possible to safeguard it, without taking definite decisions in the present. America has been taking them: witness the commitments of the American government since 1931. And those decisions are in direct contradiction to similar decisions being taken by Japan. Concretely, America must forswear its future in the Far East or overcome Japan. America must yield or Japan must yield. As has already been said, Japan will not. America gives every indication that it, too, will not. Perhaps it cannot in self-preservation. Certainly it cannot without restricting its scope and accepting a limitation of its hopes that it never has shown any temperamental inclination to accept. Concession to fate is still alien to the American temper. In that case, then almost as a matter of physical law Japan and America must collide. And unless one closes one's eyes to all the portents of the time and the lesson of history it must be apparent that year by year they have been drawing closer to collision. They have not so far to go as American complacency in its security leads the American people to believe. Before long definite steps must be taken to avert collision or it will come.

If it should come it might not be so far-reaching in

UNITED STATES VS. JAPAN

effect as a war between Japan and Soviet Russia, but for America it would mark a turning-point, a point equal in historical significance with 1776 and 1861. By all physical law America should win, not because of any innate superiority but by weight of size, population and natural wealth. America could hold out for years; Japan could not. Pushed to extremities, America could array a war machine that would overwhelm Japan. But the war would in all probability be a long one, if only because the two combatants must strike at each other across an ocean. If by chance there were a decisive naval engagement at the beginning and America should destroy the Japanese fleet, the war soon would end. For then Japan could be crushed into submission by an economic blockade. But this would be contrary to all the military laws of probability, because a decisive naval engagement at the beginning would have to be fought in Japanese waters, several days' steaming from the nearest American base, at a time and place chosen by the Japanese fleet. All the conditions would be in Japan's favor and the American superiority in tonnage would be too nominal to counter-balance them. More likely the war would be a long one. Either there would not be a decisive naval engagement at the beginning or, if there were, it would be in Japan's favor.

If the war were a long one, then with America's pride stung as it never has been, with a sacrifice of money and perhaps of men surpassing that of the World War, and normal war passions whipped to a sharper frenzy by the difference in race (what service the Yellow Peril and the

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

sanctity of white civilization would do!) . . . then no one can be so credulous as to believe that victory would be followed by a peace of conciliation and the victor would retire without spoils. America might go into the war to safeguard peace, but it would come out with the Manchurian plains. It would not return Manchuria to China as before 1931. To do so would merely leave the conditions of 1931 to repeat themselves. Instead, it would keep hegemony over Manchuria itself, not in name, perhaps, but in fact. It would have to; and it would want to. And it would then inherit all the resentments, hostilities and jealousies now Japan's. It would have to face a nationalistic China bent on recovering its lost territory and increasingly resentful of the new intruder. It would confront Soviet Russia on the same boundaries as Japan now and eventually would have to withstand the force of Russia's eastward drive. It would be an Asiatic empire, with all the glories of empire but with all the disabilities that now threaten to make imperial glories evanescent in themselves and fatal to the empires that enjoy them. It would be a different America, one destined perhaps to go the way of all great empires in history.

Chapter XI

CHINA—A BATTLEGROUND

THUS far nothing has been said about China itself. It has been discussed almost as something inanimate. It has been assumed to be a passive agent, to be acted upon rather than acting. Unfortunately the assumption is warranted. Now and for a long time to come China will have no voice in determining its destiny. Its destiny will be determined by others without regard to its own interests and on considerations external to itself. Now, as in 1900, if China survives as an independent nation, that will be because the rival aspirants for conquest check one another, which is to say that no single Power dares to force the test. In concrete application at present that means that Japan will hesitate to press its plans to a conclusion. If Japan does make the attempt China is helpless and can be saved only by the intervention of a third Power.

There is no question of fault, negligence or guilt. There is a physical fact. No matter how patriotic China might be, how consecrated, how ready for sacrifice, it is without means of successful resistance. All the morals conventionally drawn from China's pacifism, as an example of the penalty of unpreparedness, are pointless. They are erroneous as to fact and illogical in conclusion. China is not pacifistic. In its traditional scale of values

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

the martial virtues fall very low. There has been little romanticization of war and less idealization of the soldier, perhaps precisely because China has had so little of peace in actuality and suffered so much from the depredations of soldiery. But the Chinese have not practised pacifism. They have conquered and been conquered, and the memory of the race is as scarred by war as that of any other race.

If China does not resist Japan now, that is not because it lacks the will to resist or because it is debilitated by any philosophy. It cannot. In social organization and technological advancement it is still in the eighteenth century, notwithstanding a few coastal cities with some factories. Were it as martial as Sparta and twice as numerous in population as it is, it would be powerless against an enemy, any enemy, which can dispose of tanks, aeroplanes, motorized artillery and all the other implements of modern warfare. Military prowess today is not a matter of martial spirit, courage or the will to war. It is a product of technological capacity and industrial organization: means of communication, mass production, possession or command of raw materials. A highly evolved industrial system is an indispensable condition. And this is lacking in China. If it were not, if the Chinese could follow their impulses, they would have exterminated the Japanese years ago. If ever they can, they will.

No race was ever less in the mood for non-resistance as a creed than is China now. In the long view there may be foreseen as one of the dangerous consequences of what

CHINA—A BATTLEGROUND

has been taking place in the Far East the transformation of China into an aggressively militaristic and nationally self-conscious people. What has been construed as Chinese pacifism has been rather Chinese self-assurance. China is a continent rather than a country, a race rather than a nation. Analogies with single European countries do not hold. China must be compared with the whole of Europe or North America. For this reason the shrill nationalism characteristic of the West since the French Revolution could find no place in China, a fact from which we make superficial and erroneous deductions about China's lack of patriotism. Furthermore, China was for so long culturally superior to all peoples with which it came into contact that it could take its position for granted. It did not have to assert itself for recognition. Perhaps also it is an old and wearied race and lacks the dynamic propulsiveness of the fresher and more vigorous European stock.

For all these reasons China has been content to stay within its own borders, to let alone and to be let alone in return. Its imperialism has been a cultural imperialism except in a few periods of expansion under the leadership of emperors with a lust for personal grandeur. It has imposed its pattern by example rather than by force, as in Korea and Japan, or through its emigrants as carriers, as recently everywhere on the Asiatic coast. The practice of what is erroneously called pacifism was therefore a natural growth. There was no occasion or need for militarism. In the light of the last few decades, however,

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

militarism is rather the natural growth. The Chinese are learning that in the modern world militarism is the price of survival. There is already a conscious movement for military training of the whole population on the European model. There is a reasoned belief in the value of armament. Already public funds sorely needed for the building of roads or dykes against floods are being spent on military planes. If China should escape conquest long enough to industrialize on its own initiative or if, after industrializing under the tutelage of another country, it should regain its independence, the world may be confronted by a nation of 400,000,000 equipped for war purposes, indoctrinated with the idea of war as a national instrument and hungering for revenge. It is not likely that China will then let others alone.

All this is in the distant future, however. For the present and in the near future China is too weak even to defend itself. Now as for the last hundred years China's military weakness is the originating cause of the Far Eastern imbroglio. Now as in the past China's military weakness is unpreventable. Partly because China was so strong in comparison with its neighbors (despite the fact that the throne was occupied by an alien dynasty) and partly because it has had a culture of such longevity and vitality, a culture older than any that has survived into our times, it clung with blind conservatism to its inherited forms. It was indifferent to what may be called Westernism or modernism as much as it was scornful. By the time it had become aware of the penalty of indifference to the power

CHINA—A BATTLEGROUND

which modernism confers the time had already passed for decisions on its own initiative. It was already beset by the West. Then the only question was how to escape extinction as a nation. The disparity between its own strength and that of the West grew rather than diminished between 1860 and 1911, the year of the founding of the republic. For while the West was making its prodigious material strides China was virtually standing still. It had given up bows and arrows but it had breech-loading guns which it did not know how to use. Even in the fighting around Shanghai in 1932 its defense forces were firing mortars against naval guns and air bombs.

The disparity was never so wide as now. Despite China's attempts to arm itself, despite the establishment of factories and banks and the building of roads, despite all of what is called reconstruction, it has never been so weak as now, relative to other Powers. Perhaps just because of all its reconstruction it has never been so weak. For one thing, the cumulative pressure of a hundred years of attack is telling: the wearing away of the last little pebble that holds up the landslide. For another, China has lost its indifference and is attempting to make autonomous decisions. What foreign attack began revolution is completing. The traditional system of China has broken down, politically, economically and culturally, and China has itself contributed to the destruction in order to clear away the debris. China has at last deliberately resolved to modernize and to do so it has had to renounce respect for the old order, insofar as the old order had not already

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

lost respect by its demonstrated incapacity to survive in the modern world. And this has certain very concrete results in every-day affairs.

There are civil wars because there is no government that commands authority. No government can command authority because there is no principle of authority. The system of government which, with superficial modifications, had functioned for some two thousand years was discredited. It was unable to protect the country from external enemies and it was inadequate for the requirements of a country which was making a beginning toward national integration. Mandarins elected by examinations in philosophy, painting and poetry cannot administer railways, currencies and corporation law. In reality China had had no government and needed none. A country of small villages, self-sufficient and self-sustaining, each almost a world in itself, needed neither written laws nor executive, legislature and judiciary. It went by tradition, with sanctions levied when necessary by the guild and the family. From the view of government as a means of regulating the relations of individuals and groups with a minimum of friction and adjusting the whole to the physical environment this was as good a government as any with which it was contemporary and better than most. To this China owes its survival while other nations and civilizations rose and fell. But the environment changed, the basis of relations between individuals and groups changed, and with them the function of government changed. The old no longer sufficed. A country which

CHINA—A BATTLEGROUND

has railways, foreign trade, factories which sell goods in towns a thousand miles inland, stock corporations and foreign affairs cannot go on by the momentum of tradition. The old government broke down. A new one has not been devised. What passes for government does not govern. Its orders do not carry obedience. In consequence there is the lack of unification which is so widely deplored without regard to what makes unification impossible.

All the basic institutions have similarly broken down. The guild and the family no longer exercise the authority that was theirs in the scheme of things. They, too, no longer are in harmony with the environment or adequate for its demands. All economic relations, including the making and administering of commercial law, were once regulated by the guilds. They could be, because the economic unit was the small town, not counting now the rural villages, which were self-sufficient. All the processes of production and distribution were therefore visible and within range. The guild could fix prices, wages and working hours and determine trade practices and conditions of credit because all transactions were within the guild's range. It can no longer, now that the market has widened and economic operations are carried on over a large area. A guild cannot control a corporation, the ownership of which is dispersed and which does business five hundred miles away by telegraph.

So, too, the family could regulate all private relations as long as its members lived within the walls of one compound—two or three generations and collateral branches

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

—and generally worked at the family enterprise, whether a farm or a household craft industry or a silk shop. Then the acts of each member were subject to the scrutiny of the elders. Marriage, career, purchase and sale of property and disposition of income were subject to decision or consent by the elders. Now that more members of a family tend to work for outside employers for a money wage and therefore not to live within the same walls, their conduct is no longer under constant scrutiny and they themselves are exempt from the discipline of family control. Thus the family, the institution on which the whole of Chinese civilization rested, is undermined.

The same is true of the subtler, less tangible aspects of Chinese society. The classical Confucian education, which was at once compendium of knowledge, intellectual discipline and code of ethics, has been discarded, and for it, too, no substitute has been devised. All the mores of the race are relaxed. The values once intuitively accepted as absolute are now questioned, if not in disrepute. All the common beliefs, myths, legends, which, though unexpressed and not consciously recognized, fix the attitude of a race and give it both unity and continuity, have lost adherence. They may still be asserted by some, but even by them they are not genuinely held, certainly not acted on.

All this is to say that China's culture has been shattered by the disruptiveness of new forces which it cannot contain, and that the Chinese are a race adrift. Now, this may not be unique to China, of course. It may be a description

CHINA—A BATTLEGROUND

of the whole contemporary world. All that has been said of China may be equally true of Europe and America, although in less dramatic form and with consequences less catastrophic. The West has had time to build up a resistance, to lay in a reserve which enables it to withstand the shock of disruption a little longer. As a result, the disintegration may be slower, but it may be disintegration none the less. What we see as a drift to dictatorship under so-called fascisms may be only evidence that representative government also is inadequate to the demands of an economically integrated and technically complex society. There is no complete anarchy as in China and there are no civil wars—not yet—because we have had time to contract habits of orderly processes of political change. Even so, where those habits are still exercised they have ceased to be exercised as reflexes. And they are being put under observation and analysis, which is as much as to say that they have ceased to be habits.

The economic difficulties which we describe as depression also may be symptoms of an organic pathological condition. The economic institutions inherited from our own agrarian society may be too rigid to contain the forces of an economy in which continents are inter-connected, the prices of foodstuffs are fixed in a world market and the depreciation of the currency of a country in one continent is reflected at once in the trade of another continent. In the other aspects of our society, too, the symptoms are alike. The loosening of marriage ties, the rebellion against parental authority, the indifference to

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

religion and the passing of old moral restraints are more than post-war reaction. We, too, have no more folk-beliefs. We have no faith. There is no more intuitive acceptance. Our own traditions are no longer binding, because a way of life has been shattered. Westernism has taken its toll in the West too. Here as in China the industrial revolution has had sequelae which have affected the whole culture, and the old order is passing. But here the passing has thus far been in the nature of a transition, because the revolution was paced at least somewhat by our own volition. China was catapulted into the modern world, not by its own initiative and not even by its own consent. There has been no graduated initiation into the modern world comparable to the gradations in Western evolution represented by the different dates 1820, 1870, 1914 and 1928. There has been no time to assimilate one stage before the advent of the next. The whole process was telescoped in China, and the effects have had to be taken in one terrific impact. The shock has been fatal. China as it had existed from, say, 500 B.C. to 1911 broke. But the difference between China and the West may be only that China broke quickly. The West has more resistance, and the death of its culture may be only a more lingering one.

Thus may be made a blanket reply to all the questions commonly asked about China: Why can it not pull itself together? Why does it have civil wars? Why can it not have a unified government? Why must Chinese fight each other even when the country is attacked by a common

CHINA—A BATTLEGROUND

enemy? Why, as we most like to put it, must there be chaos in China? As well ask why the depression did not end in 1930, why there was inflation in Europe after 1919, why Europe does not compose its hostilities. If China could pull itself together it never would have fallen apart. The centrifugal forces which now disperse it into so many contiguous fragments are those by which it was rent. There is no unification because there is no principle of unity, and there will be no unification until such a principle is found. Probably this means that when the conditions essential to unification arrive the country will already have unified.

The conditions do not exist today. China is neither of the ancient world nor yet in the modern, and it suffers the disabilities of both. It is so far impinged on by economic forces from without that a decision by the American government to raise the price of silver threatens bankruptcy to Chinese firms because of a violent decline in Chinese prices, even for goods which never enter into international trade. But China has not enough of the modern apparatus to be able to organize its own central bank and a national currency. It has enough of means of communication and transportation for rebellious generals to be able to organize a cabal and bring together an army big enough to cut off two provinces. But it does not have railways to enable the government to despatch troops for the restoration of order and the quick suppression of banditry. The new cities on the coast, drawing off capital from the interior and reaching into local markets in the

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

interior, have destroyed the economic local autonomy which gave the country equilibrium. But there are no means of bringing grain from the wheat growing provinces in the west to the coast cheaply enough to compete with American flour. There is enough of centralization for disturbance of equilibrium, but not enough for efficient economic organization. There is a big army which feeds off the country like a plague of locusts and the cost of arming it is ruinous, but it is useless to defend the country.

The conditions essential to unification do not exist, and they cannot be fabricated by order and to specifications. China has broken with its past. If it is to survive it has no choice: it must incorporate itself into the modern world, the world of the West. Specifically, it must industrialize and it must create an effective central government—if these are not two phases of the same process. It is hardly practicable to do one without the other, and this describes a circle of frustration. So long as the country is riven by dissension, local particularism and the maneuverings of petty tyrants half-military and half-bandit, it is hardly possible to go forward with the linking up of the country by railways, waterways and canals, the establishment of a national currency, a banking system and a code of commercial law, the inauguration of universal education and provision of assistance to peasants to teach them how to cultivate the soil with all the help of science—in short, all the steps requisite to the development of the nation's resources to their fullest potentiality.

CHINA—A BATTLEGROUND

But until there is a national system of communication and transportation, until there are banks and factories and trading houses and mines and oil wells and public utilities to accumulate the wealth necessary to give the government the means of governing nationally, the country must remain torn by dissension. To unify and develop a large country requires a surplus of capital, but only a unified country has such a surplus. The only escape from this circle, which is to borrow from other countries, is fatal for a country such as China. For when it signs a loan agreement it mortgages away its independence. A weak country can today be conquered by bonds almost as easily as by guns.

China has been imprisoned within this vicious circle for years. Nevertheless there has been considerable progress in industrialization. So great are the country's potentialities that despite all the handicaps there have formed in and around centers such as Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow and Canton nuclei of new energy and power. Their influence radiates into the interior at an accelerated pace year by year. In spite of civil wars and the resulting barriers to trade in the interior, despite world-wide economic distress, China's foreign trade has steadily increased. Economically China has begun to go forward. How much and how fast it can make further progress is conditional on political eventualities, especially international eventualities. How long will China remain free to exercise its energy for its own purpose?

There has not been equal progress politically. There

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

has been actual retrogression. The present nominal central government at Nanking has little authority except in its environs, and it commands less respect. It has little claim to respect. Neither in personnel, achievements nor policies can it commend itself to the loyalty of thinking Chinese. This is not to share the conventional Occidental proclivity for applying absolute standards to Chinese governments. In most comment on the Chinese government there is a tendency to self-righteousness and pharisaism. Good government has not been among the achievements of the age of science. On balance it may be said of almost all contemporary government that it contrives to make life more wretched for the majority of those who fall under it. Even judged comparatively, however, the so-called Nationalist regime in China has been a fiasco. Even in its major purpose, that of breaking the shackles of imperialistic control, it so far misjudged its task and so blindly over-reached itself that it brought on a counter-attack which has more than wiped out the gains that were made in the beginning. China is today nearer extinction as a national entity than it was in 1914. In its quasi-radicalism, the veneer of social revolution spread by the alliance with Soviet Russia, the Nationalist regime has failed even more miserably. Social reaction is completely in the saddle, with the connivance of the Nationalist government itself, and there is a worse obscurantism than there was in the last days of the monarchy, notwithstanding a certain mechanical repetition of the phrases current in 1927.

CHINA—A BATTLEGROUND

However the blame may be divided as between the impact of the times, the undermining by foreign attack and China's own ineffectiveness, the fact is that China cannot be counted on to find itself for a long time. It will flounder for years. Indeed, there is no element in sight which holds any promise of being able to lead it out of the slough. Certainly China cannot find itself in time to ward off the attack that seems to be impending. It cannot be calculated as a factor in the international equation in the Far East. In the present historical phase China remains a passive agent and perhaps will become a battleground.

It has just been said that there is no element in sight which holds promise of serving as a point of stabilization. To this statement an amendment should be attached. Cognizance must be taken of the communist movement. That there is such a movement and that it has assumed proportions of some magnitude is undoubted, but practically nothing else can be said of it with any certainty of accuracy or reliability. There is no evidence. What is reported as fact is selective, the principle of selection being the preferences and prejudices of those who report. Few outsiders, if any, have been admitted into what is called Soviet China and permitted to take their own observations. The vilification of the communists emanates from those who are passionately anti-communistic in general and air their bitterness from the distance of Shanghai or even New York. The panegyrics emanate from devout believers, usually also from the distance of Shanghai or

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

New York. The official reports of the Chinese Communist Party have the characteristics of all Chinese public pronouncements: declaration of intent is confused with consummation. The paper plans for great societies which have been projected into the world by Chinese governments and parties in the last few years would have fashioned a utopian universe. None of them has attained a more substantial being than words on paper. The laws promulgated for Soviet China are the charter of a rational society offering a form of life idyllic by comparison with the life of other Chinese, but there is little evidence that any of them have been applied. Such evidence as is available runs rather to the contrary.

How large the communist area is; how many people are embraced within it; how far communization has gone; how many communists there are; how many of them are genuinely communists; whether the population in the communist area gives its adherence out of fear of the Red armies or out of loyalty won by betterment of living conditions; even how large and how strong the Red armies are—these are questions that cannot be answered. They are only subjects for speculation, guesses or propaganda. From the circumstances in which communism grew in China it can be assumed to be not very communistic, an assumption supported by considerable evidence. Its spread was too fast and too far to go very deep in a country where the instruments of propaganda are still primitive. A daily press, advertising, moving pictures and radio make the indoctrination of countries like Germany,

CHINA—A BATTLEGROUND

England and the United States a simple matter. But in a country where information and opinion must still be spread largely by word of mouth or instilled by fear of the bayonet sudden conversion to any doctrine is more likely to be attributable to the latter.

In the earlier communist phase in China, between 1924 and 1927, there was support from a large part of the intellectual leadership of the country. The cause carried the prestige of the only class which ever has conferred prestige in China—the intellectual and scholar class. Even then the foundation was not very sturdy. Communist strength was mainly a tour de force of propaganda. Now the same class is lukewarm or antipathetic. The collapse of the first movement left it disillusioned, hopeless or antagonistic, for the net result of those three years was a great deal of useless slaughter. The present movement was organized by remnants of the minor leadership of the first. Its success has been mainly among peasants. Its extension has been achieved by the victories of the armies it raised partly among peasants and partly from disaffected government troops, disaffected because seldom paid. It has made little impress in the cities. While China is predominantly a land of peasants, there as elsewhere new ideas have always originated in the cities and radiated out from them. Also there as elsewhere the city has generally had the power to impose a veto on such rare movements as have been initiated on the land. Mass risings that have succeeded in overturning dynasties in the past had their mainspring in oppression which weighed on city and

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

country alike. It is doubtful whether any movement can succeed in China now that does not win the urban population too.

That the communist movement has at least negative loyalty in the region where it is strong is beyond doubt. It has carried the same appeal that has won Central Europe to fascism: nothing can be worse than what is. The Chinese people have undergone sufferings in the last few years that would have been fatal to a race not so indurated to suffering or produced volcanic upheavals in a race less fatalistic from a long struggle with nature. It is, as has been said, a predominantly peasant people, and peasants live close enough to the elemental to be fatalistic. To the harshness of nature, more relentless of late years by way of famine and flood, have been added man-made depredations. The general social disorganization has borne down hardest on the masses as everywhere. The civil wars have been fought over the two-acre patches from which the peasant wrests his livelihood or over the workshops of the village artisans. Bandits have burned and looted. Government troops have been more predatory than bandits because they are not confined to fugitive appearances. Generals more heartless than bandit chieftains have levied terrible ransoms on the ground of protection against bandits. Civil officials have exacted taxes years in advance. Life, even livelihood, for the masses on the soil and in the smaller towns has become hopeless. When a group comes promising not only relief but a fuller, easier life than a Chinese has ever dared dream of for himself—

CHINA—A BATTLEGROUND

enough land, no more high rents on tenant farms, no more unscrupulous exploitation by the urban buyers of produce, no more plundering in the name of taxes—why should not the peasant welcome deliverance? All that he has dimly envisioned as paradise is about to materialize. Why should he not join a party if it comes bearing such promises? If he does not, it is only because experience has given him a profound skepticism of the fair-spoken come with blandishments.

The origin, spirit and prospects of Chinese communism can be put briefly thus: if after March 4, 1933, Herbert Hoover, Andrew W. Mellon, Ogden L. Mills, Hamilton Fish, Jr., and the president of the National Association of Manufacturers had emigrated to China and launched a campaign interpreting their party platform and principles as yielding to the Chinese peasants the same benefits and the same relief from an unbearable lot as the communists offer, the Chinese peasants would have enrolled themselves as Republicans and joined in processions for the party of perpetual prosperity and individualism. Or as Nazis or Fascists or Socialists or Prohibitionists. Or anything, in fact. And the doctrines, the ideology, the philosophy, the program would have troubled them little—as probably the philosophy of Karl Marx troubles them little, if more than one in ten is at all clear who or what Karl Marx is.

The communist movement in China is a clutching at hope out of despair. It is a mass revolt—not for a new society but against present oppressions. As revolt it is

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

genuine and deeply felt; as program for a new society it is barely conscious. But as sincere revolt it may have the same effect. Worse, it may produce just a cataclysm. That it has not already done so is more surprising than the opposite. If it does, and it does so under the aegis of the communist party, then China may very well become officially a communist country, whatever the origin may have been and whatever it may be in intellectual grasp or even understanding. That it will be really communistic as the word would be construed by Marx or Lenin or a well-read party member in Europe or the United States is only remotely possible. The categories do not fit Chinese social conditions and have no relation to the environment. The concepts are exotic. The issues have no reality—except as they state a general aspiration to a better life. Communism is for the Chinese people out of another social language, out of another planet. What they understand of it is more land, more food, less work. A new social order, based on a new social philosophy, with a new interpretation of history and a new set of values calling for new motivations and new incentives—all this is meaningless to them.

Communism in China, even if it is successful, will not be communism except on one condition—if, after its nominal success, Soviet Russia steps in and proceeds to reorganize the country on its own social ground plan and under its tutelage. But if Soviet Russia is willing and able to do this, then it is immaterial in any case how genuine Chinese communism is and how many Chinese have been

CHINA—A BATTLEGROUND

won to it. For, as has been said, China is not able by its own resources to withstand any foreign invader, whether invasion is for imperialistic objects or out of a philosophy of world revolution. That what is now called communism in China will sweep the country is by no means impossible. It may even be said to be probable unless the present government and governing classes show more capacity, more restraint and more consideration for the mass of the Chinese people than they now show. But what succeeds will not be a communist regime or even a collective society unless Soviet Russia takes control. It will be what the Western communists themselves call reformism. Even as that it may be better, however, than what is. For though obscured now by international political considerations, China's most pressing question is whether in adopting Western forms it shall go through the whole Western cycle from 1800 to 1929 or impose social control from the beginning in order to avoid the excesses, exploitation and wastes that have produced a diseased state in the West. That question must, however, be subordinated to the major question, how and when the international conflict is settled. And if Soviet Russia should step in, that would precipitate the international crisis as swiftly as would Japan's attempt to assume control.

Cognizance must be taken of another eventuality that may affect China internally. It has already been bruited in Far Eastern diplomatic gossip. This is that China will make its peace with Japan. Being deserted by the West, it will go in with Japan, making what is equivalent to

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

an alliance. Now, undeniably opportunism is the ruling principle in Chinese politics, by which may be explained the sudden reversals that often astonish Occidentals. There is scarcely any other principle. The idea of politics as embedded in Anglo-Saxon thought is alien to the Chinese mind. Politics is not a mechanism of the state or an instrument of the collective will, and parties as the vehicles of public policies are so recent an importation that they exist in name only. There was no need or place for politics in the traditional system of government by a caste recruited from scholars and exercising limited functions under a theoretically absolute monarchy—the people being essentially self-governing under precedents fixed by tradition, as has been said. Politics and parties are an outgrowth of the institution of representative government. The only politics in China has been concerned with personal careerism, pursued by shifting alliances of individuals, shifting according to opportunity for personal advancement. Opportunism was the only politics called for, the only kind that could have utility. And it has been carried over into China's foreign politics. Also, the heart of all Chinese philosophy is compromise. The middle way is the path of wisdom: never give oneself without reserve, never burn one's bridges behind one, never the last extremity. All nature is compromise and wisdom lies in the closest harmony with nature. The lost cause to the ultimate sacrifice is not in Chinese psychology. Hence also the astonishing reversals and the reconciliation of irreconcil-

CHINA—A BATTLEGROUND

ables which Occidentals construe as insincerity, bad faith or ignominiousness.

A sudden reconciliation with Japan would not be altogether out of key. But that it will materialize to the extent of an alliance is doubtful nevertheless. So high is the feeling against Japan among articulate Chinese that no Chinese government would dare risk the venture except under the cover of secrecy. But a secret alliance would be of little use to Japan. Insofar as China does make a reconciliation with Japan, it will be one of expediency, or surrender to a virtual ultimatum by Japan. China cannot help itself. It cannot resist. Therefore it might attempt to buy immunity with a promise of co-operation. But the contract would not be fulfilled in good faith and there would be no intention so to fulfill it, as the Japanese would know perfectly well. If ever, with the benefit of the alliance or by its own effort, China were able to turn on Japan, it would do so. It would do so with a clear conscience. By Chinese morality an obligation incurred under duress is not binding. It is not an obligation of honor. There is a greater likelihood that instead of making an alliance with Japan China will resort to its time-honored tactic of playing one Power off against another. If this, too, seems Oriental and slim, it should be remembered that a weak country beset by pursuers ready to spring has no other recourse. The tactic has served China well. It has helped China escape partition.

Thus may be allayed the fear which has been resurrected in the West in a somewhat new body, the fear that a new

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

Yellow Peril was gathering—Japan ambitious and militaristic and strong, with the support behind it of 400,000,000 Chinese whom it could train as cannon-fodder and as cheap factory labor to overwhelm the West in the marts and on the battlefield. The peril is as much a phantasm now as when it first generated in the mind of the volatile Wilhelm II. It carries its own contradiction. If ever China is forged by Japan into a weapon dangerous enough to use against the West, the weapon will first be turned against Japan. If ever there is a Yellow Peril it will be a Chinese peril, and that is too far distant in the future to be worth speculating on. By that time the spirit and form of Chinese culture and the basis of Chinese society will have been altered so completely that the peril will not be a distinctively "Yellow" one. It will be the peril of the largest nation become efficient, socially effective and strong, but that will be no different from a Russian, German or American peril. In that sense there was an English peril from the end of the Napoleonic wars to 1914. There is little likelihood of Japan uniting the whole of Asia against the white race, the favorite specter of the Hollywood school of historical prognosis. There is little likelihood of Asiatic unity under any leadership. Asia is torn by its own schisms. There is less basis for unity in Asia than in Europe.

There is one other ground on which China might enter into an alliance with Japan. This would be out of a sense of security derived from its history. China has been conquered before, and by submission conquered its conquer-

CHINA—A BATTLEGROUND

ors, first assimilating and then swallowing them. It is so vast a country that it has always been able to constrict and then absorb invaders and so fixed in its ways that in the end its foreign rulers conformed to it rather than it to them. So it has been with the Tartars, the Mongols and the Manchus. Their descendants are now the servants of the Peiping middle class.

The sense of security may prove to be false now, however. China has always absorbed its conquerors in the past because always they have been of an inferior culture. The rough northern tribes which laid it low had more virility, but they were primitive. Coming into contact for the first time with the nuances of a delicate culture and the refinements of a sheltered, settled life, they have succumbed to the blandishments and elevated themselves culturally at the price of losing their vigor. They had built up no immunity against the debilitation of luxury. The Japanese, however, are not of an inferior culture by the standards of the time. They are superior certainly in the mastery of the instruments of modern civilization. As of the twentieth century they have nothing to learn from China. On the contrary, it is China that is backward now. And that which is enervating in the Chinese culture they took from China more than a thousand years ago. Japan is superior in just those respects that determine ruler and ruled in our age.

China's vastness also does not offer the security it once did. In older times a country which was conquered could be kept in subjection only by stationing enough troops

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

throughout the country to put down uprisings anywhere. If the conquered country was large enough the task was an impossible one to carry out over a long period. Today a country can be subdued and kept in subjection by merely holding its key-points—ports, railheads and the ganglia of its economic system. A squadron of planes can put down a rising a thousand miles distant. Japan need not occupy the whole country to master it. And it cannot be swallowed up by assimilation. Nevertheless the physical fact is that China has at least five times as many people as Japan and is so well inoculated with nationalism that it will strive for independence. Also it is itself acquiring practice in the use of instruments of power. Its subjection by Japan for very long is not impossible but it is highly improbable.

In the immediate future, however, China cannot escape subjugation by its own efforts. In any event its most distinctly local problems are also international. That is its tragedy, that in its time of fiercest trial it must divide its attention between its own needs and the threats from without. The governing consideration must always be what foreign nations want and will do. China is still a pawn in the game of high politics.

Chapter XII

CASE STUDY IN WAR

THIS is not a book about the Far East, it was emphasized at the beginning, but a book about the West in the Far East. As may be seen now, a book about the West in the Far East must be to some extent an analysis of the mechanism of modern society and, still more, an examination of the anatomy of war. For the last purpose the Far East can be taken almost for laboratory demonstration. There better than in Europe can be seen how wars form and grow.

In Europe the causes of war are obscured because overlaid by the deposit of a long and bloody history—old national animosities, old racial hatreds, vestiges of dynastic jealousies and religious schisms, the cumulative effect of wrong piled on wrong, revenge breeding revenge, first a Polish partition, an Alsace-Lorraine and a Bosnia-Herzegovina, then a Polish Corridor, the Austrian Tyrol incorporated into Italy and Hungarian provinces into Rumania. Emotions have had greater play because of stimuli set working almost at birth, as after 1870 hatred of Germany was instilled into French children with their first words and after 1918 hatred of France into German children. But the material that goes into the making of war and that passions only develop is the same as elsewhere.

The last few decades in Europe offer a conclusive

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

refutation of the theory that war is a product of emotional storms and irrational factors and therefore is preventable by appeals to reason and the evocation of the nobler instincts. If there is an historic feud in Europe, it is not Franco-German or Franco-Italian but Anglo-French, reaching back as far as the time of Jeanne d'Arc. As late as 1898 the British and French almost came to blows when Kitchener at the head of a British force confronted Marchand and French troops at Fashoda on the Nile. The race for African possessions was on, all Powers scrambling to cover as much territory as fast as possible. The method of acquiring possessions was simple: wherever the troops of any Power set foot, that was its own. The inhabitants were not consulted. If they protested, they were killed. The British and French met at Fashoda. Kitchener ordered the French to withdraw. They refused. He gave an ultimatum. The British government stood behind Kitchener. War seemed likely, but France was unprepared and yielded. Marchand withdrew and the Sudan became British. That was in 1898. Less than ten years later Great Britain and France consummated the Entente Cordiale and a few years after that were comrades-in-arms against Germany.

What had happened in the interval? Germany had emerged to challenge British supremacy in Africa and also in the Far East. Everywhere Germany was trying to break through the British trade monopoly, and because it wanted colonies and markets was already threatening to build a navy rivalling Britain's. Also Germany was trying to es-

CASE STUDY IN WAR

tablish itself in Northern Africa, which had long been a French preserve. The historic Anglo-French feud was subordinated to more pressing considerations. More vital concerns were involved than the memories of the execution of Jeanne d'Arc or the pretensions of Bonaparte's "mounseers." Great Britain and France joined against the common enemy—the enemy of the moment, an enemy that threatened what both then considered to be their vital interests. The enmity was neither historic, racial, religious nor cultural. Racially, culturally and in religion England is closer to Germany than to France. It was not historic, since England had been in far more wars with France than with Germany. Indeed, the British dynasty was of German origin and the grandfather of George V was German-born. The enmity turned on Germany's ambition to displace England as the great colonial empire and the bank and workshop of the world. The war of 1914 followed the lines of the new enmity rather than the traditional. Without benefit of memories Germany became the anti-Christ to the English people and England to the German people. Emotions conformed to suit.

The issue is not clouded in the Far East. There no passions have had time to gather. No emotions are called into play. There has been no shifting of boundaries to include a French population in a German colony and force French children thereafter to speak German only in the schools. No hostile nationalities jostle each other on arbitrary and artificial boundaries. There is no harvest of grave wrongs and history is not taught as hate. Chinese

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

are only now being brought under Japanese sovereignty, and, besides, the war danger is not primarily between Japan and China but between various countries that have stakes in China. In the Far East the causes of war move directly to effect without any extraneous and fortuitous motive power. If there is to be any serious effort to rid mankind of the plague of war, we shall look to the Far East. For thus best we can diagnose causes as the first step toward finding a cure.

It may be too late to arrest the momentum now. Too much weight may have been put behind it by all parties at interest in the Far East. And in the nature of our society since the industrial revolution it may not have been possible to keep the causes from being set in operation. But we can see how even relatively recently it might have been possible to delay the culmination or perhaps avert it altogether—at a price. At any rate we can see how the conflict was made. The Far East can be used as a case study in international pathology.

There was a chance after the World War. Had there been any good faith behind the war aims so virtuously proclaimed until the fighting ceased, we might have inaugurated a new regime in the Far East as part of a new regime the world over. In the Far East that would have meant putting an end to the international struggle for primacy, which in turn would have meant giving up the outposts we had established there. Had we had any foresight we should have done so in our own interest. No clairvoyant sense was needed to perceive that the race was to

CASE STUDY IN WAR

Japan and the longer it continued the further ahead Japan would be. Japan was getting stronger year by year. The West, on the other hand, had little hope of being able to keep pace with Japan while it was still exhausted and no hope at all of ever again exercising the preponderance of power it once had in the Far East. The only prospect of retaining an equal status lay in starting afresh, in declaring the struggle for ascendancy off. More than verbal declarations were necessary, however. A status of equality would have had to be legislated for China too—the status of country rather than spoilsground. In other words, China's independence would have had to be restored by cancelling the derogations we had put upon it. Our financial and territorial concessions would have had to be given up, in graduated stages perhaps rather than in one immediate move, and thereafter our relations with China would have been those of one nation trading with another. Thus alone could we have avoided the sharpening of the struggle for mastery in China: by withdrawing the premium on encroachment. Thus alone might we have been able to call a halt on Japan's advance.

It might not have been possible in any case to have induced Japan to renounce the advantage already apparent to its leaders. It was hopeless unless the Western Powers gave tokens of good faith. Insofar as Japan's motives were defensive and arose from fear they could not be changed except by proof that the West had given up hopes of aggrandizement in China. No proof would have been satisfactory except actual withdrawal. Then at least Japan

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

would not have been penalized by abstention. It would have been left without the case which it can now plead with considerable merit. Most of all, the Japanese militarists would not have had so convincing a case to put before their own people. Instead, with the razing of the whole international system that had stood in China since 1842, we should have fortified that small group in Japan that had already come to believe that Japan's policy toward China should be one of conciliation. Even without such encouragement that party became vocal a few years later and for a short period had its way. Its influence might have been less transitory if there had been any concrete evidence that Japan was the only Power that harbored designs on China and that it had no rivals to fear. But as the situation was, the Japanese militarists could plead convincingly that Japan was being asked to break bread with the tiger. Japan's psychology, which is one of fear and the aggressiveness which fear begets, and which must be bred out before Japan can become a law-abiding member of international society, was instead implanted more deeply. Proof was given that Japan still had cause to be wary. Japan might have been isolated and put on the defensive before the whole world, a position which in time would have had some effect on Japanese opinion. It might have been a long time before Japanese opinion could have made itself felt and in the interval Japan would have been left free by the withdrawal of the West to work its will in China. But it is doing so now as it is. The West gained nothing by clinging to its position. It only lost the

CASE STUDY IN WAR

opportunity to make a beginning toward ending the international competition for empire in the Far East which had produced wars before and would produce them again.

The failure was not a matter of neglect or oversight, however. There was no desire to make such a beginning. Nor could it have been made except as part of an effort extending the same rule of conduct over the whole world. Morality and peace and international co-operation cannot be legislated for one continent alone. With respect to conditions that produce war there is no point of distinction as between the Eastern and Western hemispheres. A new world order would have had to be inaugurated, one which applied the lessons of the World War by eradicating the conditions which had brought it about. But there was no such desire. The war aims were a weapon of propaganda for use against Germany, not a declaration of purpose binding on the victors.

There was another chance at the Washington Conference two years after the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles. This was, if anything, a better chance. In the first place, the conference did not meet on the edge of a battlefield with the echoes of the guns still rumbling and the dead unburied. It was not hampered by a psychotic atmosphere that excluded all reason and balanced judgment. In the second place, it did not have to patch up a broken world all at once. It dealt with only one area and one set of problems, both of which had been in a state of relative poise. Also, it had the benefits of the growing recognition of the mistakes made at Versailles, already

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

rued by thinking men of all nationalities. That the peace had sown the seeds of another war was already evident. The alarms that sounded from Central Europe in 1934 were already audible to the sensitive ear in 1921.

By 1921 it was or should also have been apparent that a tempest was gathering in the Far East. Japan's retention of the Kiaochao Peninsula, overrunning of Siberia and abortive attempt to buy over control of the Chinese government were portents. At that time America's newly-won economic eminence had produced a sudden intensification of interest in foreign trade and foreign investments. There was a sudden swarm of American commercial attachés, bankers, promoters and manufacturers' agents all over the world, actively bidding for business in places where American competition had hitherto been unimportant. This was especially true in the Far East (as well as in the oil fields of the Near East and Latin America) and the result was considerable friction between Great Britain and the United States. In the Far East especially it was plain that new factors had entered which demanded at least a re-examination.

The Conference did obviate an Anglo-American-Japanese naval race. Beyond that it was barren. The same opportunity lay before it as before the Versailles Conference. Now there was even greater urgency, for Chinese nationalism had arisen. Now there were the rival claims of the various Powers to be composed and in addition China's claim to restoration of complete independence. There were thus two conflicts, each of which threatened to

CASE STUDY IN WAR

embroil the Far East. While Chinese nationalism was an added complication it also offered a way to solution. Thus might have been found an indirect check to Japan. By yielding to China the Western Powers might not only have uprooted the war system in the Far East but assured to themselves parity with Japan for a time. In any case Chinese nationalism brought the whole Far Eastern question to a head.

The Washington Conference got a better press than the Versailles Conference. It was an extraordinary feat of propaganda. Not only on the public at large but on those fairly well informed the impression was left that great deeds were in the making. But notwithstanding all the lavish official pronouncements and lush rhetoric in the press about the emancipation of the Chinese people, a new charter of liberty for China, etc., etc., in actuality very little was done. The basic situation was left unchanged. That which had necessitated the calling of a conference was left just as it had been before the conference was convened. There was no desire to touch that situation. There was, to the contrary, a deliberate and conscious effort to avoid doing so.

The foreign Powers gave up their right to maintain post offices in China. Minor leaseholds no longer of use were retroceded with a fine flourish of generosity. Spheres of influence were declared void. Vague and undated promises were given of eventual relaxation of foreign control of China's tariff and reconsideration of extra-territoriality. Similar promises had been made before. Nothing was

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

said of foreign concessions in cities such as Shanghai, Hankow, Tientsin, nothing of foreign troops stationed on Chinese soil, including the capital, nothing of foreign gunboats on Chinese rivers, nothing of foreign supervision over the customs and salt monopoly, the principal sources of national revenue. All the Powers pledged themselves yet again to respect the territorial sovereignty and integrity of China—the integrity of China as from date. As for the encroachments on China's integrity prior to 1921, they apparently were fixed with astronomical finality. When the Chinese delegates protested, they were told to go home and set their house in order. When China's house was set in order—specifications not given and subject to change at the discretion of the Powers that were both judges and parties at interest—something might be done, just what not being specified.

Japan had been put on trial; that was all. But it was tried, not for disturbing the peace and imperilling international order, not for violating the precepts of international good conduct by despoiling China because weak, but for stealing a march on others. The principle of plunder in the Far East was not challenged, only Japan's unsportsmanlike abuse of it. All Powers kept what they had; Japan was penalized for taking more than its share. Even America, which was ostentatiously snubbing Europe for its lack of political morality and idealism and had assumed the mantle of a Diogenes in search of an honest nation, even America did not raise the question of special privileges in China. Certainly it did not raise the question of

CASE STUDY IN WAR

giving up those from which it benefited in common with other Powers. It only objected to Japan's over-reaching itself.

All that was impressed on Japan, then, was the unwisdom of taking more than its share unless strong enough to keep what it took. The opportunity was again missed to isolate Japan, to put it on the defensive, to give notice that the whole world was arrayed behind China's independence for disinterested reasons. The old imperialistic system was given official sanction and perpetuated. Japan was left free to go as far as it thought it could without risk. It has been doing so in recent years because now internal Occidental conditions, political and economic, give it free rein.

What was impressed on China was that justice was only to the strong, notwithstanding the high moral tone of the time, and that if it wanted justice it could not rely on appeals to reason or fair play. Only force would avail. In result nationalism flared up and the unofficial alliance with Soviet Russia was contracted, both in direct consequence of the attitude of the Washington Conference. The sequence of events was foredoomed that led to the challenge of Japan's position in South Manchuria and Japan's reply by the seizure of all Manchuria. If Japan had surrendered to the challenge, China would have moved on to recover the foreign settlements in Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow and Hongkong and to drive the foreign garrisons out of Peking. And the Western Powers would have had to choose between doing as Japan did in 1931 or

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

surrendering. For so long as China is determined to attain a status of equality among the nations foreign Powers having possessions and privileges which violate China's sovereignty must surrender them or be prepared to suppress China by force as Japan did. There can be no compromise. The Washington Conference could have appeased China by making some concessions to its aspirations and thus postponed the liquidation, but eventually complete withdrawal would have had to come. The Washington Conference made no concessions except in words, and the test came first with Japan. Japan did as might have been expected, as probably any Western Power would have done with as much at stake and in an equally favorable position. It had no choice unless it was to fall behind in the international race, even if it had wanted to escape the necessity. It did not want to escape the necessity. Its military rulers had been longing for the excuse. The Washington Conference gave it to them.

What may be held against the Washington Conference most is not the intellectual dishonesty and hypocrisy that pervaded it but its consummate stupidity. Unwilling to end the struggle in the Far East or to withdraw from it, the Western Powers armed Japan with the weapons with which to eliminate them from it. By conciliating China they could have prolonged the status quo, which was to their interest. By refusing concessions they made China insistent and thus gave Japan its pretext. Forced to choose between the two evils of Chinese nationalism and Japa-

CASE STUDY IN WAR

nese militarism, they chose Japanese militarism, which was the greater.

More, they gave Japan its moral justification. The grounds on which the Powers refused, at Washington and before and after, to give up their territorial possessions on Chinese soil, the right of extra-territoriality, control of the tariff and the rest, were the unsettled internal conditions in China. China would have to wait until its house was set in order, else we should risk too much. Thereby we laid down a principle which Japan made its own. The whole Japanese case at Geneva and after was this: China is in turmoil; it has no stable government; hence Japan cannot turn back Manchuria to Chinese rule. The Japanese premise was sound and the Chinese were on shaky ground in disputing it. The evidence was against them. But the Japanese conclusion that therefore it might take Chinese territory does not follow. It does not follow in logic or equity, and certainly it does not follow if we are ever to have a world that orders its affairs without war. But neither did the conclusion of the Western Powers follow that therefore they had to retain control of the tariff, extra-territoriality and the richest Chinese ports. And when they enunciated the principle that disorder in a weak country justifies a strong one in invading it they laid the foundations of Japan's defense. They did not even state a position in their own interest. For however much risk there might be in letting China go free while still unsettled, there is just as much risk in letting it fall under Japanese dominion. And, even leaving Japan out of con-

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

sideration, if they had had to send expeditions to defend their concessions against an aroused Chinese nationalism, the cost of saving what was at stake was as great as the value of the stake. The risk was inherent in the situation. They did nothing to minimize it. They magnified it.

Occidental diplomatic short-sightedness, fidelity to the creed of imperialism and political and economic greed were God's gifts to the Japanese General Staff. They were more. They were the buttress of the war system in the Far East. What happened after 1931 followed as a step in a geometric theorem. But then it was too late to forestall the consequences. If now it is too late to demolish the system, we can at least see how it was built.

Chapter XIII

CAN WE PREVENT A FAR EASTERN WAR?

WE HAVE come to this: we are back at the struggle for empire as before 1914. World politics is again the rivalry of the strong for the possession of the weak.

Thus there is another turn in the cycle of imperialism, the institution in which international activity has been channeled in the age of machine industrialism. First the strong against the weak in order to reduce them to submission: the establishment of empires by the conquest of all Asia, Africa and the oceanic islands. Then the strong against the strong for exclusive possession of the weak but richest lands: the "foreign affairs" of the second half of the nineteenth century which culminated in 1914. Then, with the spread of nationalism after the World War and the rising of the dependent nationalities, the strong against the weak again in order to hold them in subjection: the rebellions in India, China, Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, Syria and elsewhere which kept the decade between 1920 and 1930 in turmoil. Now once more the strong against the strong for possession of the weak. The nationalism of the dependent countries can no longer be indulged. The times are too serious. It is noteworthy that since the first warnings of the depression there has been an increasing firmness toward movements of disaffection among subject

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

peoples—in India, in China, in Egypt, in various parts of Africa.

Not only Japan can say that its outlying possessions are its life-line, and no country strong enough to help itself will permit the line to be severed. A few years ago the principal issue in imperialism was whether the empires could and would use the force required to put down colonial disaffection. That issue is suspended for the present. The empires will do so if necessary, whether Great Britain in India, France in Morocco or Japan in Manchukuo. For the moment, therefore, nationalism among the subject peoples is quiescent—only for the moment; it will rise again. The issue now is not whether the empires can hold their possessions against native rebellion but whether they can defend them against each other's covetous designs. The inwardness of much of the tortuous diplomacy in 1934 had to do with the Italian-French disagreement over the division in North Africa, especially Tunis—the same quarrel that aligned Italy with Germany and Austria-Hungary before the World War. And Europe's studious obliviousness to the Italian aggressions on Abyssinia begun in 1934 (which are not dissimilar to Japan's in Manchuria) raises the suspicion that obliviousness is Italy's price for aligning itself now with France against Germany. It would not be the first time that a great Power has been given a free hand with a weak country in compensation for services to another great Power in a situation with which the weak country had no

CAN WE PREVENT A FAR EASTERN WAR?

connection. Diplomatic buying and selling of small and helpless nations is in the great tradition.

Mainly, however, the new struggle for empire is focussed on the Far East. The Far East is the only large area subject to conquest which is still in dispute. The others have all been allocated, with the exception of a few relatively minor points still being contested. Africa has been mainly British since 1919 and the Monroe Doctrine ensures equilibrium for Latin America—poaching is forbidden and the United States Navy is strong. Moreover, as has repeatedly been emphasized, the Far East is the most valuable perquisite of empire. The effort has begun to appropriate it. Japan is forcing the issue, with the West, the United States in particular, attempting to resist.

Now, it is arguable that for the peace of the world it would not have been an unmixed evil if by some miraculous endowment of power Japan had been suddenly enabled to carry out the principles of the Foreign Office Spokesman and by a single irresistible coup expelled the West—shut off the Far East to us as completely as by another edict of isolation. It may even be held that that would have made for an economy of suffering in the next generation. Then despite ourselves we might have escaped being drawn into a whirlpool of Asiatic wars. Faced with irretrievable loss, as irretrievable as, say, the collapse in Wall Street in 1929, we might have proceeded to make the necessary adjustments—deflated present assets, written off future prospects and taken stock of ourselves. If it were then demonstrated that we could not keep our economic

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

system going on its present basis without the profits from foreign investments and the trade of foreign markets, we might have faced earlier the necessity of trimming down our wants to our assets or changing the basis of the system so that it could keep going. It may be we shall have to make that choice in any event. If so, then the sooner we come to it the less waste there will be: better that it be made as a transition under control than as a forced measure after a destructive war. The ultimate outcome may be the same. The difference may lie only in the amount of human pain that precedes it. Even for China the immediate denouement might have been the lesser of two evils. If it must go through a phase of submission to Japan or some other Power, then better to endure it without first being ground under foreign armies battling on its soil to determine which country shall be its master. A Chinese village destroyed to save it from falling under Japanese rule is destroyed none the less. Its inhabitants are no less dead.

It is arguable also that from the Western point of view immediate expulsion by Japan would make no difference in the end. It may be that that which we seek in the Far East we shall not get in any case and that which Japan seeks to take from us it shall not have either. It may be that the goal of empire for which all great Powers strain so desperately is only a mirage and that the hot pursuit into which Japan has flung will only take it into the desert after us. Suppose Japan does get an economic monopoly in the Far East? Time may prove that it will only have set against itself the same process that we set against our-

CAN WE PREVENT A FAR EASTERN WAR?

selves in Japan. As England sold to Japan the machinery with which to equip factories that now are taking away England's foreign trade, so Japan will sell machinery to China. As England invested capital in Japan's industrial development, so will Japan invest capital in China's industrial development. As England had to, so will Japan. Unless it does do so, its economic monopoly on China will do it little good. As has been said, if China remains on a medieval economy it will not buy enough Japanese goods to indemnify Japan for the costs of occupation, let alone absorb Japan's excess products. It will not have the purchasing power. It cannot serve Japan's economic purpose without being itself industrially developed, so that it can pay for Japanese exports with its own exports. But as Japan was no longer dependent on English exports when it had reached that stage in development, so will China no longer be dependent on Japanese exports when it has reached a parallel stage. As Japan became a competitor of England when it had gone beyond that stage, so will China become a competitor of Japan.

Japan will be no better able to arrest the working of economic law than Great Britain was. It will be forced to accelerate it as Great Britain was. Japan can succeed in its purposes only by defeating them. All empire carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction. It can succeed only by failing. Not until it fails has it fully succeeded. Thus international conquest defeats itself in the modern world. At any one point in time conquest may be necessary for survival; but conquest only brings on a more relentless

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

reckoning at a later date. The West and Japan may be about to fight for a chimera.

Fatality may have its uses, but fate does not come on the summons of reason. We do not so order our affairs. In reality Japan does not now have the power to evict us at once, so that the fact can be accomplished and irrevocable and resistance hopeless. Japan must proceed as opportunity offers. In the meantime we can resist. We are doing so and we shall continue. By all the laws that govern us in our group conduct we must. It may be that in the end we shall be no better off by restraining Japan or no worse off if Japan is allowed a free hand. But the long view is an unreal one in a society which is not organized on any continuity from present to future.

The benefits that will accrue in twenty-five or fifty years do not matter if profits must be foregone now or if, as is nearer the truth, our social foundations are jeopardized. We must keep going this year. Profits in a distant future in compensation for losses suffered in the present do not interest us if the losses threaten bankruptcy now for industrial corporations, banks and governments—or even prolonged depressions which slowly tend in the same direction. The scorn of practical men, as they are called, for theoretical considerations is not wholly attributable to their limitations. They are in part right. Only a society planned on a long range, with reserves laid up out of the past to cover deprivations in the present, could make serious sacrifices to insure a better future. Ours is not such a society. We live from year to year. Demonstrable as it

CAN WE PREVENT A FAR EASTERN WAR?

may be that imperialism is self-defeating and that in the long run none of the great Powers can get what it expects from the exploitation of China, if the profits of exploitation can provide prosperity for a few years or even security that is enough to motivate aggression on China. It is enough to motivate resistance to any country which seeks to arrogate all the profits of exploitation to itself. It motivates our opposition to Japan's aggressions.

The conflict in the Far East, it must be clear now, is more than political. It is not just a clash of diplomatic policies. It is more than a rivalry for private, capitalistic profits. It derives from the evolution of industrial civilization. Competitive imperialism, the nationalistic struggle for control of undeveloped lands, arose from the needs of establishing an industrial society. It continues because of the needs of maintaining the industrial society. And it becomes more acute as the difficulties of maintaining that society become greater. Without political expansion for economic purposes carried out under the agency of the national state with national armies and navies, the whole material progress of Europe and America would have been seriously impeded in the nineteenth century. Now, that might not have been a tragedy. Europe and America might have worn a fairer aspect today and been inwardly healthier than they are. If instead of the rapacious plunge over the whole planet to gouge out the natural wealth of every hidden valley and island for the quickest profit we had measured our advance with some regard to consequences, for one thing the whole East would not today be

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

in a state of social pathology. The civilizations of China and India would not have been first disorganized and then shattered by the irruption of military expeditions and the sudden intrusion of new economic bodies into their own mechanisms of production and distribution. They would have had time to adjust to factories and banks and railways, introducing them as and when the strain could be most easily absorbed. We have felt the effects of technological unemployment only for a few years. The East has for decades suffered not only technological unemployment but technological paralysis. China might not now be in that chaos which we deplore so self-righteously. Europe and America might have escaped the dislocation of the social organism from which they now suffer had there been time for adjustment. Their people would have been spared the atrocities of the factory, mill and mining towns of the nineteenth century: women and children would not have been chained to carts in coal pits in English mines. We, too, might not be today in the chaos which we do not recognize so clearly in ourselves as in China.

The question is no longer pertinent. The fact is that we carried out our expansion as we did and without it our material progress would have been impeded. The fact is also that without its continuance we cannot make further progress or hold to the progress we have made. There is little likelihood that we can escape retrogression. Our whole economic mechanism is set to the expectancy of growth. Future growth has been discounted in present values. Debts have been assumed on the assumption that

CAN WE PREVENT A FAR EASTERN WAR?

there would be continued growth, and they cannot be met without it. Our productive efficiency has outrun geography. In the simplest terms, we can produce more than can be absorbed at home. The excess must be exported, or the domestic market is glutted, wages cannot be paid, workmen must be laid off, the domestic market is then choked even worse, more workmen must be laid off, loans to banks cannot be met—the chain of which the last link is panic. The excess must be exported, but where? Geographically the opportunities have contracted. We have reached out to all the continents there are. And nearly everywhere on those continents industrial development has gone so far that a law of diminishing returns has set in for the exporting nations. For such opportunities as still exist we must strive the harder. The few markets still open to development must become the objects of sharper contention than ever. As has already been said, they are becoming so. The race for markets is already on. It underlies all of contemporary international politics. This is the reason for the polarization of international politics toward the Far East—the only extensive market still open to development.

If we are entering now on a struggle for control of the Far East—or to prevent Japan from acquiring control—it is not by the evil promptings of sinister diplomats, militarists or other figures out of the demonology of conventional pacifists and liberals. Nor is it only by reason of the desire of acquisitive capitalists to amass even greater private fortunes. We do so in order to exist. Not to do so is

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

to imperil our economic system and our social order. It would be unsound from the point of view of what might be called social biology. In order to prevent the struggle, with its inevitable concomitant of war, it is not enough to castigate the villains or exorcise evil spirits. Nor is there any utility in arbitration treaties, security pacts, international conferences or any of the other mechanical devices which arouse the enthusiasms of the large numbers of Americans who still are faithful to the national belief in mechanical contraptions for the solution of all social and cultural ills, however deep-lying they may be. These devices have been futile thus far. They will remain futile. They deal with symptoms only. No verbal pledges of restraint will stand when existence is at stake, when the price is millions of men out of work and doles can be paid only by turning currency off the printing presses. From any rational or realistic point of view it would be unsound to let them stand.

If international conflict to the point of war is inherent in the social order, we shall have conflict and war. But to say that conflict is inherent in the social order is vastly different from saying that it is innate in the universe, a curse laid on man. The social order is neither eternal nor immutable. It is at the most six generations old and it is subject to change. And any close historical analysis of the Far East demonstrates that war is not fated. It is made, and in the Far East its making is clearly traceable. Step by step the process is visible from the beginning to the stage it has now reached—just before the finished prod-

CAN WE PREVENT A FAR EASTERN WAR?

uct is ready. But if the making is traceable, so could prevention be charted.

The question of war, whether in the Far East or elsewhere, is part of the social dilemma: the rapid flow of production choked in the bottle-neck of old channels of distribution. The problem of war is inseparable from the social problem and subordinate to it. The motive of political aggression is economic expansion, and economic expansion is indispensable to social stability. Since all highly industrialized countries are in the same situation and have the same motivation, there is competitive aggression between nations. Conflict is inevitable. It can be prevented only by the elimination of the motive.

Concretely this means that it must no longer be essential to industrial and financial solvency that a surplus of capital and of goods be exported. While it may be practicable to limit the accumulation of mobile wealth it is not practicable to limit the production of goods, even if it were desirable. The alternative, then, is to consume the product of each nation's industrial mechanism at home. This is far from any doctrine of economic nationalism, economic self-sufficiency or "autarchy," in the day's slang. All of these are impracticable except as expedients in abnormal times. No nation can be self-sufficient except by a retrogression as marked as that which is caused by chronic depression. For the production of goods must be limited and the standard of living lowered for all except a small minority, and this would constitute a social revolution as thorough-going as any proposed by the officially

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

revolutionary parties. It would amount to a cultural revolution, for it would reject one of the fundamental tenets of the philosophy by which we have lived for a hundred years—the tenet that elevation of standard of living is progress. In any case economic self-sufficiency is unmanageable except by centralized supervision and control of all economic activity as stringent as that which is proposed by any revolutionary party. It would differ from the programs of the revolutionary parties only in that it would be centralized control to maintain the external appearances of the status quo. The walls of national self-sufficiency were razed by the first modern means of communication and transportation. They can never be reared again so long as those remain.

There is no practicable way to ensure absorption of unrestricted production at home except by a redistribution of wealth which will give the masses sufficient income to buy what is produced. It follows as a corollary that there must be collective control of finance, of production of goods, and of distribution of wealth. The production of goods must be allocated, even if not limited. And capital cannot be left free to accumulate a surplus which is used either in reinvestment in productive apparatus or exported as loans to foreign countries, there to constitute a vested interest which must be protected by armies and navies and which starts the whole self-defeating process again. In pure reason this might be feasible without interference with individual initiative, private property and profit, but all contemporary experience proves that it is not, that

CAN WE PREVENT A FAR EASTERN WAR?

there are no half-measures, desirable as those may be in that they would retail a less violent wrench of habit and instinct. All the evidence of recent years bears to the conclusion that only by socialization can we attain a proper balance between productivity and income, the balance by which alone we can avoid recurrent choice between economic stagnation and national aggression as an escape from stagnation. Private profit and a balanced economy have become mutually exclusive terms. Collectivization we are getting in any case. The process of collectivizing our economic activities began with the beginning of mass production. We are left to choose only whether there shall be concentrated control by small groups without public responsibility, with all the forces that make for war unchecked—the dominant group in each country using the strength of the whole nation against another country for the right to exploit still other countries—or social control in the name of the whole population, if for no other purpose than as insurance against war.

And this is the only insurance against war, whether in the Far East or elsewhere: to eliminate the cause—the cause of economic expansion, national aggression, imperialistic rivalry and war. In the Far East the cause is already in operation, and it has been gathering force and intensity year by year. Unless arrested, there is no reason to expect that it will not have the effect familiar in history. The climax may not be far off.

As it was in Europe in the years just preceding 1914, so is it now in Asia. By all historical analogy and from

MUST WE FIGHT IN ASIA?

the direction of all the forces in contemporary civilization there is no reason not to expect that it will be in Asia as it was in Europe in 1914. In 1919 the whole white world, appalled amid the ruins, wondered how 1914 had come about and why. Only one question concerning Asia matters now. Must there be the parallel of 1914 and must we wait until the parallel of 1919 to ask how it came about and why, and whether it could not have been prevented.

INDEX

- Abyssinia, Italian aggression, 224
 Africa, 31, 36, 55, 90, 105, 130,
 133, 210, 225, 233
 colonization, 6
 Allies, 44, 47, 55, 56, 110, 170
 in Siberia, 48
 Alsace-Lorraine, 209
 Amur River, 31
 Anglo-American-Japanese naval
 race, 216
 Anglo-French feud, 210, 211
 Anglo-Japanese alliance, 49
 Anglo-Russian rivalry, 147
 Asia. *See* Far East
 Asiatic Monroe Doctrine, 85, 150
 Asiatic unity, 206
 Austria, 4, 94
 Austrian Tyrol, 209

 Balkans of the East, 43
 Battle of the Concessions, 31, 164
 Belgium, 33
 Bosnia, 4, 209
 Boxer indemnity, 35
 Boxer Rebellion, 35, 41
 and the United States, 167
 British Malaya, 26, 136, 146
 Bryan, William J., 170, 174
 Burma, 31

 Canton, 28, 30, 58, 195
 Ceylon, 132
 Changchun (Hsinking), 42, 78, 79
 Chang Hsueh-liang, 67
 Chang Tso-lin, 67
 Ch'ien Lung, Emperor, 27
 China, 1, 2, 3, 25ff., 183ff.
 aggression on, 7, 9, 26, 27, 31,
 229
 by Japan, 2, 44, 45, 77, 213
 American residents in, 157

 China—(*Continued*)
 and League of Nations, 145
 and Soviet Russia, 56, 70
 alliance, 219
 anti-British feeling, 61
 anti-foreignism, 37, 60, 61, 64
 anti-Japanese feeling, 45, 48, 64,
 77, 205
 assimilation of conquerors, 207
 civil wars, 188, 200
 civilization, 185-190, 229, 230
 Communism, 58, 70, 71, 145,
 197-203
 cultural imperialism, 185
 culture, 38, 185-190
 customs supervision, 33, 34
 development of resources, 17, 18
 economic exploitation, 120, 122
 equality, 213
 exploitation, 229
 family, 188
 financial aggression, 32
 foreign concessions, 29, 217
 foreign market, 127
 foreign trade, 127, 195
 government of, 188, 196
 guilds, 188
 immigrants in Manchuria, 66,
 68, 118
 imperialism, 185
 industrial revolution, 190
 industrialization, 18, 19, 193,
 194, 195
 in Soviet-Japanese War, 144
 Japanese attack, 77, 145, 187
 Japanese boycott, 45, 48, 77
 Japanese defeat, 31
 Japanese domination, 89
 Japanese influence, 45
 loans, 32, 33, 46, 84, 85, 88,
 126, 195

INDEX

China—(*Continued*)

- market for Japan, 120
- militarism, 186
- modernization, 91, 186, 187
- nationalism, 37, 56, 58, 64, 66, 72, 73, 91, 95, 101, 173, 208, 216, 219, 220, 223
- Nationalist government, 67, 70, 196
- Open Door, 29
- opium question, 28, 31
- pacifism, 183
- partition of, 164
- patriotism, 185
- politics, 204
- population, 8, 186, 208
- post-office supervision, 33
- railway rights in Manchuria, 69
- railways, 33, 68, 169
- recognition of Soviet Russia, 59
- reconstruction, 187
- republic, 57, 187
- self-determination, 51
- sovereignty, 34, 50
- tariff control, 30, 34, 38, 59, 61, 67, 217, 221
- territorial integrity, 50, 170, 174, 218
- textile market, 16
- treaty obligations, 69
- uprisings, 56
- war with England in 1842, 29 in 1856, 30
- war with France in 1856, 30
- war with Japan in 1894, 39
- Chinese Communist Party, 70, 198
- Chinese Eastern Railway, 33, 41, 57, 65, 68, 69, 71, 98, 138, 139
- Civil War, U. S., 161
- Civil wars, 188, 200
- Collectivization, 234, 235
- Colonization, 6
- Commercial Powers, 159, 160
- Communism in China, 58, 70, 71, 145, 197-203
- Confucian education, 190
- Cotton goods, exports, 16, 132
- machinery, 14
- Cuba, 55, 163
- Daimyo, 112
- Dairen, 42, 65, 69, 75, 79, 80
- Dalny, 42
- Depression, 5, 7, 9, 129, 191, 233
- Disarmament, 4, 5
- Dollar diplomacy, 169
- Dutch East Indies, 26, 133, 146
- East Africa, 133
- Eastern Asia. *See* Far East
- Eastern Inner Mongolia, 81
- Eastern Siberia, 138
- Economic depression, 5, 7, 9, 129, 191, 233
- Economic expansion, 6
- Economic exploitation, 3, 120, 122
- Economic self-sufficiency, 233
- Economic system, 232
- Egypt, 33, 53
 - nationalism, 223
 - uprisings, 56
- Embargoes, 128
- Empires, 6, 9, 120, 223
 - destruction of, 227
 - goal of, 226
- Entente Cordiale, 210
- Europe, aggression in the Far East, 159
 - balance of power, 4
 - causes of war, 209
 - disarmament, 4
 - effects of World War, 91
 - expansion, 36
 - industrial expansion, 16
 - trade in China, 85
- Extra-territoriality, 30, 38, 61, 67, 96, 217, 221
- Family, 188
- Far East, 25, 26, 140, 150
 - American interests, 157

INDEX

Far East—(*Continued*)

- causes of war, 212
- colonization, 6
- foreign market, 231
- Japanese hegemony, 2, 83, 84, 88, 104, 119, 122, 135
- Far Eastern Republic, 49
- Fascism, 190
- Fashoda, 210
- Feudalism, 11, 20, 39, 63, 111
- Fillmore, Millard, 160, 163, 179
- Finance imperialism, 6
- Financial control in Manchukuo, 125
 - in North China, 125
- Financial invasion of China, 32
- Fish, Hamilton, Jr., 201
- Foreign concessions, 29, 34, 59, 61, 67, 217
- Foreign markets, 3, 6, 128
- Foreign trade, 8, 19, 179
 - in China, 127
 - in Manchukuo, 123
- Formosa, 39
 - ceded to Japan, 40
 - Japanese colonists, 118
- Formosans, 14
- Fourteen Points, 55
- France, 92, 94
 - and Soviet-Japanese conflict, 147
 - Chinese loans, 33
 - foreign policy, 147
 - in China, 32
 - War in 1856, 30
 - Liaotung Peninsula, 40
 - naval reduction, 50
- Franco-German feud, 210
- French Indo-China, 31, 146, 147
- Fusan, 42
- German-Japanese alliance, 148, 149
- Germany, 92, 94
 - and Bolshevik regime, 48
 - and the Open Door, 165
 - Chinese loans, 33
 - Chinese possessions, 47, 48, 170

Germany—(*Continued*)

- imports, 16
- in Africa, 210
- in China, 31
- in the East, 7, 210
- Liaotung Peninsula, 40
- Shantung rights, 44
- Tsingtao lease, 41, 44
- Great Britain, 3, 6, 92
 - and Soviet-Japanese conflict, 147, 151
 - and the Open Door, 165
 - Chinese concessions, 30
 - Chinese loans, 33
 - commercial supremacy, 132
 - Empire, 136
 - in China, 31, 32, 61
 - War in 1842, 29
 - War in 1856, 30
 - in the East, 7
 - naval reduction, 50
 - opium question, 28
 - opposition to Japan, 136
 - textile trade, 16
 - in India, 4, 5
 - trade routes, 136
 - trade supremacy, 14, 210
- Great Wall, 67, 69, 81, 82
- Guild, 188
- Hankow, 195, 218, 219
 - British Concession, 60
- Hawaii, 53, 159, 163
- Herzegovina, 4, 209
- Hongkong, 136, 151, 219
 - ceded to England, 29
- Hoover, Herbert, 160, 178, 201
- Hsinking (Changchun), 42, 78, 79
- Hulutao, 69
- Hungary, 4, 94
- Imperialism, 6, 31, 59, 121, 222, 223
 - self-defeating, 229
- India, 53, 55, 89, 99, 132, 136, 146

INDEX

India—(*Continued*)

- civilization, 230
- industrialization, 19
- nationalism, 223, 224
- opium in, 28
- self-determination, 51
- textile market, 4, 5
- uprisings, 56
- Indo-China, 151
- Industrial revolution, 5, 190, 229
- Inner Mongolia, 44, 81, 100
- International law, 167
- International relations and foreign markets, 128
- International trade agreements, 4
- Italy, Abyssinia aggression, 224
- naval reduction, 50

Japan, 11ff., 73ff.

- aggression, 2, 9
- in China, 44, 45, 77, 213
- and League of Nations, 25, 26, 74-85, 97, 155
- withdrawal, 83, 87, 88, 156
- and the World War, 44
- a world Power, 8, 11
- army, 12, 112, 113
- attack on Shanghai, 77, 145, 187
- boycott in China, 45, 48, 77
- colonists, 118
- culture, 8, 38, 110
- empire, 12, 86
- expansion, 25
- exports, 23, 130
- Far Eastern policy, 7, 62, 151, 213
- feudalism, 11, 20, 39, 63, 111
- abolished, 20
- foreign markets, 23, 129
- geographic distribution, 132
- government, 1867, 20
- expenditure, 106
- immigration barrier, 110, 172
- imperialism, 111
- industrialization, 8, 19, 20, 105, 117, 119

Japan—(*Continued*)

- in Siberia, 48
- in South Manchuria, 43, 168
- investment in Manchuria, 66
- Jehol conquest, 43, 81, 82, 99, 101
- labor, 130
- liberalism, 108, 114, 115, 116
- loans to China, 46, 84, 85
- Manchurian conquest, 2, 3, 4, 5, 15, 25, 42, 43, 73, 74, 87, 89, 97-100, 173, 219
- American opposition, 155
- market for West, 22
- militarists, 65, 67, 75, 108, 111, 114, 121, 143, 172, 214, 221
- military tradition, 39
- modernization, 14, 20
- national debt, 107
- national psychology, 109
- nationalism, 110
- natural resources, 117
- naval equality, 154
- naval reduction, 50
- navy, 12, 112, 113, 134
- Open Door, 19, 38, 122
- opposition to Western Powers, 129
- patriotism, 111
- population, 118
- racial equality, 110
- textile exports, 132, 133
- trade invasion, 130, 131, 132
- war with China in 1894, 39
- war with Russia in 1902, 27, 42, 46, 51, 67, 139
- warning to Powers, 83-86
- Westernization, 20, 117
- Japan Sea, 140, 143
- Japanese-American conflict, 152, 154
- Japanese-Chinese alliance, 203
- Japanese Emperor, 20
- Divinity of, 110
- Japanese-German alliance, 148, 149

INDEX

- Japanese Spokesman's Statement, 83-87, 97, 126, 225
 - protest by Powers, 86
- Java, 89, 151
- Jeanne d'Arc, 210, 211
- Jehol, 43, 81, 82, 99, 102
- Joffe, 70
- Kamchatka, 150
- K'ang Hsi, Emperor, 27
- Kellogg Pact, 81, 86, 94, 164, 173, 177
- Kenya, 133
- Kiaochao Peninsula, 171, 216
- Kipling, Rudyard, 15
- Kitchener, 210
- Knox, Philander C., 168, 169
- Korea, 39, 40, 41, 42, 89, 97, 137, 167
 - annexed by Japan, 43
 - independence, 40
 - Japanese colonists, 118
 - uprisings, 56
- Koreans, 14
 - in Manchuria, 74
- Kuomintang, 57, 58, 59
- Lake Baikal, 138, 142, 150
- Lancashire, 132
- Lansing-Ishii Agreement, 88
- Latin America, 105, 130, 133, 225
- League of Nations, 69
 - and China, 145
 - and Japan, 25, 26, 74-85, 97, 155
 - withdrawal, 83, 87, 88, 156
 - Covenant, 81, 94, 173
 - future of, 4
 - Lytton Commission, 73, 77, 79, 82, 83, 97
 - Manchuria problem, 74-85, 88, 108, 173
- Lenin, 202
- Liaotung Peninsula, 40, 41, 42, 44, 80
- Liberalism, 108, 114, 115, 116
- Little Entente, 94
- Loans to China, 32, 33, 46, 84, 85, 88, 126, 195
- Lytton Commission, 73, 77, 79, 82
- Lytton Report, 80, 81, 83, 97
- Machine civilization, 5, 24
- Malaya, 26, 89, 130, 136, 146, 151
- Manchukuo, 3, 78, 79, 80, 81, 123, 137, 140, 224
 - financial control, 125
 - foreign trade control, 123
 - government, 97
 - Japanese control, 25, 87, 89, 97-100
 - Open Door, 123
 - natural resources, 98
 - Protocol, 80
 - public utilities, 98
 - railways, 33, 68, 98, 168
 - recognition by U. S., 97, 175
- Manchuria, 3, 15, 40, 41, 42, 64, 67, 73-86, 138, 140
 - Chinese colonists, 66, 68, 118
 - government expenditure, 106
 - Japanese colonists, 118
 - Japanese control, 2, 3, 4, 5, 15, 25, 42, 43, 73, 74, 87, 89, 97-100, 173, 219
 - railways, 33, 68, 98, 168
- Manchus, 100, 207
- Mandarins, 188
- Manila, 151
- Marchand, 210
- Marx, Karl, 201
- McKinley, William, 163, 178
- Mellon, Andrew W., 201
- Middle East, 35
- Mills, Ogden L., 201
- Missionaries, 31, 54
- Mongolia, 25, 99
- Mongols, 100, 207
- Monroe Doctrine, 94, 225
- Morocco, 4
 - nationalism, 223

INDEX

- Most-favored-nation treaties, 30, 161
- Mukden, 2, 74, 79
- Muto, General, 80
- Myth of white superiority, 13, 52
- Nanking Government, 67, 196
- Nationalism, 37, 54, 58, 91, 101, 134, 146, 223
- Nationalist Government, 67, 70, 196
- Naval agreement, 50
- Naval equality, 5, 134, 154
- Naval negotiations, 1934, 154
- Naval race, 3, 49, 155, 216
- Near East, 31, 36, 55, 90
- Netherlands, 133
- Nine-Power Treaty, 50, 81
- Nishihara loans, 46
- North Africa, 224
- North China, 15, 81, 82, 101, 167
 - financial control, 125
 - foreign trade control, 123
- North Manchuria, 33, 41, 43, 65, 71, 138, 140
- Northeastern Asia, 10, 99, 140, 141
- Open Door, 29, 30, 164, 165, 166, 170, 174, 177
 - in Japan, 19, 38, 122
 - in Manchukuo, 123
- Opium, 28
 - legalized in China, 31
- Opportunism, 204
- Outer Mongolia, 100, 140
- Peiping, 80, 81, 82, 102
- Peking, 46, 48, 66, 79, 88, 219
 - legations, 30, 35
- Perry, Commodore, 19
- Philippines, 26, 55, 89, 146, 151, 158, 161, 163, 165
- Polish Corridor, 209
- Population, of China, 8, 186, 208
 - of Japan, 118
- Port Arthur, 42, 65
- Porto Rico, 165
- Portsmouth Peace Conference, 42, 43, 44, 168
- Portsmouth, Treaty of, 42, 43, 44, 168
- Power-machine industrialism, 128
- Profit-taking imperialism, 6
- Propaganda, of Soviet Russia, 150
 - of the West, 52
- Pu-Yi, Henry, 78, 79, 100
- Racial equality, 110
- Railway politics, 68
- Railways, in China, 33, 68, 169
 - concessions, 33
 - in Manchuria, 33, 68, 98, 168
- Raw materials, 7, 9, 36
- Reconstruction Period, U. S., 162
- Reformism, 203
- Roosevelt, Theodore, 168
- Russia, 31
 - and the Boxer Rebellion, 167
 - and the Open Door, 165
 - Chinese loans, 33
 - in China, 31, 32
 - in Manchuria, 40, 167
 - in North Manchuria, 43
 - Liaotung Peninsula, 40, 41
- Russia, Soviet, 48, 92, 136
 - and Chinese Communism, 202
 - and Kuomintang, 58
 - in Manchuria, 69, 76
 - in Siberia, 122
 - in the Far East, 3, 56
 - opposition to Japan, 136, 137, 139
 - propaganda, 150
 - recognition by U. S., 175
- Russo-Japanese alliance, 43, 168
- Russo-Japanese War, 27, 42, 46, 51, 67, 139
- Samurai, code of, 39, 113
- Sandwich Islands, 159
- Self-determination, 54, 55

INDEX

- Seoul, 74
- Shanghai, 195, 218, 219
 - Japanese attack, 77, 145, 187
- Shantung Province, 44, 47, 48, 49, 170, 171
- Shogun, 20
- Siberia, 3, 26, 31, 43, 48, 77, 88, 101, 122, 137, 143, 216
 - evacuation of, 50
 - Russian tenure, 140
- Singapore, 136, 151
- Six-Power Consortium, 169
- Social Order, Western, 232
- Socialization, 234, 235
- South Africa, 133
- South Manchuria, 2, 41, 42, 43, 44, 65, 73, 168, 170
- South Manchuria Railway, 44, 65, 69, 75, 98, 139
 - tracks destroyed, 74, 103
- Soviet Russia. *See* Russia, Soviet
- Spanish-American War, 163
- Spheres of influence, 7, 33, 217
- Stimson, Henry L., 160, 174
- Stimson Doctrine, 174, 177
- Straits Settlements, 132
- Sudan, 210
- Sumatra, 151
- Sun Yat-sen, 57, 70
- Surplus capital investment, 7, 17, 169
- Syria, nationalism, 223
 - uprisings, 56
- Taft, William Howard, 169
- Tariff autonomy, 61
- Tariff control, 30, 34, 38, 59, 61, 67, 217, 221
- Tariffs, 4, 128, 133
- Tartars, 207
- Taylor, Zachary, 159, 163
- Technological unemployment, 230
- Technology, 13, 24
- Textile machinery, 14
- Textile markets, 4, 5
- Textile trade, 14, 132
- Tibet, 150
- Tientsin, 30, 79, 102, 195, 218, 219
- Tokyo, 19, 46
- Trade agreements, 4
- Trade imperialism, 6
- Trade rights, 3, 166
- Trade war, 29
- Trans-Siberia Railway, 41
- Treaty of 1842, 29
- Treaty rights, 170, 174
- Tsingtao, 41, 44, 47, 88
 - retrocession to China, 50
- Tunis, 224
- Turkey, 33, 53
 - nationalism, 223
 - uprisings, 56
- Twenty-one Demands, 44, 45, 47, 88, 170, 171
- Uganda, 133
- Unequal treaties, 59
- United States, 3, 92, 94
 - aggression in the Far East, 158, 163
 - and Japan, opposition to, 43, 136, 152, 154, 155, 168, 171, 173
 - and Manchukuo, protest, 155
 - recognition, 155, 175
 - and Manchuria, 108, 155, 173
 - and Shantung settlement, 48
 - and Soviet-Japanese conflict, 151
 - and the Boxer Rebellion, 167
 - and the Open Door, 165
 - in Japan, 11
 - Chinese concessions, 30, 218
 - economic expansion, 36, 179
 - entry in World War, 170
 - foreign investment, 216
 - in China, 127
 - in Far East, 157
 - foreign trade, 216
 - in China, 30, 218
 - exports, 179

INDEX

- United States—(*Continued*)
 in China—(*Continued*)
 investment, 127
 trade, 85, 157
 treaty rights, 174
 in Siberia, 48
 Japanese immigrants barred, 110,
 172
 market for Europe, 22
 naval reduction, 50
 opposition to Twenty-one De-
 mands, 171
- Versailles Conference, 47, 55, 56,
 94, 95, 171, 216
- Versailles, Treaty of, 47, 55, 56,
 94, 95, 171, 216
- Vladivostok, 41, 101, 137, 140
- War, causes of, 2, 209, 232, 235
 insurance against, 235
- Washington Conference, 47, 49, 51,
 56, 81, 88, 95, 171, 215,
 220
- Webster, Daniel, 159, 163
- West, civilization, 36, 192
 in Asia, 53
 economic system, 232
 industrial revolution, 5, 191,
 229
 propaganda, 52
 social order, 232
- Western conquest, 13
- Western Empires, 133
- Western imperialism, 31, 222, 223
- Western Powers, affected by Japan,
 21
 alliances, 148
 and Soviet-Japanese conflict, 151
 attitude on Manchuria, 96
 expansion, 5, 36
 exploitation of Asia, 122
 in China, 9, 27, 50, 90, 164,
 212
 investment, 17
 loans, 32, 33
- Japanese warning on China, 83-
 86
- protest on Spokesman's State-
 ment, 86
- vested interests in Far East, 2,
 127
- White superiority, 13, 52
- Wilson, Woodrow, 55, 178
- World War, 4, 5, 7, 9, 22, 23, 44,
 46, 52, 54, 88, 91, 104,
 170, 212
 effect in the Far East, 47, 170
- Yangtze River, 102, 150
- Yedo, 19
- Yellow Peril, 130, 181, 206
- Yellow River, 102

